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ABSTRACT
The main subject of this thesis is the development project
process and the differences in project organizational systems in
different environments. Through the case study of the Toyota
Kentucky (KY) Project and three other comparable projects, Nissan
Smyrna (Tennessee), Toyota Tahara (Japan), and Fuji Gunma
(Japan), the differences in project development systems between
Japan and the U.S. are examined. It is found that the American
development environment is more flexible and dynamic, especially
because of the possibility of a fast-track program, than the
Japanese environment.
Specifically, differences and similarities in the project
organizational systems, such as, traditional, design-build, and
construction management, between the two countries are studied.
A framework of the project organizational systems is built and
used to analyze the project organizations in the four automotive
plant projects as well as to define the differences and
similarities between the two countries. The influence on the
project organization of a fast-track program to achieve the
shortest possible project duration time is examined in the Toyota
KY Project. For the base of the analysis of the four project
organizational systems, a theoretical model developed by Minden
is used and its validity is simultaneously evaluated by the
applicability to the projects. Additionally, the organizations
of the client (Toyota Motor Corporation) and the design-builder
(Ohbayashi Corporation) for the Toyota KY Project are analyzed.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Bernard J. Frieden
Title: Professor of City Planning
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INTRODCTION
The meeting of two different cultures is a significant
character of the Toyota Kentucky (KY) Project, the first $800
million direct investment in the U.S. by Toyota Motor Corporation
(TMC/Toyota), the biggest Japanese automobile manufacturer. The
main subject of this thesis is the development project process
and the differences in organizational systems in different
environments. Toyota is trying to build a Toyota style auto-
plant, with Japanese management leadership applying the Toyota
Total Quality Control (TQC) system to the construction using a
Japanese construction manager, Ohbayashi Corporation (OHB), and
using American general and sub contractors in the U.S.
This thesis analyzes this project as a core case study
examining the following questions:
1) What are the differences in the development process and
organizational system for an automotive plant construction in
Japan and in the U.S.?
2) What kind of project organizational system (including project
members' internal organization) do TMC and OHB build to cope- with
uncertainties, such as many change orders caused by a fast-track
program?
3) What kind of conceptual model and design methodology of
project organizational systems should be used or developed for
future projects?
In addition to these main questions, TMC and OHB's learning
process in the new business environment, and the difficulties of
technology transfer in the construction industry are
9
cupple: I cent a Iy eai' ned. e- F i na. l the thesis an, a lyes seeveralc
alternative trategiec empoyoed by vIl and HB to man c ae
uncertai ntie in the new environment.
Special coharacteritics of the core case, the Tovota
Ktky Project, are as follows:
1) This i the first indi-vidual di rect inves.tment into the U.S.
by the Toyota Iotor Corooration; 2) The Ohbavashi. Corporation,
one of the Bi g Five Japanese Cengi reer in cocntractors, manages the
project Lsino the fst-trac.k program cs a c:nstruction manager by
tLlrnkl::ev contract wit h Toyota 3) Toyota will get more than or
eCla to 125 m i ion in i aid -From K.:entuc ki.y qovernment for $900
milion ar-id 200000 cr r y i -Far plant; 4) Toyota and Ohbvasihi
made a project agrcement () with AFL-CIO construc:tion labor
un:i on durino the construction.
This c thes is analyzes thhe Toyota KY Project as of the end of
January 1937. though the project i still under conlstructio:4n.
Because the "A was off i i ca isvcigqned on the beginni ng of D)ecemriber
198. the :i mpact of the PA) i s- not S.tud i ed i n the thei s...
lthouLh the complete anli: of 1abor r el aion in the proj cct
i S out of the f cuE of th t h . c. the ieSccr i pt. i on of i mpIrt ant
events . ab:::oL.t labor rel cat i on.s and t he ir infli..enc:e on the projiect
wi b e nresceItc: ed
New" c-Ocets for TMC and OHiB as.sociatedc w it h t.he pr oj ec t
are those such as the 4 ast--track program, cost-plu-fe contract
:construction manaement, turnk:y c:ontract, tate i ncenti ves for
the proiject site,, and labor reiations includino thOsie wiith AFL-
CIO. The Japanece dcision making ystem , lon t eI- m r el at ion ship
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between clients and contractors, and TQC program are unusual
factors in the American construction industry.
Comparative studies using the Nissan Smyrna Project, the
Toyota Tahara Project, and the Fuji Gunma Project will be done to
find answers to the main questions. The Toyota Tahara project
would be an ideal comparable project in Japan with the Toyota KY
Project because they have many common factors, such as building
type, client, and prime contractor. Therefore, the difference
between the U.S. and Japan's development process and organization
will be extracted. The Fuji Gunma Project will be used to check
special features of Toyota's methods for its construction by
comparing the project with the Toyota Tahara Project. This
comparison will be important to define the Japanese style of
development process and organization for automotive plant
construction.
The Nissan Smyrna Project would be an ideal project for the
comparison of the Toyota KY Project in order to examine the
differences between the TMC's strategy and Nissan's in regard to
risky projects. These two projects also have many similar
points: the clients, Toyota and Nissan, are the two largest
Japanese international car manufacturers; both projects are the
first large direct investment in the U.S. by Toyota and Nissan;
the location of each project is in the mid-South, Kentucky and
Tennessee; the project manager, Robert B. Jordan, working for
Ohbayashi in Toyota KY was the project manager for Daniel
Construction in the Nissan Smyrna Project. Therefore, special
features or roles of Ohbayashi in the Toyota KY Project will be
11
etr acte(j by the compar iso:r of Toy'ota KY with the Nissan 3Irvyrna
Prjcl I ect
Tabl e 1 s -1 umnmar i es the pr o ects and t h e d i 4'ff I e Iricc-s of the
most i mportant factors. The di fferences; in each devel opment
process a nd organi Zati on w i be ep1 ai ned frai nl b the
differences bet ween t hese i mportant factors sho..twn above the
dcuble horiz-ontal li nes. Factors belov the double horiZontal
liie will be analvzed in Chapter 4 and 5.
Thu1h T' s pol i cy for the pro I ect may w el l be to use STC
traditional methods for its plant const.ructi on in Japan as much
as ossible., many factors of the development orocess and
organi zati on seem to contradict the policy, such as the use of a
fast-track rgram and a cost-p-olus--fee contract wivth OHB and
ceneral con tractors. They are undesirable for TMC beciusi:e the
fast-track needs instant decisions and marv change orders during
the conStruc:tion stace. Namely, TMC uSes a giroup decisiion ystem
to analye var ious factors- of probl ems, and :is not used to quiCk
dc i ci on mak: i n .. Further, the c ost -pl us-fee cont r act does not
guarant the f inal pajroicct cost for TMC and manv chancie or ders
i nC rea' the uncertai ntv of the ffinal coS.t r. Moreover . the
necesity of -fle1xibility of a bae desig pln ilan in the ast-track
procram c e 1t rime.s c ontr ad i :tsi= i nt.ensi ve use of value eng i neer i no
as a oart of TMC s TQCU procgram, because excessive us o.fV . L.e
ngineering tends to el i mi nate spare space or the posi bsibility of
future changes.
TMc s short constructi c:'n schedul e, probab v due to the
urnc er t ai nty of the future c omp act c ar m11ar k et in the U. .. . creates
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TAB 1- PR O EC 1 AND DI FFERENCES OF 'Ol0ST I MF O RT ANT FACTORS
PRO JECTC i-TYOT A NISSANr TOY OTA FU J I
T 5 KENTUCKY SMYRNfNA TAHARA GUNMA
LOCAT 1IN U. SU. JAPAN JAAN
NAT I ONAL~ Y JAPANESE AMEiR ICAN A JAPANESE 1APANE
CLIEN 1T, TYOTA YES NO YES NO
PRIMEl C'ONTRACTFOR, fOH BA YASHI DAN IEL OHBAYASHI OHBAYASHI
STAZF NOTIONALTY Ame.': Jap. Ame. Jap. Jap.
(OHBAYASHI) TOYOTA (FUJI)
A E GIFFLES KAHN (OHBAYASHI) OHBAYASHI
PROJ ECT SIZE
(FLO:R AREA) 370, 000 SM 00, C) SM 73 000 SM 30, 000 SM
USI) SS
RELA' T ONSHIPS LONG TERM SHORT TERM LONG TERM LONG TERM
CLIENT &< CONTRACTOR!
(MONTH) (PLAN) (BUILDING) (BUILDING)
CONTFUCTION PERIOD (20) 22 11 6
CONE -UCTION METHOD PHASED PHASED TRADITIONAL TRiD I TIONAL
(FAST TRACK<I) (FAST TRACK::)
PROJ CT DES I GN- Cc)nt r ac tor TRD IT I ONAL DESIGN-UILD
ORGA"C IZ(AT ION MlANAGE Const. Mngt. (OWNER S
(TRUNKEY) 'A/E)
CONT CT TYPE COST PLUS COS T PLUS LUMP SUM LUMP SUM
.L IE' < PRM. CONT. FEE FEE
METHED TO SELECT :NEGOTIATION NEGOTIATION SELECTIVE SELECTIVE
PRIME CONTRACTOR BIDDING BIDDING
SELFE DERFORM BY NO Y YEYES YES
F'RTK CONTRACTOR (:TRUCTURAL (TEMFORARY (TEMFORARY
FRAME WORKS) WORKS) WORKS)
LAPBD RELiATIONS MERI T SHOP MFIT SHOPF MULTI--LAYER MULTI--LAYER
TO (OPEN SHOP) SB- SUB-
CLOSED SHOP CONTFCT I NG CONTRACT I NG
TOTA QUALITY YES NO YES NO
CONT ~LD ( T QC)
I N C 1STRUCT I ON
INCE YTIVES FOR $125 mi $19 mil n.a. ni.
CLI. EJ5 BY STATES
those undesirable factors unintentionally because the schedule
requires the fast-track program, which needs the cost-plus-fee
contract.
The separation of the construction management function from
the use of the company's own forces (self performance of
construction) is OHB's decision based on the policy and capacity,
but the decision basically fits TMC's strategy which employs a
turnkey contract with OHB. OHB tries to distribute the project
to many American contractors to avoid unnecessary blame for new
trade friction in the construction industry, and OHB does not
have enough Japanese staff to use self performance in addition to
construction management.
KY's incentives for TMC have influenced the strong reaction
by the AFL-CIO (construction union) against TMC and OHB because
they try to use local workers (75"4 non-union) regardless of the
workers' labor relations rather than only union contractors.
This is based on the local business conventions and probably is
based on the best effort base agreement between TMC and KY.
The difficulties of the implementation of TMC's Total
Quality Control program on the American construction system, and
the difficulties of American managers' associating with TMC's
Japanese-style group decision process show the difference in
business conventions and the potential difficulties for American
contractor's entry to the Japanese construction market.
There are many variables that affect a development process
and organization in a development project; building type, project
size (physically or monetary), construction schedule, location,
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and contract type are important variables, as are the
participants in a project, such as a client, a state or local
government, an architect and engineer (A/E), a construction
manager, a general contractor, subcontractors, and labor union.
Environmental conditions around the project are important ,too,
such as political, legal, economical, social conditions, and
business conventions.
To be more specific, differences and similarities of
construction management or project procurement methods between
Japan arid the U.S. will be studied. Despite many text books and
articles about construction management, they do not have a
rational general theory of the selection for an optimal
procurement method, and each author sets his/her individual
definition or terminology of alternative project management
methods, such as construction management and design-build.
Similarly, although there are many studies about technology
transfer of construction in the broad transfer of the development
process in the context of the developing areas, there is almost
no study about technology transfer (including management systems)
of development process in developed countries. Because of the
popularity and explicitness, Barrie and Paulson's Professional
1
Construction Management is used as the text book to define
alternative construction management methodologies. Based on
B&<P's definition, the author develops a framework of project
organizational systems in a triangular shape in Figure 4-1-3.
For a theoretical framework, Minden's procurement decision making
38
model is employed to define theoretically optimal project
15
organizational systems of the four automotive plant projects
because of this is probably the first and firm attempt to develop
a theoretical procurement methodology. At the same time,
applying the decision making model for the four automotive
projects, the validity of the model will be evaluated.
Additionally for a framework for organizational analysis of
TMC and OHB for the Toyota KY Project, the concepts built by
9
Mintzberg, Bronfman Professor of Management Policy at McGill
University is used. This theory provides a framework for the
classification of organizations and for defining independent
variables known as contingency factors, to change or formulate
27
organizational structure. Irwig's summary of Mintzberg's
framework is used to show the results of the analysis of TMC and
OHB's organization for the Toyota KY Project on Irwig's pentagon
diagram after Mintzberg.
Finally, the strategy of TMC and OHB for the project to cope
with uncertainties is analyzed. Several alternatives of the
actual strategy are examined.
The thesis structure is as follows:
Chapter 2: Background information of the project. This chapter
includes four sections. The first section presents historical
background on the economic and political situation of Japan and
the U.S. The second section describes the history of OHB in the
U.S. The third section presents an outline and the history of
TMC. The last section describes three projects comparable with
the Toyota KY Project: Toyota Tahara, Fuji Gunma, and Nissan
Smyrna, are explained respectively.
16
Chapter 3: Toyota Kentucky Project. This chapter includes a
project summary, development process and schedule, and project
organization. The project summary presents important factors
used to describe the project outline. The development process
and schedule section presents a detailed description of events on
each development stage and the possible reasoning of these
events. The project organization section describes the
organizational structure and contract types of the project, and
explanation of OHB's organization of the project.
Chapter 4: Alternative procurement methods/project organizational
systems (including classification of the four automotive plant
projects). A new framework of project organizational systems is
presented. Alternative procurement methods comparing Barrie and
1 38
Paulson's definition and Minden's one are explained here. The
four automotive plant project organizations will be classified in
the framework.
Chapter 5: Evaluation of the development process and the project
organizational systems of the Toyota KY Project. The development
project process and the organizational systems of the Toyota KY
Project are analyzed. Differences between Japan and the U.S.
about these points and the strategies employed by TMC and OHB are
studied. Several alternative strategies employed by TMC and OHB
to manage uncertainties in the new environment are examined to
define possibly the optimal procurement methodology for TMC and
OHB. Comparative studies using the Nissan Smyrna, Toyota Tahara,
and Fuji Gunma projects, are used to find these answers.
Chapter 6: Conclusions and Further Research.
17
2. Back groumd infatrnation of Toyota Kentucky Project
This section includes on account of the general economic
situation between Japan and the U.S. in projects comparable with
the Toyota KY Projects. The first part explains the brief
history of trade friction between Japan and the U.S., Japanese
direct investment, and Japanese international contractors
operations. The next part describe the outline and history of
the Ohbayashi Corp. in the U.S. Then, an outline of the history
of the Toyota Motor Corp. will be explained. Finally, three
projects, Toyota Tahara, Fuji Gunma, and Nissan Smyrna, will be
described. These projects will be compared with the Toyota KY
Projects in section four.
2-1 Trade friction, Japanese direct investment, and Japanese
inter-national contractors.
Special features of the Toyota KY Project and the scarcity
of the study about transfer of development process between
developed countries will definitely support the importance of the
thesis. The Toyota KY Project is a symbolic event in the context
of the current relationship between the U.S. and Japanese
industry. At the same time, the project is a symbol of the rapid
increase of the share by Japanese international engineering
construction companies in the U.S.
Trade friction between the U.S. and Japan is classified into
three periods: the first period was 1971 to 1972; the second
period was 1976 to 1978; the third period is 1981 to date.
Special features of the third period is the sophistication of the
18
items that cause the trade friction. In the first period, the
textile industry was the major problem. Then in the second
period, the steel industry was discussed. Now the items are
expanded to automobiles, color televisions, semiconductors and
financial services.
Japanese direct investment overseas is related to trade
friction. The first period of the direct investment boom was
1972 to 1973. At this time, mostly the manufacturing industry
invested in developing areas, such as Asia and South America.
Only trading and financial service industries invested in
developed countries. In 1973, the investment yielded $3.5
billion due to the favorable environment for the direct
investment because of the scarcity of the domestic (Japanese)
labor supply and the strong yen created by the "Nixon shock."
Backed up this environment, the textile industry and some
electric manufacturers invested in South east Asia and other
areas. But on the other hand, Japanese manufactures were not
strong enough to go to developed countries, such as the U.S. and
Europe. The second direct investment boom, begun since 1980, has
been accelerated by the strong yen against U.S. dollar. Compared
with the first period, the contents of the investment and the
target areas are very different. The transport machine,
electric, and mechanical industry have increased their share.
Especially, in VTRs, semi-conductors, computers, and
communication devices, which Japan has a technical advantage, are
increasing. In the automobile industry, after Honda and Nissan,
Toyota decided to invest in the U.S. Mazda, Mitsubishi, Fuji,
19
and ISuZu are following, too.
Because of the slow economic growth in Japan and the
economic slump in developing countries, the Japanese construction
industry has recently turned their target to the direct
investment by Japanese corporations in developed countries. The
U.S. has become the most attractive market for them. The total
contract amount overseas in 1985 was 11 billion yen which was 10
% more than in 1984. This total includes direct contract by
Japanese contractors and their overseas subsidiaries. Contracts
by the overseas subsidiaries have been increasing every year
8
since 1979.
Figure 1-1 shows the market trend of the international
construction market and the share of Japanese contractors in it.
Figure 1-2 shows where the Top 250 international contractors won
foreign contracts. These graphs indicate the declining market
of the Middle East and Asia, and the relatively steady market of
North America. The increasing share of Japanese contractors is
not still significant but it appears stable compared with the big
ups and downs of the whole market.
Figure 1-3 shows 13 years trend of Japanese contractors'
overseas operations. It shows rapid expansion of international
operations by Japanese contractors in this decade.
The regional share of the contract is changing. While the
share of Asia has shrunk drastically, North America, Europe, and
Pacific region are increasing and occupy 46% of the total
overseas contract. The top five countries are as follows:
1) The U.S. except Hawaii, 199 billion yen;
20
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2) Australia, 176 billion yen;
3) Hongkong, 106 billion yen;
4) Singapore, 86 billion yen;
5) Hawaii, 77 billion yen.
Figure 1-4 shows the recent change of major international market
for Japanese contractors.
Figure 1-5 shows the recent trend of overseas operations by
the Japanese Big Five contractors plus Kumagai-gumi. Kumagai-
gumi has extended its business drastically, and the Big Five seem
to be starting new steps in the international market.
The Japan's ministry of Construction explains that the
reason for the decline of contract share of Asia for Japanese
contractors from 59% in 84 to 36% in '85 is due to the inactive
economy of ASEAN (Association in South East Asian Nations) and
the decrease of new projects. The reason for the increase of
contract share in the U.S. and Australia for Japanese contractors
is the increase of Japanese plants and offices in the U.S.
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associated with the direct investment by Japanese corporations.
Additionally, the rapid increase of real estate development by
Japanese contractors in the U.S. and Australia is another reason
for the increased share in these areas for Japanese contractors.
The Ministry of Construction forecasts that the U.S. and
Australia will continue to be major overseas markets for Japanese
contractors.
Reaction by the U.S. against the current increase of
Japanese contractors' operations in the U.S. has begun to change
gradually. Because of the imbalance in contracts between
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Japanese contractors in the U.S. and American contractors in
Japan, the U.S. government has asked Japan to open up its
construction market. Japanese contractors got 280 billion yen in
the U.S. market, but on the other hand, American contractors got
nothing in '85. The Kansai International Airport Project is the
first target by the U.S. government. Though there is little
visible movement in the Japanese government, Japan has a new
potential problem in the construction industry in 1986.
Topics about Japanese contractors in the U.S. have recently
appeared both in professional construction magazines such as
Engineerinq News record and national newspapers in the U.S.
Engineering News Record, Sep. 20, '84, reports the recent rush of
Japanese contractors into the U.S. market comparing it with the
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previous Canadian movements. It explains the attractiveness of
the U.S. market as much space, political stability, relatively
loose restriction. The magazine describes the general situation
for Japanese international contractors and states their
activities as contractor developers in the U.S. The U.S. market
for Japanese contractors has become the first in '84, from the
fifth in '83.
In The New York Times, Bennet writes "Now, Japan Inc. Wears
a Hard hat: Japanese builders are beginning to win some big
17
contracts in the U.S." The article begins with Ohbayashi Corp.'s
tunnel construction for the I-10 highway in Phoenix and concludes
using the favorable comments for Ohbayashi by Shank-Artukovich,
the American joint venture partner of Ohbayashi for the project.
Bennet explains the basic situation of the U.S. construction
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market as "This year ('86), the (Japanese) companies may capture
$4 billion of the more than $100 billion in American contracts -
no far- bellow the $5 billion in domestic contracts won last year
by Bechtel, one of the nations top three builders." In the
article, he states American construction companies' reactions
that "some American builders are bitter, others are profiting."
John P. Boone, senior vice president of the Dallas based Vantage
Companies, one of the nation's largest private developers,
described briefly that "It is a two way street. While they are
learning about doing business here, we can tap technology from
Japan." This statement seems to point out the essential
relationship between the U.S. and Japan's construction industry
to date, though differences of building construction technology
between these countries seem to be little.
Though the drainage tunnels construction for the I-10
highway by Ohbayashi is a sensational event in the U.S.
construction industry in terms of public construction done by a
Japanese builder, it is still an exceptional case to date. Most
work for Japanese contractors in the U.S. comes from their
Japanese clients or from development projects by themselves. A
report prepared by international Business Information Inc., a
leading Tokyo-based construction firm says that medium-size
Japanese contractors are now setting up subsidiaries in the U.S.
and expanding along with leading firms such as Ohbayashi Corp.
and Kajima Corp. Hann and Krizan summarize this report and say
that the bulk of the U.S. contracts have been for the factories
and offices of Japanese companies setting up shops in the U.S.
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including Toyota, Nissan, Cannon, and Nippon Denso. Bennet says
that the Japanese construction companies have strong ties with
other Japanese corporations, because the traditional Japanese way
of doing business insures long-lived relationships between
17
builders and their clients. Actually this is the main reason why
the Ohbayashi Corp. got the Toyota Kentucky Project from the
Toyota Motor Corporation, one of Ohbayashi's most important
clients.
Supplementally the following part of this section presents
the discussion about Japanese contractors' general strategy of
structuring a project organization especially in the U.S. As a
general policy of Japanese contractors, they are trying to
capture overseas projects by Japanese investors, such as auto-
manufacturers and financial institutions. But competition among
Japanese contractors and local contractors is unavoidable.
Therefore cooperation with the local construction industry is
important to avoid new trade friction. President Ohbayashi says
that a joint venture with local contractors,or construction
management contracts like the Toyota KY Project should be
actively used to ease friction with the local construction
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industry.
Historically, joint ventures have been a traditional and
popular method for Japanese engineering construction companies to
avoid or reduce business risks in unfamiliar countries. Joint
ventures are also very popular in the Japanese construction
industry, though the emphasis of their merits are quite different
from the usual joint venture concept, the distribution of
29
business risks. Joint venture construction in Japan is very
popular because it is a convenient way to distribute public
projects to small or mid-size local companies maintaining the
high quality guaranteed by the joint venture sponsor, a big
engineering construction company. This type of joint venture is
an effective way to transfer technology from a big and advanced
company to a small or medium sized local construction companies.
Another purpose of joint venture in Japan is coordination
for construction companies by a client or sometimes by
construction companies themselves. For instance, when a
manufacturing company decides to rebuild its main factory, the
company will choose some contractors who are usually building or
maintaining the company's facilities. Historically, the share
among contractors for the manufacturing company does not vary so
much. If the rebuilding project is unusually big, the
manufacturing company may well arrange a joint venture whose
participating ratio will be similar to the historical
distribution of contracts among the contractors for the company.
Through much experience of joint venture in Japan, Japanese
international contractors are aware of its merits as well as
demerits. Diversification of construction risks is an important
factor of the joint venture in overseas construction for Japanese
contractors despite the unusual application of it in Japan.
Knowledge about local business conventions is one of the most
important purposes for international contractors to structure a
joint venture with a local construction company. Considering the
difference between the U.S. and Japan, and their matured
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construction industry, companies without sufficient knowledge of
business conventions in each country must get help to secure
their operations in the new environment. The necessity for help
from local companies reduces as a company accumulates the know-
how of operations in the new market.
Information about local trade or jurisdiction of the
construction industry in the U.S. is very important to manage a
project effectively and successfully. Structuring project
organization including subcontracting in a reasonable way is a
key factor to achieve project goals. Either through a
traditional construction process or construction management style
construction, the input of local construction conventions into
design and procurement is critical and not an easy task.
Information about the local construction industry in Japan
is important, too, because even in open shop areas in the U.S.,
local information is very important including labor relations.
It may not be appropriate to describe the labor relations in
Japan as open shop, however, it has many similarities between
Japanese labor relations and the open shop in the U.S. For
instance, the Japanese construction industry has no industrial
unions, so trade or jurisdictional arrangement is not necessary
in Japan.
Ohbayashi Corp. has used the joint venture as a learning
tool for American construction business as well as avoiding some
business risks since its first operation in the U.S. There are
some examples in Ohbayashi's history in the U.S. such as the
Kyoto Inn Hotel construction in 1974 and the Evertrust office
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building in 1985. Ohbayashi did this construction by structuring
a joint venture with American contractors to learn business and
to avoid some risks.
In the context of both the Japanese and American
construction industry, a Japanese construction company could gain
a greater reputation by doing construction management than by
contracting as a sponsor of a joint venture. This is because
the construction management for Japanese contractors is a new
contracting style and challenging subject for them. It is too
risky for unexperienced Japanese construction contractors who
have come recently to the U.S. seeking for Japanese clients
because of the difficulty of getting information and hiring good
American managers.
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2-2 Chatline and the history of Ohbayashi Corporation in the U.S.
Ohbayashi Corp. has been in the U.S. since 1966, having
worked on relatively small projects in Hawaii and on the West
Coast until 1982. It has gradually undertaken bigger projects,
primarily the building of factories and warehouses for Japanese
23
companies setting up operations in the U.S. Ohbayashi began to
attach importance to the U.S. market around 1982 because it began
80
to get heavy construction in the U.S.
Though Ohbayashi Corp. is almost unknown except very
recently in the U.S., it has been famous as one of the Big Five
engineering construction companies in Japan. The outline of it
is as follows:
1) name; Ohbayashi corporation,
2) head office; 3, 2-chome, Kanda Tsukasa-cho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo,
Japan,
3) establishment; Jan. 25, 1892,
4) capital assets; 32.6 billion yen (Mar. 31, 1986)
5) employees; 9,915 (ave. 39.4 years old) (Mar. 31, 1986)
6) subsidiaries in the U.S. (1985)
a. Ohbayashi America Corporation, California
b. United Development Corporation, Washington
c. J. E. Roberts-Ohbayashi Corporation, California
d. Ohbayashi Hawaii Corporation, Hawaii
e. Ohbayashi Associates Hawaii Inc., Hawaii
f. Citadel Corporation, Georgia
7) Overseas office in the US. (1985)
a. New York
b. Los Angels
c. San Francisco
d. Chicago
e. Atlanta
f. Honolulu
Important events of Ohbayashi corp. in the U.S. are as
follows:
1966-1971; the first operation of Ohbayashi Corp. in the U.S. was
the Surfrider hotel in Honolulu, Hawaii. After Ohbayashi got a
negotiated contract from a Japanese overseas subsidiary, Kyouya,
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Ohbayashi registered as a foreign corporation, and then received
a contractor's licence in 1967. The completion of the
construction was in 1969. In addition, Ohbayashi got an
enlarging and remodeling construction contract for the Princess-
Kailua Hotel, and completed it in 1969.
Ohbayashi started real estate development as well as
construction in Hawaii. Ohbayashi acquired a 1600 square meters
(SM) parcel in downtown Waikiki in 1971. This acquisition was
the first permit by the Ministry of Finance (Japan) regarding the
acquisition of overseas real estate for Japanese corporations.
Ohbayashi opened its local office in Honolulu in 1971. Then, it
set up its overseas subsidiary, Ohbayashi Hawaii Corp., in 1972.
1972; Ohbayashi started its operations in North America by
setting up the overseas subsidiary, Ohbayashi America Corp. in
Los Angels (L.A.). It received a licence of a general contractor
in the U.S. in 1973.
1973; Ohbayashi set up the Department of Overseas Business in
the Tokyo Head Office. Besides Ohbayashi America Corp., it
opened a local office, which mainly dealt with heavy construction
in Los Angeles.
1974-1975; After two years of market research, Ohbayashi America
started active operations on the West Coast. It got the
construction of Hotel Kyoto Inn from America Kintetsu Kougyou.
The completion of the construction was in 1975. Ohbayashi chose
J.E.Roberts Co. as the joint venture partner for the
construction. Actually, Ohbayashi did not make a profit because
it gave too many incentives to the partner. Since then,
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Ohbayashi America has gotten many projects mainly from Japanese
companies or their subsidiaries. Ohbayashi did this
construction by itself with little profit, but it learned the
construction business through these experiences.
1976-1977; Ohbayashi America expanded its network from Los
Angels to San Francisco (S.F.) and Seattle. Then, Ohbayashi
America took on a big project, the Milcreak Project. This
project is located in a suburb of Seattle, and developed about
3,200 private residents and various recreational facilities on
1,085 acres wilderness. Ohbayashi Corp., Tokyuu Group., and
American investors set up the United Development Corporation to
manage the project. The corporation plans to complete the
project in 1988.
Ohbayashi got the Koncho Building project from an American
company. This event was a milestone in Ohbayashi America's
history because Ohbayashi America got it for the first time
from an American company through competitive bidding with
construction bonds, which does not exist in the Japanese
construction business. In Nov. 1976, Ohbayashi America hooked up
with Adlian Wilson Co., a big American design firm, and arranged
Ohbayashi America's organization to manage a turnkey program.
Consequently, it constructed the L.A. office of American Komatsu
Forklift, by turnkey contract.
1978; Ohbayashi chose J.E.Roberts Co. as a strategic partner in
order to expand Ohbayashi's operations into public facility
construction because J.E.Roberts had much experience in the
field. J.E.Roberts-Ohbayashi succeeded in getting a public
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housing project in north San Francisco from the Federal Housing
Department. Ohbayashi began to manage the Wilshire Building in
L.A., one of the Ohbayashi's properties, this year.
1979-1980; Ohbayashi got a sewage project of the City of San
Francisco, proposing "Slurry Shield Tunnel Construction Method,"
a sophisticated tunnel construction method. This project was
sensational both in the U.S. and Japan because of its advanced
civil engineering technology, which once the U.S. had exported to
Japan, came back to the U.S. from Japan. EngineerinQ News
Record, Sep.20,1979, used the president, Ohbayashi's portrait on
the cover, and wrote a special topic about Ohbayashi Corp.
because this tunnel project was the first public heavy
construction project done by a Japanese contractor in the U.S.
1982; Ohbayashi opened the New York office. The original
purpose of opening the New York office was to get business
information especially for American companies that planned to go
to Japan. Soon after some efforts to get such kind of
information, managers in the office realized that someone who
does not give anything cannot get anything in business. Then,
managers in the office began to get projects on the East Coast.
The first success was the NEC Information's Boston factory.
Ohbayashi contracted this project with Turner Construction using
the lump sum contract. Doing the construction, Ohbayashi began
to get business information through its business relations.
Noma, the head of the New York office, gave an example of
this relationship. When a typhoon destroyed Ohbayashi's hotel in
Hawaii, Ohbayashi had difficulties getting insurance money. An
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inlLSUrance broker at Hartford, which Ohbayashi asked to introduce
an underwriter of the NEC project, introduced a construction
insurance specialized lawyer for Ohbayashi. It received more
money from the insurance company than it had expected. If
Ohbayashi had not done business in N.Y., it would not have found
80
such an appropriate person, Noma added.
1983; Ohbayashi corp. got a public housing project from the L.A.
Urban Renewal Department. This was the first case for a Japanese
contractor to get a public building construction project. It
also got the Westside Pump Facility from the City of San
Francisco, and a condominium, Tokyo Villa in L.A., through
competitive bidding.
1984; Ohbayashi Corp. agreed to business cooperation with The
Rothchild Realty Group, Ill. Ohbayashi got the drainage tunnel
17
construction for I-10 in Phoenix. It also got a big (324,000 SF)
high rise (17F) office building from Evertrust, a subsidiary of
Ever Line, in Jersey City, New Jersey, on just the other side of
the river from Manhattan. This was the first case for a
Japanese contractor to get a project from a non-Japanese company
in the greater New York area.
Ohbayashi chose Sordoni, a medium size construction company
in New Jersey ( about one tenth of Turner Construction), as a
joint venture partner. Turner Construction rejected the offer
from Ohbayashi Corp. to be the joint venture partner though
Turner had contracted the NEC Boston project with Ohbayashi.
According to Noma, the head of the N.Y. office, because Ohbayashi
tried to get involved in the construction and to learn the
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business on the East Coast, it chose joint venture rather than
lump sum contract with an American contractor. Ohbayashi was
cautious enough to avoid doing construction individually in N.Y.
At the same time, it was afraid of unforseen problems during and
after the construction because it had not enough experience on
the East Coast. Why Ohbayashi could not do construction in New
Jersey, despite it doing construction individually in L.A., is
that the concessions related construction business especially in
greater New York is extremely complicated. A very strong
construction union is one of the special features of the
construction business in Manhattan. Noma explains that even
Sordoni, the joint venture partner, cannot do business in
Manhattan island. To do construction business in Manhattan,
construction companies have to hire powerful project managers who
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have much experience there and know who does what exactly.
Though several Japanese contractors do tenant construction
for Japanese clients in Manhattan, usually by lump sum contract
with American contractors, Japanese contractors did not suffer
from obstructions by the union or others until 1985. This is
probably because the Japanese construction business is too small
for the union or others to pay it special attention.
One of the reason that Ohbayashi does not do construction
independently on the East Coast is that Ohbayashi cannot fail in
its construction for its Japanese clients. Even in the U.S..,
failure of construction for Japanese clients causes a terrible
influence on Ohbayashi's business in Japan. Japanese clients
regard their contracts with Ohbayashi for overseas projects as a
38
simple extension of their long term relationships with Ohbayashi.
If Ohbayashi fails in a Japanese client project overseas,
Japanese competitors will take some portion of Ohbayashi's share
for the client. At worst, Ohbayashi may loose its reputation and
historical advantage for the client; it may loose chances even
for selective bidding of the client's projects, which used to be
automatically contracted with Ohbayashi by negotiation.
1985; Ohbayashi Corp. changed its operation system in the U.S.
after 20 years after its first operation in the U.S. It has
three main overseas offices in the U.S., N.Y., L.A., and S.F.
Ohbayashi added two other offices in Chicago and Atlanta. It
completed the first full-turnkey project as a Japanese contractor
for the Sumitomo Kinzoku Kouzan's semi-conductor factory in
Fremont.
Ohbayashi set up Citadel Corp. in Atlanta, a key city in the
Sun Bel t. The reason for setting up a new subsidiary in the Sun
Belt is the increasing Japanese investment there and the
necessity to set up an open shop construction company. Ohbayashi
is a closed (union) shop company in the Sun Belt, so it cannot
contract with open (non-union) shop companies which dominate the
area; the contract between union and Ohbayashi prohibits
Ohbayashi to use non-union contractors in contracted areas. The
Sun Belt is very popular for Japanese corporations partly because
it is largely non-union. Japanese management tries to avoid
unfamiliar headaches which would be caused by labor unions.
Labor unions exist in Japan, too, but most of them are individual
unions within their corporations rather than interindustry or
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craft unions. Therefore, the concept of the labor union in Japan
is totally different from that in the U.S.
Ohbayashi Corp. uses a so called "Double Breast Strategy,"
that means the strategy for an owner of construction companies to
possess two different operational companies, closed and open shop
companies. Most big American construction companies use this
strategy in the U.S.
A special feature of Citadel Corp. is that all management is
American. Noma explains that because excellent American managers
tend to avoid working under Japanese managers, Ohbayashi decided
to hire an American president for its new subsidiary. Ohbayashi
simply gives policy but does not try to control the operations of
Citadel. Though Citadel has gotten only small projects as of
1986, the top management of Ohbayashi is looking for Citadel to
get into the American construction market while Ohbayashi
provides business for it. Management recognizes that the goal of
its operations in the U.S. is to be able to get sufficient work
from American clients in all areas in the U.S.
At the end of 1985, Ohbayashi got the Toyota KY Project.
Citadel did a good job for Ohbayashi to gather information
regarding site selection or other project related matters, during
the planning stage of the project for Toyota Motor Corp. Main
reason for Ohbayashi's success in getting the project was the
long-term relationships between Toyota and Ohbayashi in Japan,
but the contribution by Citadel was significant for Ohbayashi.
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2-3 History of Toyota Motor Corporation (T1C)
This section has two parts: the first part is a summary of
the history of TMC; the second part is a summary of the
historical relationship between TMC and Ohbayashi.
Since the independence from Toyoda Automatic Loom Company
(established in 1918 by Sakici Toyoda) in 1937, TMC has grown to
a world famous auto-manufacturer through ups and downs during 50
years. TMC produced 3.4 million cars next to the top, GM's 5.7
million cars in 1984. TMC became the top Japanese manufacturing
company in 1978 because its sales, and profit, both after
financing and taxes, were the most. TMC has maintained the
prestigious position in Japanese industry since then. TMC
employs 62,000 people and has 11 factories in Aichi prefecture in
Japan. The products are automobiles, industrialized housing,
industrial transporters, and parts.
The outline of TMC is as follows (1986):
1) Name; Toyota Motor Corporation
2) Establishment; Aug. 28,1937
3) Location; I Toyota-Machi, Toyota City, Aichi Prefecture, Japan
4) Capital Assets; 133.2 billion yen
5) Employees; 61,676 (m.:56,117, f.:5,579)
Table 2-3-1 shows its factories. The Tahara factory, one of
the comparable plants with the Toyota KY plant, is a relatively
new factory, the tenth factory of TMC. The Honsha factory is the
oldest, the dedication was about one year after the establishment
of Toyota Motor Industry Co. Figure 2-3-1 shows the location of
the TMC's plants in Japan. All factories are located in Aichi
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LOcT ION OF TM's PL-ANTS
1. Location of Toyota City
2. Location of Takaoka Plant
FIGURE 2-3-1
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Prefecture and most of them are in Toyota City. Figure 2-3-2
shows a typical TMC's plant layout (Takaoka Plant). Most TMC's
plants use structural steel and are one-story buildings.
Table 2-3-2 gives a brief history of TMC. Sakichi Toyada
(1867-1930), a famous inventor of the Toyoda Automatic Loom in
Japan, is the founder of the parent company of TMC. He became
interested in motor vehicles around 1910. Then, he had his
eldest son, Kiichirou (1894-1952), study automobiles. After
graduation from the Mechanical Engineering Department of Tokyo
University, Kiichirou entered his father's company. Though
Kiichirou got an excellent education, he was not willing to enter
the automobile industry because the level of Japanese industry
was far behind the Western countries at that time. The main
reason for Kiichirou to enter a new business field was his
2
father's personal wish, so it was emotional rather than logical.
After the independent establishment of Toyota Motor industry
Co.(Toyota), there were many ups and downs. Gradually, Toyota
built its factories and set up sales companies both in Japan and
overseas. It won the Deming Prize, an award for excellent
companies for quality control in 1965. Toyota has developed its
Total Quality Control system further after that event. Since the
'70s, Toyota has actively done social and cultural activities
including establishing the Toyota Foundation and the Toyota
Industrial Institute. The merger of Toyota and Toyota Motor
Sales was a big event in the '80s. Another big issue is the
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Table 2-3-2
Outline of the History of Toyota Motor Corporation
Year Events
1933 Set up Department of Automobile in Toyoda Automobile
Loom Manufacturing Co.
1935 Prototype of Al car
1937 Establishment of Toyota Motor Industry Co.
1938 Start of Honsha Plant's operation
1950 Establishment of Toyota Jidousha Hanbai (Toyota Motor
Sales) Company
1956 Establishment of Toyopet Shops (sales chain)
1957 Establishment of Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc.
1961 : Establishment of Toyota Publica shops (now, Toyota
Corolla Shops) (sales chain)
1962 One million car production (accumulated total)
1965 Wining the Deming Prize
1966 :Business cooperation with Hino Motor Industry Co.
1967 Establishment of Toyota Auto Shops (sales chain);
Business cooperation with Daihatsu Industry Co.
1972 Ten million car production (accumulated total)
1974 Establishment of Toyota Foundation
1975 Publication of Toyota Office (industrialized office
building)
1976 20 million car production (accumulated total)
1977 Publication of Toyota Home (industrialized housing)
1980 : 30 million car production (accumulated total);
Establishment of Toyota Vista Shops (sales chain)
1981 Opening of Toyota Industrial Institute
1982 Merger of Toyota Motor Industry Co. and Toyota Motor
Sales Co.; the new company name is Toyota Motor
Corporation
1983 40 million car production (accumulated total)
1984 Start of NUMMI's operation, joint venture of TMC and GM
1986 : 50 million car production (accumulated total);
Toyota KY Project
SOURCE: TOYOTA 1986 BY TMC
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trade friction between the U.S. and Japan, especially about
automobiles. TMC set up New United Mortar Manufacturing, Inc.
(NUMMI) with GM in order to ease the trade friction and a
preparation for the individual direct investment, the Toyota KY
Project.
TMC has 30 overseas manufacturing or assembling plants in 20
countries. It is also building manufacturing plants in the U.S.
and Canada. In the U.S., TMC has two manufacturing companies:
NUMMI and Toyota Auto Body Inc. of California. TMC invests 50 %
of NUMMI which was set up in 1984 and has 2,500 employees.
Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A.,Inc. invests 100 % of Toyota Auto Body
Inc. of California which was set up in 1964 and has 350
emp I oyees.
TMC has 24 overseas subsidiaries around the world. There
are six subsidiaries in the U.S. as of Jan. 1986: an outline of
the subsidiaries in the U.S. is shown in Table 2-3-3.
Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A.,Inc. is the first overseas
subsidiary of TMC whose business is the import of TMC's cars and
the distribution of them to four distributors in the U.S. Toyota
Motor Distributors, Inc. is one of four Toyota distributors in
the U.S. whose business is wholesale sales. The Toyota Technical
Center-, U.S.A.,Inc. is a Research Laboratory for automobiles in
the U.S. though TMC has its main research institute, Higashi Fuji
Ken kVu.jo, in Japan, which has 2000 employees. Calty Design
Research, Inc. is a research and development company for car
design in the U.S.
TMC is the core of the Toyota Group which has 13 companies
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Tabe 2 - -
Su~bsiddiaries cf TM1C in the U. S.
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30
and two business cooperation companies. Table 2-3-4 summarizes
the group member companies. Toyoda Automatic Loom Manufacturing
Company is the parent company of TMC, the second oldest in the
Toyota Group. Most other group members' business is strongly
related with TMC. Nihon-Denso is the second biggest company in
the group. It is also a world famous electric manufacturing
company.
Relationships between TMC and Ohbayashi have continued since
the first plant construction in 1937. Ohbayashi has participated
in most plant constructions, as well as the dormitories and
offices. For instance, Ohbayashi was the sponsor of the joint
venture of Toyota Tokyo Building Project, B5F, 19F, 49,000 SM
building since 1980 to 1982. Doing maintenance and repair of
most of TMC's plants and buildings, Ohbayashi completed the Third
Body Shop of Tahara plant in 1986. It got the Toyota KY Project
in 1986, too. Because Ohbayashi has done maintenance and repair
as well as new construction, the contracts between TMC and
Ohbayashi count more than 800 since the beginning.
Several of Ohbayashi's competitors have done construction
for TMC. Takenaka Koumuten got its first contract around 1955
from Toyota. Shimizu Construction got its first project around
1965. Around 1967, Kajima Construction began to participate in
the construction business for TMC. All of them are members of
the Big Five Construction Companies in Japan as well as
Ohbayashi. Ohbayashi has the longest relationship with TMC.
TMC usually use selective bidding to choose the prime
contractor for a new project. Because TMC has strict criteria of
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quality, cost, safety, and timeliness for bidders, TMC
eliminates contractors with bad performance. Because TMC's
projects require more management on every phase of construction,
and are more cost effective than usual projects, selected bidders
for TMC are literally selected and limited both in general
contractors and subcontractors.
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2-4 Other Autanotive Plant Constructions
The Toyota Tahara Project, the Fuji Gunma F'roject, and the
Nissi.an Smyrna Project are described in this section. The outline
of the projects, and some details of the development process and
organization of the projects, which are comparable with the
Toyota KY Project are examined here.
The Toyota Tahara Project has many common factors with the
Toyota KY Project, such as building type, client, prime
contractor, and TQC program in construction. Therefore,
differences between the U.S. and Japan's development process and
project organizational system will be extracted without
confounding it with comparison of these projects.
The Fuji Gunma Project will be used to define the Japanese
style of the development process and organization for automotive
construction through the comparison with the Toyota Tahara
Project. The comparison is also useful to check special features
of Toyota's method towards its construction.
The Nissan Smyrna Project may well be the most similar case
to the Toyota KY Project because these two projects have many
common points: the clients, TMC and Nissan, are the Big Two
Japanese international car manufacturers; both projects are the
first big direct investment in the U.S. by TMC and Nissan; the
location of each project is in the mid-South, Kentucky and
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Tennessee; the project manager, Robert B. Jordan, working for OHB
in the Toyota Ky Project, was the project manager of Daniel
Construction in the Nissan Smyrna Project. By the comparison of
these projects, the differences of both companies' strategies for
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developments in uncertain environments, and the differences of
OHB from Daniel will be studied.
2-4-1 Toyota Tahara Pr-oject (in Japan).
This section includes a project summary, and development
process; and organization of the Toyota Tahara Project. Though
the long term relationship between TMC and OHB is explained in
section 2 -3, an outline of the TMC's organization for its
facility construction and maintenance is additionally explained
as well as the OHB's project organization, here. Most
86 83
information of this section is provided by Tanabe, Sato, and
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Ohsaki who were OHB's project manager, quality control officer,
and A/E manager for the project, respectively.
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2-4-1-1 Schematic Project Susasary.
Project summary is as follows:
1) Project name; Toyota Motor Corporation The Third Body Shop
Proj ect.
2)Project location; Tahara town, Atsumi gun (county), Aichi
Prefecture, Japan.
3) Project organization;
Owner, Toyota Motor Corporation.
General contractor, Ohbayashi Corporation.
Architect/engineer, Toyota Motor Corporation Registered
Architects and engineers.
4) Time schedule; Start of building works, Jan.6, 1986.
Completion , Oct.31,1986.
5) Site area; 983.5 acres (3,980,000 SM)
6) Floor area; 774,413 SF (71,943 SM)
(Total floor area in the Tahara Plant is about
320,000 SF)
7) Type of shops; press and welding.
8) Building outline;
a. Foundation -- steel pile and spread footing.
b. Structure -- structural steel.
c. Roof -- Autoclaved Lightweight Concrete panel 8< sheet
water proofing.
d. Exterior finish -- Asrock, colored steel panel.
9) Production capacity; 340,000 cars/year.
(as of feb. 1984)
10) Products; passenger cars: Soarer, Supra, Corona, Celica,
Corolla, Sprinter, and HiLux (small truck).
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Development Process and Organization.
The development process, schedule, and organization of the
Toyota Tahara Project is described in this section. TMC usually
does not hire an A/E because TMC has its own A/E department. TMC
does all the A/E's jobs by itself. Except for TMC's roles of
owner A/E, this project's development process and organization is
a usual Japanese construction project.
The construction method is a traditional sequential method
because the Japanese building Code requires completed drawings
and specs for building permits. The contract type between TMC
and OHB is a lump sum; other contract types between clients and
general contractors for new buildings practically do not exist in
Japan. TMC used selective bidding to choose a general contractor
for the project. Though negotiated contracts are popular as well
as competitive bidding in Japan, TMC usually employ competitive
bidding to select contractors or suppliers.
OHB uses its own forces for work or does self-performance
mainly for temporary works as a usual practice in the Japanese
construction. There are no strong national unions in Japanese
construction industry, its labor relations are so-called "multi-
layer-subcontracting," which has a hierarchy of labor. For
example, there are several coordinators or brokers between a
general contractor and workers. The number of layers varies by
location and trades, but usually from two to four.
As a special feature of TMC's plant or building
construction, TMC applies its Total Quality Control (TQC) program
for its construction. TMC has its own design-construction
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management manual that includes TMC's checking items and general
contractor's checking items on each development stage.
Construction management items are classified in four, such as,
scheduling, document control, inspections, and shop drawings. In
addition to this manual, TMC also has many special formats, Such
as a standard construction manual, many kinds of inspection and
report sheets, and a value engineering proposal sheet.
Figure 2-4-1-1 shows the development process of the project.
The vertical axis indicates the project participants and the
horizontal axis means the progressive order from the left to the
right. Important events from "Need for Facility" to
"Construction" are allocated in boxes in the chart. Because the
Tahara Project is an expansion of the plant, after the
confirmation of the need for a new facility, TMC must have
checked and adjusted the standard manual of its construction
management a little for the new construction. TMC has known in
advance almost all the important factors for the new project;
TMC's work to set up the strategy are minimal.
The Toyota Tahara Project is a quite usual TMC's plant
construction, so TMC uses the standard methods of management for
the construction of the Tahara Project. TMC does all functions
of the A/E and uses a traditional sequential construction
program, that is, the construction starts after the completion of
all construction documents including work drawings and
specifications. Accordingly, Japanese clients including TMC use
only the lump sum contract with a prime contractor for new
buildings.
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At the design stage, TMC asked OHB to do the structural
design for the Tahara Project by a unit price contract. Though
OHB cannot cover even the direct cost of the design because of a
very low unit price set by TMC, this cooperation does not affect
the competitive bidding of the project, at least formally. TMC
sometimes asks for some parts of design works from selected
general contractors or building equipment companies. The type of
the design cooperation varies, such as, only architectural
drawings, structural drawings, M/E drawings, architectural and
structural drawings, and all work drawings.
At the procurement stage, TMC uses selective bidding to
choose a prime contractor for its projects. TMC selects six
general contractors as bidders, such as OHB, Shimizu, Taisei,
Takenaka, Kajima, and Mitsui. TMC requires bidders to submit the
following items: itemized estimates, work plan schedule,
construction planning, site organization list, quality assurance
items, and value engineering proposals. TMC asked tenderers to
make more than 50 value engineering proposals for the original
drawings and specs in the Tahara Project. This heavy requirement
for value engineering proposals is a special feature of TMC's TOC
program for its construction.
Along with competitive bidding, TMC applies for a building
permit to the local government. Building permits are the most
important permits among many regulations for owners to start the
construction. Along with many local government inspections
during and after the construction, inspections for occupancy
permit and fire safety permit are the most important for general
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contractors and owners.
After a lump sum contract with TMC, OHB starts the
construction using subcontractors and its own forces perform the
work. OHB uses a lump sum and a unit price contract with
subcontractors. A cost-plus-fee contract is not used in Japanese
building construction. One of the reasons for no cost-plus-fee
is that Japanese business tradition does not allow contractors to
request explicit profit or fees from their clients. For example,
during a negotiation between an owner and a bidder, usually the
owner asks the bidder to cut or reduce its overhead and profit
items, or even to cut them all.
TMC asks OHB to make more than 30 value engineering
proposals during the construction phase in addition to 50
proposals at the bidding stage in the Project. TMC applies its
own quality control (QC) program to the project. TMC requires
OHB to submit many inspection reports during construction. For
example, OHB's engineers check R-bar works and form works before
the concrete placement. OHB also inspects the form works after
the concrete works. Many items of the inspections are required
to be quantitative.
OHB also has its own quality control program during
construction which has three grades. The grades are determined
by the importance of facilities, requirements by clients, size or
complex-ity of the projects, and others. TMC's program is not so
different from the OHB's QC program. Regarding inspectors, OHB
tries to make subcontractors inspect their work and make reports,
but in reality, OHB does most inspections itself. In the Tahara
60
Project, OHB does many inspections of subcontractors jobs during
construct ion.
Figure 2-4-1-2 shows the Toyota Tahara Project schedule.
The engineering and design was completed in Nov. 1985. TMC
announced the tender on Nov. 20,1985 to six contractors. The bid
date was Dec. 9 and TMC awarded OHB the contract as the general
contractor -for the project in late Dec. The construction started
Jan.6, 1986. The structural steel work began in mid April and
finished at the end of June. The building construction was
completed at the end of Oct. 1986. It took ten months for the
building construction. OHB does not contract most of M/E works
or any production equipment works. TMC usually contracts
production equipment and installment with individual suppliers
directly. TMC often contracts building service equipment works,
such as HVAC, plumbing, and M/E, with special contractors of
these works.
Because TMC does A/E works, distributing building
construction, building service equipment, and production
equipment works to many different contractors, TMC actually
functions as "construction management" for its construction in
Japan.
Figure 2-4-1-3 shows the outline of organization and
contract types of the Toyota Tahara Project. This organization
is typical in Japanese manufacturing plant construction except
for TMC's in--house A/E. TMC contracts with OHB by a lump sum
contract as well as a building service equipment contractor, and
many production equipment suppliers. OHB contracts with many
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subcontractors by lump sum or unit price contracts. OHB does
self performance mainly for general condition works.
Figure 2-4-1-4 shows the TMC's organization for the Tahara
Project. The Department of Facility Environment's roles are
those of a construction manager and A/E. The department of
Procurement is responsible for all purchases including
construction contracts. This department deals with progressive
payment for contractors during construction. The flow of OHB's
application of progress payment is from the Tahara Project team
in the A/E section, through the manager of the Department of
Facility Environment, to the Department of Procurement that does
not only clerical work but also checks the evaluations closely.
This system is applied to the Toyota KY Project, too.
The Department of Production Engineering inputs many
requirements regarding production engineering during the design
phase into the drawings and specs. The Department of Facility
Environment coordinates various requirements from different
sections of production engineering.
Figure 2-4-1-5 shows the OHB's site organization for the
Toyota Tahara Project. It includes many civil engineers who did
the work on pits for the press machines, the slab on grade, and
the machine foundations. Because the project is big compared
with usual Japanese projects, the site has two managers and eight
architects and engineers for shop drawings. Generally, Japanese
A/E's drawings includes less details than American A/E's, so shop
drawings by general contractors are important and share the
substantial portion of the general contractor's jobs. There are
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two quality control officers and one safety officer apart from
the construction line. OHB sometimes assigns a QC officer to a
big project like this, but two OC officers were used for the
Tahara Project, implying how very strict TMC's OC program is.
Although there are some peculiarities in the project
organization and in the OHB's site organization, this
organization can be described as typical in Japanese construction
for this scale of project.
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2-4-2 Fuji 6unma Project (in Japan)
This section includes the project summary, the development
process, and the organization of Fuji Gunma Project. Most of
the information in this section is provided by the cooperation of
'75 74 72
Kuroki, Kujirai, and Imagawa, who were OHB's A/E manager, deputy
project manager, and the head of Takasaki office for the project
respectively. Project summary is presented in 2-4-2-1 Schematic
Project Summary.
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2-4-2-1 Schematic Project Stummary.
Project summary is as follows:
1) Project Name; Fuji Heavy Industry Co., Gunma Manufacturing
Division, Yajima Plant, the Second Assemble and Paint Shops
Project (Fuji Gunma Project).
2) Project Location; Ohta City, Gunma Prefecture, Japan.
3) Project Organization;
Owner, Fuji Heavy Industry Co.
General Contractor, Ohbayashi Corp.
Architect/Engineer, Ohbayashi Corp.
4) Time Schedule; Start of building works, Feb. 25, 1980.
Completion , Aug. 27, 1980.
5) Site Area; 134.6 acres (545,000 SM)
6) Floor area; 318,973 SF (29,633 SM)
7) Type of shops; Assemble and Paint shops.
8) Building Outline;
a. Foundation A-- C pile and spread footing.
b. Structure -- structural steel.
c. Roof -- corrugated asbestos-cement roof, and
corrugated metal roofing.
d. Exterior finish -- insulated metal siding.
9) Products; passengers cars.
10) Schematic plan of main shops and this project.
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11) Section of Assembling Shop.
E
FIGURE 2-4-2-1-b
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Development Process and (O-ganization.
The development process, schedule, and organization of the
Fuji Gunma Project is described in this section. Fuji selected
OHB as a design-builder of the Fuji Gunma Project through
selective bidding after the Fuji's schematic design. The project
is a quite typical design-build in Japan, though a negotiated
contract with a design-builder without selective bidding is also
popular in Japanese construction.
The construction method is a traditional sequential method
like the Toyota Tahara Project. The contract type between Fuji
and OHB is a lump sum after the completion of the work drawings,
though the first contract between Fuji and OHB was a design
contract. Though Fuji usually uses a negotiated contract with
OHB, Fuji uses selective bidding to choose a design-builder for
the project so that Fuji tries to confirm the cost effectiveness
of OHB this time.
Figure 2-4-2-1 shows the development process of the project.
The vertical axis indicates the project participants and the
horizontal axis the progressive order from the left to the right.
Important events from the "Need for facility" to "Construction"
are allocated in boxes in the chart. Because the Fuji Gunma
Project is an expansion of the original plant like the Toyota
Tahara Project, after the confirmation of need for a new
facility, adjustment of the standard procedure of its
construction must have been minimal and the project process was
as usual.
At the planning/pre-design stage, Fuji planned to use OHB as
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a design-builder for the project through negotiation, because OHB
had built almost all buildings by a design-build contract at the
Yaj i ma Plant. But during Fuji's schematic design phase, someone
in Fuji proposed selective bidding for choosing a design builder
to get the maximum cost efficiency for the project. Finally,
Fuji decided to use selective bidding and sent notices to the
bidders on Dec. 30, 1979.
Figure 2-4-2-2 shows the project schedule. Because all
Japanese construction companies set its official holidays at
least between Dec.31 and Jan.3, the date of the notice (Dec. 30)
to the bidders is very unusual and hard for bidders to bid on
Jan. 7. Even in the usual business time, only one week for an
estimation is too short for bidders to submit definite tenders.
Therefore, the effects of Fuji's attempt to do selective bidding
is questionable. Fuji selected seven bidders including OHB, but
the other contractors of OHB may not have done do their estimate
seriously because of the unusual schedule of bidding and OHB's
domination of the Yajima Plant construction.
The design and construction schedule of the project is
extremely short. OHB completed the construction of a 300,000 SF
factory in only seven months after the design build contract with
Fuji. If the A/E and the general contractor had been different,
the schedule of construction would have been prolonged at least
one month because a roll order to a steel manufacturer during
work drawing phase is almost impossible without a general
contractor.
Compared with other industrial buildings, the construction
73
CONSTRUCTION
PILING
FOUNDATION
STRUCTURAL STEEL
ROOF & WALL
OPERATION &
MAINTENANCE
ROLL - ERECTION
ORDER FABRICATOR
--
DUs . 13u M13. 10 m'iN. - 10 AUG. 8
NOTICE TO APPLY START COMPLETION
BIDDERS PERMIT STRUCTURAL
A A! 6 STEEL
JAN.10 FEB.28 JUN.10 SEP.1
AWARD BLDG. START START
PERMIT M/E OPERATION
FIGURE 2-4-2-2: FUJI GUNMA PROJECT SCHEDULE
period of about five months, and two months for the design and
engineering for a 300)C),000 SF factory is unusual. It took ten
months for the Toyota Tahara Plant construction. An example
project, a 150,000 SF, structural steel, warehouse, in Barrie and
Paulson's Professional Construction Management, takes eight
months for the construction, though this duration might include
I
some slack. According to Barrie and Paulson's example, it takes
12 months by a sequential program and takes nine months by a
phased program from the beginning of detail design to the
completion of the construction. Though the overlap of design and
construction is impossible in Japan, OHB had done the detail
design and construction of the Project within seven months. In
the Project, piling works (the beginning of the construction)
actually started on the building permission day; pile driving
machines had waited the permission on the construction site.
There was no overlap of design and construction, however, design
and procurement were overlapped, and this overlap was one of the
significant advantages of a design-build in Japan.
Figure 2--4-2-3 shows the outline of organization and
contract type of Fuji Gunma. The structure of this project is
the same as that of the Toyota Tahara Project except the
placement of A/E function. Fuji did the schematic design and
provided all production engineering for the project. Fuji also
directly contracted with a building equipment contractor and with
many production equipment suppliers who supplied and installed
equipment. Therefore, Fuji acted as a construction manager
especially in the later part of the construction, as did Toyota.
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Figure 2-4-2-4 shows the organization of Fuji for the
project. The development process in the organization is as
fol1 Ows:
1) The Engineering Department forms a plan of a new shop. Along
with the production equipment planning, it defines the building
outline, such as plan, clearance height, and transportation.
2) The administrative manager and staff in the Facility Section
checks the outline of the building defined by the Engineering
Department, the costs with the budget, the schedule, and contract
types (negotiated or bid). Then, the Material Purchase
Department orders the design and the construction from the A/E,
contractors, or suppliers.
3) The Engineering Department is responsible for engineering
decisions regarding the construction (production equipments), and
the Facility Section is responsible for the building (shell,
building equipments, and finish).
Figure 2-4-2-5 shows OHB's organization for the Fuji Gunma
Project. Though OHB is the design builder for the project, OHB
does not have a general project manager who is responsible both
for design and construction. One of the reasons for the lack of
a general project manager of design-build in OHB as well as other
Japanese engineering contractors is due to almost independent
design and construction work during the design phase in a
traditional sequential method.
The four departments are parallel in the organization
structure because their supervisor is the head of the Tokyo
Branch who practically does not manage the specific projects.
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The A/E Departments are responsible for completion of
construction documents, obtaining the building permissions, and
supervision of the construction. The Building Construction
Department is responsible for estimation, negotiation with
clients about contract terms and prices, and the final
inspections of projects based on OHB's standard. Construction
site managers are responsible for all activities of the project
after the contracts with clients. They are responsible for
subcontracting, application for progressive payment, payroll,
cost control, scheduling, quality control, safety control, and
others. The Building Construction Engineering Department is
responsible for structuring site organization, assistance in
construction planning, providing construction engineering service
for sites, and others.
Because of the extremely short design schedule for the Fuji
Gunma Project, the number of the design staff is large for this
kind of project. A section chief of an A/E section is the
project manager of design who corresponds with the client,
manages the design team, is the representative registered
architect for the application for the building, and cooperates
with the construction site manager during design stage.
The structure of the construction site organization is usual
except for the large number of building construction engineers
because of the extremely short construction schedule for this
size of project. The Construction Site Manager was assigned at
the beginning of the design phase in order to mange the pre-
purchase of structural steel and to obtain several subcontractors
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before the start of the construction.
This overlap of the design phase and the procurement phase
by a design builder is an important advantage of a design build
contract especially for fast construction. Another important
advantage of a design-build contract is good coordination of the
design, building construction, and installation of production
equipment that was managed directly by Fuji in the project.
Except for the extremely short design and construction
schedule, this project is a good example of a design build for
industrial plant construction. This project highlights the
advantages of a design-build contract for a client in a short
schedule construction in Japan. The development process is quite
usual as a design build construction, though Fuji used selective
bidding for its schematic drawings to choose a design builder.
The project organization and the OHB's organization for the
project are usual and very similar to those in the Toyota Tahara
Project. Finally, the organization structure of Fuji and TMC for
their construction is found to be similar though TMC has more
staff than Fuji.
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2-4-3 Nissan Smyrna Project (in the U.S.)
This section includes the project summary, the development
process, and the organization of the Nissan Smyrna Project. This
section also includes outline of Nissan Motor Manufacturing
Corporation U.S.A. (NMMC). Most of the information in this
73
section is provided by Robert Jordan, who is the project manager
in OHB for the Toyota KY Project and was the project manager for
Daniel on the Nissan Smyrna Project, and is referred from Nissan
41
in Tennessee by NMMC.
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2-4-3-1 Schemkatic Project Summeary
Project summary is as -follows:
1) Project name; the Nissan Motor Manufacturing Corporation
U.S.A. plant project (NIssan Smyrna Project).
2) Project location; Smyrna, Tennessee.
3) Project organization;
Owner, Nissan Motor Manufacturing Corporation U.S.A. (NMMC).
General contractor, Daniel Construction Company.
Architect/Engineer, Albert Kahn Associates, Inc.
4) Time schedule; Start of grading work, February, 1981.
Start of building work, April, 1981.
Completion , April, 1983.
5) Site area; 782 acres (3,166,000 SM)
6) Floor area; 3,400,000 SF (315,864 SM)
7) Types of shops in the project;
Body, Frame, Stamping Shop.
Paint Shop.
Trim and Chassis Shop.
8) Building Outline;
a. Foundation -- spread footing.
b. Structure -- structural steel.
c. Roof -- metal deck, built-up roofing.
d. Exterior finish -- block & metal siding.
e. floor -- slab on grade.
9) Production capacity; 100,000 cars & 140,000 light trucks/year
10) Products; passenger cars and light trucks.
11) Schematic plan of main shops (next page).
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Outline of Nissan Motor- Manufacturing cor-por-ation U.S.A. (NP9IC).
This section includes a summary of NMMC and Nissan's
strategy for the development as well as for the business in the
U.S.
Nissan has been the rival of TMC since their beginning in
truck manufacturing before World War Two. Contrary to the Toyoda
family's strong leadership and group-isms of TMC, Nissan's
formation is the history of merger and separation of
corporations. In addition to the dynamic company history, Nissan
and Hitachi have been linked through the Japan Industrial Bank,
which has close ties with the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (MITI), and the Ministry of Finance.
The formation of NMMC and Nissan's strategy for the
development as well as for the business in the U.S. are unique
for Japanese corporations and very different from TMC. Nissan's
first step for the new manufacturing company in the U.S. was the
formation of the subsidiary's organization that was intended to
be localized. This local company has been expected to be
responsible for all operations except production engineering.
Therefore, this American company of Japanese parentage was
responsible for the construction of the new plant.
Nissan succeeded in inviting Marvin T. Runyon, the former
Vice President in charge of body and assembly operations of Ford
Motor Company, to become the president and a chief executive
officer of NMMC in Aug. 1930. He was given the widest possible
latitude to develop not a Japanese company in the U.S. but an
American company of Japanese parentage. Zaitsu, a chief
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executive officer of NMMC, explained that " Most Japanese
companies with American subsidiaries have relied on Japanese
managers to run these enterprises. We decided to try a different
way; we would hire the most experienced American manager we could
hire, and give him a free hand to build an American company with
American leadership and American workers." The board, made up of
four directors, including three Nissan executives and Runyon,
outlined four objectives for NMMC, and gave Runyon the
responsibility and the authority to achieve them. After the
appointment, Runyon hired four vice presidents for engineering,
manufacturing, finance, and human resources. Alvin Folger, Vice
President for Engineering came from the Ford Motor Company in
1980. Jerry Benefiled, Vice President for Manufacturing joined
NMMC from the Ford Motor Company in 1980, too. James Stewart
came to NMMC in 1981 from Gulf+Western Manufacturing Company.
Wayne Write, Vice President for Human Resources, joined NMMC in
1982 from Texas Instruments Incorporated. The other two vice
presidents came from Nissan: Shuichi Yoshida for quality
assurance and Masuo Kiyota for production design. All six vice
presidents are responsible to Runyon.
Accordingly, Nissan's control on the development was
minimal. It formed a so-called C-30 task force whose leader has
been Zaitsu since the preliminary planning phase. During
construction, a small team of Japanese coordinators (C-30) of
five individuals remained constant and acted as consultants for
NMMC. In addition to Nissan's commitment to NMMC, NMMC also
committed to Daniel Construction regarding decision authority of
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change orders. Daniel was given the latitude to decide $50, 000
or less items by itself. Resident representatives of NMMC
decided more than $50,C)00 items. In the Toyota KY Project, TMC
did not give OHB decision making power on change orders.
Moreover-, TMC's head office in Japan decided change orders of
more than $10,000, spending much time because of its group
decision making system.
Development Process and Organization.
The development process, the schedule, and the organization
of the Nissan Smyrna project is described in this section.
Because Nissan committed Runyon to manage most of NMMC's
operations including the construction of the new manufacturing
plant, the client's strategy might well be very similar to that
of Ford Motor's. NMMC is an American company, so it uses only
American A/E and a general contractor in a relatively
traditional project organization, though a fast-track program is
used for the project.
Timing of the formation of the project organization,
including the selection of A/E and a general contractor, is one
of the most significant factors in the development process. A
fast-track program is another important factor that requires a
cost-plus-fee contract between a client and general contractors
and also requires operational complications during the design and
construction stage.
Some focal points of each development stage is as follows:
1) At the conceptual planning stage, the strategy of Nissan and
NMMC, that is, Runyon's strategy is important.
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2) At the planning/pre-design stage; the site selection and
structuring of the project organization are major events.
Runyon's previous association with Albert Kahn Associates, A/E in
Detroit, is a key factor in the project formation.
3) At the engineering and design stage; interaction between C-30
(Nissan's task force), NMMC, Kahn, and Daniel is an interesting
aspect.
4) At the procurement stage; contract types between project
participants as well as labor relations are important topics.
5) At the construction stage; the construction is the quite usual
American style. Daniel's self performance, and the use of night
and weekend shifts are important factors in the success of the
early delivery of the facility.
Figure 2-4-3-1 shows the development process of the Nissan
Smyrna Project. The vertical axis indicates the project
participants and the horizontal axis the progressive order from
the left to the right. Important events from "Need for
Facility"to "Construction" are allocated in boxes in the chart.
Arrows between boxes shows the relations of events. Among the
project participants, TN means Tennessee government or the local
government. AFL-CIO means the national construction union.
Nissan, NMMC, Kahn, Daniel and subs are the members of the
project organization.
The first events in the development process is Nissan's
confirmation of the need for a new facility. Nissan did the
preliminary survey for a plant site in the U.S. in the early
1970s. Like TMC, Nissan did political, market, industrial, and
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to
feasibility analyses for the new plant in the U.S. in the 1970s.
In 1 9 7 9 , Nissan formed the company's C-30 planning team whose
head was Zaitsu. Probably, Nissan decided the necessity of a new
plant in the U.S. around this time. Although the initial
production for the new manufacturing plant was small trucks, even
at this stage, Nissan presumably had a plan to change or expand
the plant to produce compact cars in the future.
As described in the previous section, Nissan set up a unique
strategy for its new subsidiary, NMMC. Nissan decided that NMMC
should be an American company and should hire an american
president and give him/her the widest possible authority to
structure and manage the new subsidiary. After Nissan's set up
of the strategy, Nissan succeeded in inviting Runyon to NMMC as
the president. Soon after his joining NMMC, he assumed full
responsibility of the development project, becoming actively
involved in the negotiation with the Tennessee government
regarding the site selection, and hiring Kahn as A/E for the new
construction.
Though Nissan's site survey in the U.S. began in the early
1970s, the intensive activities began after the formation of C-30
in 1979. Since Nissan's first visit to the site, Nissan sent the
investigation team five times or more before Runyon joined NMMC.
In early 1980, Nissan refined its requirements: About 400 acres
of flat land were required within fifty miles of the Nashville
airport, readily accessible to a railroad and an interstate
highway; the site must have an adequate water supply and other
necessary utilities, and its subsurface foundation must be firm
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and stable.
Nissan officially announced the new pickup truck
manufacturing plant project in the U.S. in April, 1980. During
Nissan's negotiation with several states including TN, NMMC was
incorporated in July. The president, Runyon started working on
Aug. 1. Though his major work in the early months of NMMC was
design, construction, and staffing, his contribution to the site
selection was important. Nissan got about 19 million dollars in
incentives from TN. Finally, on Oct. 30, 1980, Ishihara, the
president of Nissan, announced the decision on the Smyrna site.
Runyon's first major decision was his selection of Albert
Kahn and Associates as A/E, a prestigious Detroit A/E having
plenty of experience in auto plants. Runyon and Folger had known
several members of the firm personally through some previous
projects. Additionally, Shahan, Kahn's president, and his
associates helped the plant-site selection process to get the
project from NMMC.
After the selection of Kahn, Runyon made another key
decision on the development, the selection of Daniel Construction
for the general contractor in early 1981. Though Daniel had not
had experience in automobile plant construction, it had enough
skills and the manpower to manage the project. Daniel's head
office was located in South Carolina and its operations were
world wide.
Daniel Construction managed the fast-track program so well
that NMMC could begin production two months ahead of the
5i2i
schedule. Because Daniel is an open shop contractor, it build a
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merit shop for the project. Daniel used it own forces' work,,
(self performance) widely for the shell construction to
facilitate the fast-track program. Because of the self
performance, 280 of Daniel's staff worked in the site office at
the construction peak. The figure is very large compared with
OHB's about 60 staff in the Toyota KY Project site. According to
Jordan, Daniel's project manager of the Nissan Smyrna Project, if
Daniel had operated in a pure construction management mode, the
staffing would probably have been in the range of 40 to 45
individuals.
Daniel, one of the leading open-shop companies, built a
merit shop for the project. As NMMC expected, the AFL-CIO
attacked the project demanding that NMMC use only union
construction workers in the project, though about 95'4 of the
construction in middle Tennessee is done by nonunion labor (ENR,
Dec. 12, 1935). For example, on the ground-breaking day, several
hundred protestors came to interfere with the ceremony. Runyon
kept a firm stance against the unions saying that the union's
objectives did not match those of TN and NMMC. Governor
Alexander, supported Runyon's attitude expressing embarrassment
and disappointment that the hecklers had given such a rude
reception. Despite continued pressure by the AFL-CIO, Daniel and
NMMC carried out the project keeping the merit shop.
A fast-track program is an important factor in describing
the design and construction stage. The overlap of design and
construction had Daniel start construction without Kahn's
detailed blueprints that would be provided as construction
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proceeded. Because of the big size of the project and the short
schedule, both Kahn and Daniel's staff were large. More than one
hundred of Kahn's architects, engineers, and draftsmen worked on
the design. More than 250 of Daniel's staff managed more than
200 subcontractors which used nearly 4,000 construction workers
at a peak on the site. Daniel kept construction going day and
night with two ten-hour shifts working Monday through Thursday
and a thirteen-hour shift working Friday through Sunday.
Though Daniel and Kahn worked very hard with excellent
proficiency, the most important factor for the success in the
fast track-program is probably the good coordination between
NMMC, Kahn, and Daniel. Following Nissan's basic information for
the plant through the C-30 task force, NMMC working closely with
Nissan's consulting engineers, combined the local experience with
,Japanese data. Kahn was the next party to make drawings
according to the NMMC's information. Finally Daniel built the
plant following Kahn's construction documents. Because of the
nature of a fast-track program, there were far more decisions,
instructions, specific steps, facts and figures for the project
team to deal with during construction than in traditional
projects. NMMC reacted promptly not to terminate the flow of
construction. Nissan's delegation of authority to NMMC must be
seen a key factor in facilitating the cooperation between the
project participants.
Figure 2-4-3-2 shows the outline of the Nissan Smyrna
Project schedule. From the start of building construction in
April 1981 to the start of the test production in Feb. 1983, it
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took about 22 months. Seven months after the start of design and
engineering on Sep. 15, 1980, the building construction started
in Apr. 1981. This timing of design and construction is almost
the same as the Toyota KY Project. Nissan spent seven months to
make final decision on the plant site after the announcement of
the project in Apr. 1980. The general proportion of the Nissan
Smyrna Project schedule is similar to that of the Toyota KY
Project though grading work is less than in the Toyota KY.
Figure 2-4--3-3 shows the design and construction schedule of
the project. NMMC contracted with Daniel just before the ground-
breaking ceremony in Mar. 1981. Much work overlapped during the
construction. The weekend shift started in Dec. 1981 and the
night shift started in Mar. 1982. These shifts continued until
Feb. 1983. Compared with the traditional sequential program, the
fast-track program saved about seven months, which is the overlap
of design and building construction. The early start of
production equipment installment made for the complicated
coordination by Daniel between building construction work and
production engineering work.
Figure 2-4-3-4 shows the outline of the organization and
contract types of the Nissan Smyrna Project. The project
organization is classified as a contractor mode CM (explained in
Chapter 4). A separate designer, the single general contractor
appointed before the completion of work drawings, and numerous
subcontractors are factors of a contractor mode CM project
organization. The process of the organization formation is also
typical; NMMC selected Kahn first because of its good reputation
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and previous work experience with NMMC' s executives; then NMMC
selected Daniel as the general contractor.
Nothing is unusual in contract types between project members
as a development project in the U.S. NMMC contracts with Kahn by
a percentage fee contract, the most popular contract type between
clients and A/E. Because of the fast-track program, NMMC
contracted with Daniel by a cost-plus-fee contract, which is also
used often in American construction industry. Subcontracting is
a lump sum or unit price contracts, which use basically the same
rules as OHB in the Toyota KY Project.
According to Jordan, Daniel's project manager, Daniel had
the authority to spend up to $5,000 without Nissan approval and
the Nissan site construction manger had authority to spend up to
$50,000. Purchase up to $100,000 could be approved by the
manager of engineering. All expenditures over this level went to
Runyon's office for approval, and presumably Runyon had the
ultimate authority. This delegation of authority is totally
different from that of the Toyota KY Project.
Figure 2-4-3-5 shows the organization of NMMC for the
project. Former Ford Motor executives, Runyon and Folger, had
the final authority over the construction. Nissan's C-30 task
force acted as a consultant with NMMC regarding process and tool
engineering. NMMC seemed to have enoucgh staff and effective
organization to monitor the project and to correspond with Kahn
and Daniel.
Figure 2-4-3-6 shows the organization of Daniel's site
office for the Nissan Smyrna Project. The heavy use of Daniel's
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own work forces for the btilding shell work is an interesting
feature at the construction stage. Because of the flexibility of
Daniel's using its own forces' work to deal with the fast-track
program, the Daniel's staff counted 280 at the peak both for the
pure function of "construction management" and direct supervision
of the own forces work. According to Jordan, the staff taking
responsibility for the pure construction management for OHB in
the Toyota KY Project was in the range of 40 to 45; the function
of 235 to 240 of Daniel's staff in the Nissan Project is
allocated to general contractors and subcontractors in the Toyota
73
KY Project. Daniel's site organization was almost self contained
as with medium or even large American contractors organization.
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3. Toyota Kentucky Project
About one year after the announcement of TMC's $800 million
automotive plant construction in Scott County, Kentucky, most
structural steel frames have been assembled on the 1.300 acres
site, in January,1987. (see figure 3-0-1) The project has been
sensational both in the U.S. and Japan since the planning stage.
The thesis covers the project until the end of Jan. 1987, when
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about 50% of the construction was completed.
The first part of this section (3-1) summarizes the
important items of the project including some drawings and
pictures. The second part (3-2) describes the development
process and schedule in detail. The last part (3-3) explains the
project organization including contract types.
Special features of the project are as follows:
1) This is the first individual direct investment into the U.S.
by TMC,
2) Ohbayashi manages the project using the fast-track program as
a construction manager by turnkey contract with TMC,
3) TMC will get more than or equal to $125 million in aid from
the Kentucky government,
4) TMC and Ohbayashi made a project agreement (PA) with the AFL-
CIO, construction labor union, during the construction.
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FIGURE 3-0-1: TOYOTA KY PROJECT IN JAN. 1987
The site diagrm identifies building name and location. Square footage for each is
shown below. Te completed facility will cover approximately 1,400 acres.
1. Press & Welding (1,170,016)
2. Trim &Assemblv (1,054,878)
3. Paint (869,336)
4. Plastics (343,175)
5. Administratim (91,964)
6. Test Laboratory (57028)
7 Electrical Pbwerhouse (13,300)
8. Utility Building (66,377)
9. Training Center (46,400)
10. Wastetaer Pmtreatment (1Z252) SOURCE: OUTLINE, JAN. 1987
3-1 Schematic Project Summary
Project summary is as follows:
1) Project name; Toyota Automotive Manufacturing facility Project
2) Project location; Scott County, Kentucky
3) F'roject organization;
Owner, Toyota Motor Manufacturing, USA,Inc.
Construction manager, Ohbayashi Corp.
Architect/Engineer, Giffles Associates Inc.
4) Time schedule; Start of grading work, Mar.3,1986
Start of building work, Aug.4,1986
Completion (plan) 1988
5) Site area; 1293.03 acres (5,232,763 SM)
6) Floor area; 3,980,189.00 SF (369,760 SM)
7) Area names and general contractors
Area Name : Bldg.Area (SF) : General Contractor
- - - - - - - - - - -- - - - ---- --- ----------------------.--
#100 Press & 1,344,389 : Daniel International Corp.
Welding
#200 Paint : 753,718 NIC Constructors
#300 Trim & : 1,230,831 : Blount Brothers Corp.
Assembly
#400 Plastics 384,901 James N Gray Const. Co.,Inc.
#500 Utility : 109,700 : Beacon const. Co., Inc.
#600 Admi . : 153, 400
Testlab
#700 Site Works 3,250 Metric Const.,Inc.
Total : 3,980, 189
8) Building Outline;
a. Foundation -- caisson & spread footing
b. Structure -- structural steel
c. Roof -- metal deck & insulation & built-up roofing
d. Exterior Finish -- brick & block & insulated metal siding
e. Floor -- slab on grade, hardener
9) Production capacity; 200,000 cars per year
10) Products; passenger cars of 2000cc class
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11) Scfhematic plan of main shops
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3-2 Developent Process and Schedule
The development process arid schedule of the Toyota KY
Project is described in this section. After the outline of the
development process and schedule, details will be explained
following the order of development process from the conceptual
planning stage through the construction stage.
The timing of the formation of the project organization,
which includes the selection of the construction manager and the
architect and engineer (A/E) is one of the most important factors
in the development process. The fast-track program is another
important factor which has a critical influence on the project
organization and operational complications throughout the design
and construction stages.
There are several focal points at each development stage.
On the conceptual planning stage, TMC's strategy for the new
project is an important issue as well as its long term
relationship with OHB. Structuring the project organization and
selecting the site are major events during the planning/pre-
design stage. Interaction between TMC, OHB, and Giffles
Associates (GIF) is an interesting aspect at the engineering and
design stage. Labor relations including TMC, OHB, KY, and the
AFL-CIO is unavoidable arid one of the most important factors
during the procurement and construction stages. Contract types
and operational procedures on procurement will be described here.
Implementation of the Total Quality Control (TCC) program and
interaction among TMC, OHB, GIF, and general contractors are the
main topics at the construction stage.
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Figure 3-2-1 shows the development process of the project.
The vertical axis indicates the project participants and the
horizontal axis means the progressive order from the left to the
right. Important events from "Need for Facility" to
"Construction" are allocated in boxes in the chart. Arrows
between boxes show the relations of events. Among the project
participants, KY means the Kentucky government and the Scott
County government. The AFL-CIO means the national construction
union. KY and the AFL-CIO are the most influential parties
outside of the project organization. TMC, OHB, GIF, general
contractors, and sub-contractors are the members of the project
organization. Slanting arrows among GIF, GCs (general
contractors), and Subs (subcontractors) mean the overlap of the
design and construction.
The first event of the development process is TMC's need for
the new facility. This includes political, marketing,
industrial, and feasibility analyses for the TMC's first
individual direct investment for the manufacturing plant. After
the confirmation of the need for the facility, TMC has to set up
the strategy for the new automotive plant including management,
operation of the facility, and construction.
Though there is no clear statement of TMC's policy for the
construction of the project, it could be described that TMC has
tried to build a TMC-style plant in the U.S. using TMC's
traditional construction management as much as possible, even
though using American contractors. Because TMC wants to be
involved in the construction but does not have any experience of
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FIGURE 3-2-1: DEVELOPMENT PROCESS CHART
construction in the U.S., TMC decided to select a Japanese
design-builder from the most reliable contractors who have had
long term relationships with TMC. According to this strategy,
TMC contracted with OHB by turnkey contract.
At the same time, TMC tried to select the construction site
after the public announcement of the project. Finally, TMC
selected KY because of the favorable incentives, labor quality,
parts supply, market closeness, and others. After TMC's site
selection, KY does the grading of the site, and some
infrastructure development around the site as a part of the
incentives. Along with this work, KY checks and approves
several building permissions, and monitors labor relations for
the local construction industry and workers.
After the design-build contract with TMC, OHB selected A/E,
Giffles Associates (GIF), and got the approval from TMC. OHB
defines itself as a design-manager in the project, that is, OHB
deals with design and construction management without dealing
with the construction directly. OHB assigns the operational
function of the construction to six general contractors with
cost-plus-fee contract, who are selected by negotiation.
Consulting with TMC, OHB selects the type of labor relations as a
merit shop, that is, OHB uses both union and non-union
contractors. Talking with KY, OHB and TMC selects the most
favorable shop for the local contractors and workers. All of the
selected general contractors, except for Gray Construction (open
shop contractor in KY), can contract both with union and non-
union sub-contractors.
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After the selection of the general contractors, OHB's main
job is the construction management, that is, assistance for TMC's
involvement into design and construction, coordination between
A/E and contractors, monitoring the construction, labor
relations, public relations, etc.
Though union contractors have a chance to get contracts from
OHB because of the merit shop, open shop contractors dominate the
contracts because of their higher productivity in this area,
which enables them to offer lower bids than union-contractors.
The building trades tried to impose on the project an agreement
to make the project union shop. The AFL-CIO put strong pressure
from the beginning of the project on OHB, KY., and TMC.
Finally, the AFL-CIO got the project agreement from TMC and
OHEB after about 50% of the construction was completed in Dec.
1986. Though the actual impact of the project agreement on the
project is out of the scope of the thesis, the change in the sub-
contractors' labor relations, higher wage rate, and change of
working conditions, will have about a three-month delay of the
schedule.
Figure 3-2-2 shows the outline of the project schedule. The
scope of the thesis is until the end of Jan. 1987. The project
officially appeared in public on July 23,1985 by TMC's
announcement of the decision of direct investment in the auto
manufacturing plant in the U.S. Soon after the announcement 31
states offered proposals to invite the plant. On Dec. 11, 1985,
TMC decided on the site in Scott County, Kentucky. The schematic
design began at the beginning of 1986. Grading work began in
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Mar. 1.986 and Building construction started in Aug. 1986. The
construction is planned to be completed in early 1988. TMC plans
to produce the first car in mid or late 1988.
Figure 3-2-3 shows the design and construction schedule.
The schematic design (including design development phase) that
began in Jan. 1986 took three months to complete. The
construction documents phase began in Apr. 1986. During the
schematic design and design development phases, the A/E made
schematic drawings, outline specifications, and preliminary
estimates of cost. During the construction documents phase, the
A/E made working drawings, specifications, and bid documents.
Grading began in Mar. 1986 and was completed in Aug. 1986.
Though building work was planned to start on Jun.20, the work
actually began on Aug. 4 because of a delay in obtaining the
Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) permission. After the
beginning of the piling and foundation work, the construction
went basically smoothly until the end of Jan. 1987, when the
effects of the project agreement with AFL-CIO have not appeared
yet. Structural steel work in the Press, Welding, and Assembling
shops began in Sep. 1986 and was finished in Jan.1987.
Structural steel in the Paint shop began in Oct. 1986 and is
planned to be completed in Mar. 1987.
As of the end of Jan. 1987, most of the structural steel
frames have been assembled, and roof and wall work have started,
but mechanical and electrical (M/E) work have not started yet.
M/E work was planned to begin in Dec.1986, but the work will
begin mid Feb. 1987 after two and half months delay from the
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original schedule. This is because OHB terminated bidding for
one month after Nov.21, 1986 due to the negotiation about the
project agreement with the AFL-CIO. In addition to the one month
termination of the bidding, it takes about one and half months to
do re-bidding. The Project Agreement between TMC and the AFL-CIO
became effective as of Dec. 1, 1986.
Finally, installment of the production equipment is planned
to start in Sep. 1987. OHB plans to complete the construction in
Mar.1988, which is a three-month delay from the original schedule
due to the Project Agreement during the construction.
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3-2-1 Planning/Pr-e-design Stage
Important events during the planning/pre-design stage are
such as "Need for Facility,""Set LP Strategy, ""Selection of
Site,""Selection of Design-Builder, "and "Selection of A/E" in
Figure 3-2-1, the Development Process Chart. The main actor on
this stage is TMC. This stage was begun in the late 70s,
probably around 1977 when Honda Motor decided to build its motor-
cycle manufacturing plant in the U.S.
Need for Facility:
TMC examined many factors to confirm the necessity for the
new manufacturing facility in the U.S. TMC and Nissan studied
the feasibility of direct investment into the U.S. in the late
70s, but they decided to postpone the investment. The problems
13
exceeded the advantages for TMC and Nissan at that time. The
advantages were as follows:
1) Price of energy and materials such as Aluminum and glass was
low due to the appreciated yen and the depreciated U.S. dollar.
2) TMC could avoid tariffs and save shipping cost.
3) TMC could avoid the U.S. government's protectionism by
reducing the excessive export of Japanese cars.
The disadvantages were as follows:
1) Though in the long run, TMC could solve the cost inflation
problem due to the appreciation of the yen, in the short run, TMC
would certainly suffer from cost up for a 240,000 car/year
production capacity plant.
2) TMC could not expect the similar suppliers' cooperation that
TMC had enjoyed in Japan. Japanese suppliers could produce high
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quai a. d l c -, ow c:jt proDcicts constant I -for TMC. Add t i onal 1 y .,
it was doubtful that TMC could appl y the Toyota Producti on System
j.n the U.S.
3) The labor wage of the UAW is higher than that of the Japanese,
though the di ff erenc e of the wages was reduced due to the
appreciation of the yen.
4) B ec.ause of the differences of 1abor quality, 1abor relations,
personnel management system, and corporate management style, the
productivity o-f Americ:an labor was lower than that of the
Japanese; additionally it was difficult to do Japanese-style
quality control. TMC had strong fear of the UAW which held long-
term strikes in some cases.
13
Ni kkou Research Center explains that considering these above
factors. exports from Japan to the U.S. ware more profitable than
produc.ti on in the U.S. for TMC in late 70s, even i f the yen
continued to appreciate.
This analysis presents the most important considerations for
TMC to define its need for the new faci 1 itv in the U.S. In the
late 70s, the industrial climate for TMC's direct investment into
the? U. S. was unfavorabl e, and also the Japanese government had a
negat ive attitude against the direct investment.
In Dec. 1979, TIC announced that it was studying production
in the U.S. to avoid tightening import restrictions. A fter a
whi 1 e, in Fe:'b. 19'80' several newspaper- reported that TMC had no
p l - to b:u i l d the U. S. p1 ant s desp i te thr eats of i mpor t
restri cti ons. But even after the announcement, the WallI Street
Journa, Apr.9, 1980, reported TMC sti11 studied the feasibility
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0f building vehiles in the U.S. In July 1980, several
newspapers reported that TMC negoti ated wi th Ford Motor on a
possil ie joint venture auto product ion in the U. S. Though the
negotiation continued in 1981, they could not reach agreement.
Around 1981, trade f r i ct i on between the U. S. and Japan
emerged clearly and changed the situation of TMC's direct
investment. Protectionism by the U. S. government appeared and
the Jap anese government changed its attitude for the Japanese
corporaitions' direct investment in order to ease the trade
friction.
Aft.er the cancelation of the planned joint venture with Ford
Motors, TMC changed its possible
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Inter national Trade and Industry (MITI) advocated the joint
venture as one of the strategies to avoid trade friction.
Kajiwara, an economist, explained that TMC had expected the U.S.
government to ease import restrictions while TMC participated in
NUMMI, but on the contrary to TMC's expectation, the pressure by
the U.S. government became stronger in 1985. Around the
beginning of 1985, TMC might have had to change its policy of
building a new manufacturing plant individually in the U.S., or
the collaborative effort with GM might be one calculated step for
TMC's final plan to establish its plant in the U.S. Finally, TMC
announced the new automotive manufacturing plant project on July
23, 1985, probably on the basis of political consideration.
Set up Strategy:
Along with the confirmation of the need for the new
facility, TMC had set up the strategy for the new manufacturing
plant's management, operation, and construction. Though TMC has
learned about American auto manufacturing industry including the
UAW through its experience in NUMMI, the joint venture
established with GM in California, several problems related with
the production and sales still remained. Especially the future
automobile market situation in the U.S. is one of the most
important factors for TMC's new plant.
The expected automobile market condition in the U.S. in 1988
or 1989 is very competitive for TMC because many Japanese car
manufacturers plan to increase or start car production in the
U.S.: Nissan plans to produce 120,000 car/year in 1987; Honda
plans 300,00) car/year in 1988; Mazda and Mitsubishi plan to
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start production in 1987 or 1988. In addition to those Japanese
companies' activities, GM also plans to produce compact cars in
1989 by the Saturn project. Hyundai's participation in the
automobile market in the U.S. will enhance the keen competition.
Fear of a saturated market of small cars or Japanese cars in
the U.S. is probably the main reason for TMC's setting fast
construction as the first priority of the construction.
Because TMC has many staff for the plant construction, and
has confidence in Toyota's production system, TMC's policy for
the new construction may well be as follows: TMC tries to build a
TMC-style plant in the U.S. using TMC's traditional construction
management methods as much as possible even though using only
American builders. Then, TMC decided to choose a Japanese
design-builder who has much experience in the U.S. so that TMC
can participate much in the design and construction process as
well as avoid risks associated with projects in the new
environment.
Site Selection:
Though TMC asked three American and Japanese companies to
conduct feasibility studies, including possible site
investigation in 1980, practical activities of site selection for
the new project started with the official announcement of the
project on July 23, 1985.
The interaction between TMC and KY can be summarized as
:7'9
fol los:
May, 1984; the first KY's Far-East office's contact with TMC
regarding possible plant site.
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May, 1984; representatives of KY visited TMC.
Jul. 1984; KY submitted basic information about KY to TMC.
Mar. 1985; Governor Collins visited Japan by the invitation of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Collins met Yamamoto, vice
director- of TMC.
Jun. 1985; KY submitted data for an industrial site in
Georgetown.
Jul. 2, 1985; Nihon Keizai Shinbun (Japan Economic Newspaper),
reported TMC's individual direct investment in the U.S. as the
top news.
Jul. 9, 1985; Wall Street Journal mentioned Tennessee, Kentucky,
Indiana, and Missouri as possible sites for the plant.
Jul. 23,1985; TMC officially announced the individual direct
investment. TMC sent the first questionnaires to states
governors.
Oct. 1985; TMC sent the second questionnaires to selected states.
Oct. 15, 1985; TMC's first investigation team arrived at KY, and
stayed for two days.
Oct. 25, 1985; Collins met Toyoda, the president, Kusunoki, vice
president, and others of TMC.
Nov. 8, 1985; TMC's second investigation team visited KY and
stayed for nine days.
Nov. 14, 1985; Three of TMC's vice presidents, Tsuji, Kamio, and
Kusunoki, visited KY and stayed for two days.
Dec. 3, 1985; TMC sent a third investigation team to KY and
Tennessee, each team having 12 or 13 members. KY finally
acquired the possible site near Georgetown at this stage. KY and
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TMC had a final negotiation-r about incentives, while TMC seemed
to do the same procedure with Tennessee.
Dec. 8, 1985; Mr.and Mrs.Toyoda, the director of TMC, visited
Lexington,KY and met Collins.
Dec. 11, 1985; TMC officially announced the decision on the site
in K.*Y
To invite TMC, KY offered a $125 million incentive package,
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states to Japanese auto manufacturers as shown in Table 3-2-1.
Though the percentage of KY's incentives over direct investment
is not the highest, the absolute amount is the biggest. The AFL-
CIO's legal challenges against KY's incentives, and the
disqualification for TMC to get investment tax credit in the new
tax law, possibly by the unions strong opposition against TMC,
could be interpreted as the reaction against the possibly
excessive incentives for TMC.
As TMC used three consultants for the feasibility study in
1990, TMC might well use several consultants including OHB for
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site evaluation in 1985. As TMC's spokesmen said that TMC would
decide on plant sites, considering such factors as quality of
labor, parts proc.Irement, etc., TMC evaluated possible sites from
many points.
According to OHB's site evaluation sheet for the project,
evaluated items in the questionnaires counted 97 classified in
six areas, such as administrative regulations, labor quality,
welfare and amenity for living, industrial transportation, site
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conditions, and incentives for the site. These six areas could
be further classified as follows:
1) Administrative regulations; tax, labor law, environmental
regulations, building code, welfare charge, efficiency of the
government.
2) Labor quality; labor, residents, wage rate.
3) Welfare and amenity for living; education and training,
recreation, medical service, etc.
4) Industrial transportation; assembled cars, parts, raw
materials, Complete Knock Down Box, accessibility to highway and
railway.
5) Site conditions; building, public service, parcel, climate,
other auto manufacturers' location, construction labor.
6) Incentives for industrial investment; financial assistance,
education and training assistance, assistance in site
development, etc.
Having gotten the responses to the second questionnaires
from selected states, TMC sent the first and second investigation
team to several states in order to get detailed information. At
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this stage, the following points were discussed: rezoning,
permissions, industry tracks, geotechnical and geographical
conditions, public utilities, and site development.
The project site was in the agricultural zone next to the
industrial zone, and the planning department of Scott County had
been working to change the zoning, including that of the project
site, to the industrial zone. Though the usual procedure of
rezoning begins from the application for rezoning by a landlord
or his agent, Scott County allowed the county to rezone the area
rather than by the TMC's application.
At the site selection stage, TMC investigated the details of
regulations regarding city planning, environmental policy, and
building and construction. The details are explained in the part
of "project permissions" at the design phase.
Selection of Design-Builder:
Following the setup of TMC's strategy for the construction,
it started negotiation with several general contractors including
OHB to select the design-builder of the new project. Though it
is not clear when TMC decided to choose OHB as the design-builder
of the new facility, OHB assisted in TMC's site selection before
the design-build contract. Because OHB has the longest
relationship among the competitors with TMC, and has 20 years
experience in U.S. construction, OHB was probably the most
reasonable selection for TMC. Additionally, OHB's assistance for
TMC's site selection using its all American subsidiary, Citadel,
to gather information, was probably the key point for OHB to get
the turnkey contract with TMC.
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TMC and OHB use the AGC's turnkey contract form rather than
the AIA form, because the AIA does riot have a design-build type
contract form. Though the AIA has a standard form of "Owner-
Contractor Agreement Form - Cost Plus Fee," A111, TMC and OHB did
not use this because TMC's first priority for the new
construction is probably to choose a reliable contractor who is
responsible for all the project process. Cost-plus-fee contract
is basically unfavorable for TMC because it cannot guarantee the
construction cost nor utilize price competition among possible
prime contractors.
Because the design--build or turnkey contract has been
developed from the negotiated contract, the nature of the AGC's
design-build contract is the cost-plus-fee contract. Because the
cost-plus-fee contract is rarely used in building construction in
Japan, this is the first case for TMC and OHB to make this kind
of contract. Based on the mutual trust through the long term
relationship, OHB has proceeded to start the project without
setting OHB's fee, nor with a definite completion date of the
construction.
Because the shortest construction period at reasonable or
cost effective price may well be TMC's goal for the project, TMC
and OHB confirmed the shortest schedule on the best effort base
as the first priority. They did not set the exact completion
date because it was unrealistic to set the date because of many
uncertainties at this stage.
Selection of A/E:
The first important task of OHB after the design-build
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c nt.ratc t w.i tI-h TMC was the sel c t i o + a., n arch itect and engineer
(A/E) , this may be one of the most important decisions on cost
and quality o-f the bui ding as wel1 as on the scheduling of the
bui l di ng devel opmen t. OHB selected Gi f fi1es A ssoc i ates 4, Inc.
(GIF) in Nov. 1985.
After identifying ten potential candidate for A/E, OHB
gathered important factors about them for the evaluation. The
important considerations are as follows:
1) Location of design office.
2) Location of main design works.
3) Type of the firm; Architect/ Engineer. Engineer/Architect, and
Ar chi tect /Engi neer /Pl anner .
4) Specialization of works; manufacturing, building, power plant.
5) ElNR rank ing ir 1984.
6) Current manpower aind classification of the staff; architect,
civil engineer., structural engineer. electrical engi neer.
mechani cal engineer, and industrial engineer.
7) Current work load; backlog, total project amount in dollars,
major projects.
8) Experience on major projects of automotive assembly; number of
projects in the past five years, total floor area in this five
yeaEirs, main clients in this five years.
9) Experience with Japanese cli ents.
1C)) Proposed fee section; list alternate approach such as lumo
sum, hourly rate, cost pluS fee, etc.
No selection process is foolproof, but gathering information
in an organized manner can provide a clearer image of A/E
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57
c(andidat es for the client.
GI.F' s ou e tin accor di ng to OHB' s eval uati on sheet is as
1) /Es name; i f-f leS Associ. ates Inc.
2) Location of heiad off ice and branches: Southfield, MI, Troy,
MI, Atl1 ansta, GA.
3) Location of main design works; Midwest, West, and Southwest.
4) Type of the firm; Architect/Engineer.
5) Speci-fic ation of the fTirm; manufac tur ing 66%, power plant 15%.
6) ENR ranking in 1984; 44th, 46.3 million dollars (design
contract)
7) Current manpower and classification o-f staff; total 765, 125
architects, 40 civil engineers, 90 structural engineers, 83
electri cal engineers, 147 mechanical engineers, and 54 industrial
erig ine .
8) Cu rren t work 1 oad; 24 proj ects. 1658 mill ion (oro i ec:t
amounrt) main cli ents are Ford and General Dynamics.
9) Ex per i ence on maior proi ect s of automotive assembly; 22
projects, 8 million SF, (clients) GMFord, VW, and Nihondensou
(all in past five years).
10) Ex--perien(ce with Japanese clients; Nihondensou (Southfield),
Mazda (Hircshima plant). NEC (GA).
11) Fee, 3. 25%
1.2) Other comments; the 1arqest A/E among Detroit A'/Es.
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3-2-2 Desi gn Stage:
Important events during the design stage are those such as
"Engineering and Design, " and "Bui I ding Permi ssi ons, " in Figure
3-2-1, the Development Process Chart. The main actor on this
stage is GIF. The main jobs of engineering and design began in
Jan. 1986 and finished in Jan. 1987. KY is responsible for
issuing various permits regarding city planning, environmental
policy, and construction.
Engineering and Design:
After the architectural contract with OHB, GIF started
schematic design through discussion with TMC assisted by OHB.
Though GIF has had much experience both in automotive plants and
with Japanese clients, OHB's role as a bridge between TMC and GIF
is important because of communication difficulties, and TMC's
higher involvement in design than other Japanese clients.
The schematic design phase began at the beginning of Jan.
1986 and almost finished in late Feb. 1986. Using the schematic
design, OHB started the selection of general contractors from
Feb. 27. Schematic design and design development phases finished
in late Mar. 1986. After that, the construction documents phase
began and finished in Jan. 1987. During this phase, GIF made
working drawings, specifications, and bid documents. Working
drawings total more than 1500 which are classified into five
categories; architecture, steel structure, foundation,
mechanical, and electrical. GIF does quantity survey and
preliminary cost estimation. GIF divided the bid documents into
47 to manage the design process for the fast track program.
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One of the pec:Lliarities of TMC is that it has a large
division for the facility environment including maintenance and
construction (Shisetsu Kankyou Bu), which has about 200 staff
members. In the division, TMC has a registered design and
engineering office, which has about 100 staff. Because TMC has
sophisticated planning and facility groups having the knowledge
and ability to do everything of an A/E's functions for its plants
in Japan, the level of TMC's involvement in and requirements for
the plant design is one of the heaviest among GIF's clients. At
the same
design i
to cover
U.S.
time, TMC's
s one of the
the lack of
heavy involvement in the Toyota KY plant
reasons to select a Japanese design-builder
experience of building development in the
Though TMC is a competent company in engineering and design
for the facilities in Japan, it may well be an ordinary major
industrial corporate client in the U.S. According to the
76
classification of industrial clients by Lefebvre, the major
ordinary industrial client organization has a planning group
representing the division requiring the facility, a corporate
plant engineering, construction group, the coordinator of the
development of the project among the division, top management,
35
and A/E. TMC's situation for the Toyota KY Project may well be
like this ordinary client, though TMC communicates through OHB
with GIF.
While TMC is famous for its Just-in-time production system,
it is one of the leading companies which employ the Total Quality
Control program. TMC applies the TQC program to all phases of
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the company operations, such as management, sales, production,
procurement, and construction. Feigenbaum argued that QC
programs should focus on defect prevention rather than
inspection. Though his proposals did not impress American
corporations, his basic ideas were accepted and modified in some
parts by many Japanese corporations including TMC. Among many
special features of the TQC program, the intensive use of value
engineering (VE) for various steps in company's operations
including its plant construction caused some stress between TMC
and American construction industry during the project.
TMC's policy, applying the TOC program for its construction,
is unusual even in Japanese automotive plant construction
projects. TMC has developed the application of TOC for its
management of construction by long time association with selected
general. contractors including OHB in Jzpan. OHB and other
selected general contractors have developed their own programs to
respond to TMC through long time experience with TMC's projects.
Because TMC's TQC program for the construction works well by
the long term relationship with limited general contractors in
Japan, the excessive application of the TUC program for the new
project in the U.S. caused some stress among the project members.
This aspect will be discussed further in section 3-2-4,
Construction Stage. Even a Japanese contractor that has no prior
experience of TMC's project would certainly have some
difficulties in responding appropriately with TMC's requirements.
GIF, supported by OHB, basically does its design and engineering
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works well, but certainly there are many surprising things for
GIF in its interaction with TMC.
Possible reasons for GIF's surprises in the association with
TMC are as follows:
1) GIF's lack of previous experience of TMC's projects.
2) TMC's lack of experience with the fast-track program and
construction in the U.S.
3) Differences of business relationships of clients with the A/E
between Japan and the U.S.
4) Group decision system of Japanese management system including
TMC's.
5) Some conflicts between intensive VE as a part of the TQC
program and the fast-track program.
Even though OHB works as a buffer between TMC and GIF, the
inherent mismatch of intensive VE with the fast-track program
generates some stress for TMC, OHB, and GIF at the engineering
and design stage. Many change orders during construction are
usual in fast-track program. Therefore the flexibility of the
tentative drawings (though it costs a little) is more important
than very detailed analysis for some items that have to include
some undecided items.
Though TMC understands special features of the fast-tack
program conceptually, it has had some difficulties in adjusting
their traditional management style for its construction. For
instance, space efficiency, which is a typical goal for Japanese
auto manufacturers, has caused TMC to lose flexibility of
tentative drawings for design changes. In the fast-track
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program., construction of the building shell begins without
defining the building service equipment, such as HVAC, plumbing,
and M/E. Though the building shell can be divided relatively
easily into each shop, the building service equipment need to be
connected as one system. Therefore, in the fast-track program,
building layout should have enough space that gives flexibility
for the connections of building service equipment that will be
designed during the shell construction. TMC tried to get space
efficiency through intensive VE on the early stage of design. As
a result, this caused costly joints of building equipment between
buildings.
The slow decision making procedure of TMC and less
commitment of authority to OHB and GIF creates some inefficiency
in the fast-track program. Intensive use of V/E in the TQC
framework has many advantages in the office or in plant
development especially in the traditional construction process
that needs minimal change orders, but in the fast-track program
delay of decision from appropriate timing by the excessive use
of VE and group decision process may well cause more
disadvantages than advantages by VE.
Besides the complexity of the fast-track program, cultural
difference may cause some frustrations between the client and
A/E. Some cause for difficulties at the design stage related to
cultural differences are as follows:
1) The complicated process for the A/E to ask Japanese clients to
provide some information or to give permissions.
2) Japanese clients' unorganized manner to request design
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c han g? e s.
3) Di fference of language.
4) Different conceptions on the same words.
For OHB, TMC's policy of heavy involvement in the design and
construction of the Toyota KY Project is one of the most
important reasons to become the design-builder by itself rather
than to have Citadel do the design and construction of the
project. OHB's goal is to satisfy TMC by not only providing the
new facility of satisfactory quality within the budget and
schedule but also offering appropriate service that fulfills
TMC's requirement. Coordination between TMC, GIF, and the
general. contractors is a very complicated matter; this may well
be the most important factor why OHB got the project from TMC.
Project Per-missions:
Kentucky state and Scott County governments are responsible
for approving the project, checking various issues such as city
planning, environmental policy, and building design and
construction. Time and the complexity of obtaining permits are
very important for a short--schedule project. Even at the site
selection stage, all permissions were studied carefully by TMC
and OHB. Assistance and some simplification of permission
procedures by KY were considered as an important part of
incentives for TMC.
1) City Planning Act:
As explained in the site selection stage, Scott County
decided to rezone the project site area by itself. Actually, the
planning commission, consisting of Scott County, Georgetown,
136
Sadieville, and Stamping Ground, administers comprehensive plan,
zoning, building permits and others. Only the zoning ordinance
has a direct influence on the Toyota KY project; the regulating
for industrial zone (I-1) includes such factors as minimum lot
size (more than or equal to five acres), building coverage (at
most 50 ".)., set back (50 feet for front and side, 25 feet for
back), and allowable facility usages. No serious obstacles exist
in the zoning ordinance for the project.
2) Environmental Protection Act:
Environmental protection regulations are complicated and
very important for industrial building developments. Through
time and complexity to obtain environmental regulation permits at
the site selection stage, the start of building construction was
delayed by one and half months because of the delay of obtaining
EPA permission.
KY does not have a State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA),
which many other states have legislated. Therefore, TMC does not
need to make an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) or to go
through the time-taking procedures (public announcement, public
hearing, etc.) which are required by SEPA in some other states.
KY requires developers to get the permissions shown in table
3-2-2 (not including those at the plant operation stage) from the
Department of Environmental Protection in KY. These are based on
Federal law, such as the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. The Division of Air
Pollution Control, of Waste Management, and of Water evaluate
applications and issue permissions individually. The
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Table 3-2-2
Required Permissions Regarding Environmental Policy or
Construction Stage in KY
Administrative Persmissions : Comments
Division
A. :1. Construction Air pollution source and
of Air Pollution: Permit : construction of air
Control : pollution control
facilities.
:2. Prevention of Similar permission to the
: Significant : above. Some criteria are
: Deterioration : different from 1. PSD
: (PSD) Construction: permission is applicable
: Permit : for facilities that
: prodece more than 250
: ton/year pollution.
B. :3. Hazardous Waste Sources of non-poison
of Waste : Generator : waste 1 ton/month or
Management : Registration poisonous waste i kg/
: month.
:5. Hazardous Waste : The following facilities'
Facility Permit : construction and
: a. Storage : operations.
: b. Treatment
: c. Disposal
C. :1. Waste Water : Construction of waste
of Water : Facility water treatment
: Construction : facilities.
Permit
:2. Waste Water : Operation of waste water
Facility : facilities.
: Operating
: Permi t
:4. Flood Plain : Change of natural
: Construction waterway or flood plain.
Permit
Source: OHB's internal paper.
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construction permit (A-1) is the most important permission for
TMC to obtain before the start of building foundation work.
3) Construction Permissions:
The KY state government and the local government check and
issue building permits. The applicable law is the Kentucky
Building Code, the National Electrical Code, and others. To
achieve TMC's short construction schedule, TMC and OHB studied
the time and complexity of obtaining building and construction
permits as well as the possibility of the fast-track program at
the the site selection stage. During the design or construction
phase,, GIF applies for permissions; on the other hand, the
Department of building of the KY government is responsible for
issuing most permissions.
A fast-track program is possible in KY because developers
can get partial permits according to the design progress. The
following six permits are needed for developers to get
individually:
1) Foundation permit; This permit is for the building
foundation, machine foundation, and foundation pile. Preliminary
fire sprinkler plan drawings and plumbing drawings related to the
foundation are required for the application. Getting all permits
regarding environmental regulations before the application is
necessary. Individual application for building foundation from
the machine foundation, or individual application for each
building in one project that has several buildings is
possibletoo.
Given that the Department of Building in KY and GIF keep
1;9
continuous and close contact, the Department Building will issue
permits within several days after GIF's applications. This
condition is applicable for the following permissions:
2) Shell Permit; This permit is for the building shell that does
not include interior finish works. Further divided applications,
such as structural steel, roof, or exterior wall, are possible.
3) Interior Improvement Permit.
4) HVAC Permit.
5) Fire Sprinkler Permit.
6) Electrical.
The department of Building does not do plan to check for
building service electrical equipment or production electrical
equipment. Resident inspectors inspect and approve the
electrical works.
Another advantage for TMC is the non-requirement for a
'grading permit in KY, that is, site clearing, grading, and
excavation can proceed without permission.
KY appointed an officer for the project to facilitate the
clerical procedure of permissions. KY also suggested that TMC
submit applications to the local government and the state
government simultaneously though usually developers submit
applications only to the local government. This simultaneous
application facilitated the permission procedure because approval
by the state government is necessary for the local government to
issue permits.
Permissions for the installment of production equipment is
flexible. If KY judges the site safety by OHB's submission of
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machine laVoLIt and by the signs of safety methods at the site,
installment can start without the occupancy permit. Japanese
equipment that has some past records in the U.S. or has a
certificate of Japanese authority is no problem.
Other- important permissions or the procedures during design
and construction are as follows: TMC needs the permissions of
the Department for Environmental Protection for plumbing and
waste water drawings; TMC can start the production by obtaining
the Temporary Occupancy Permit before the Occupancy Permit; KY
examines drawings of boilers, compressors, and fuel tanks; land
scape work does not need permission; the retention pond won't be
necessary; the state government sends all resident inspectors.
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3-2-3 Procurement Stage (including labor relations)
Important events during the procurement stage are those such
as "Selection of General Contractors," "Bidding Out," and labor
relations shown in Figure 3-2-1, the Development Process Chart.
On this stage, OHB assumes a very important role in coordinating
GIF, GCs, and Subs, and in negotiating with the AFL-CIO and the
KY government as an agent of TMC. Different objectives of TMC,
OHB, KY, and the AFL-CIO are a cause of a labor-management
battle.
Selection of GCs:
OHB selected six general contractors from 13 as area general
contractors in late Mar. 1986, after the finishing of the
schematic design. Before the selection of GCs, OHB defined
itself as a design-manager who does not employ any hourly wage
construction workers directly on its payroll. OHB also decided a
hiring plan as the merit shop after the investigation of labor
relations in KY. All selected GCs except for Gray Construction,
an open shop contractor in KY are merit shop contractors. All
contractors are capable of dealing with self-performance by non-
union workers in case of troubles with the union.
OHB contracts with the general contractors by cost-plus-fee
with guaranteed maximum cost. Appendix 1 shows a contract draft
between OHB and NIC, a general contractor. This form is based on
the AIA form. In the contract, Schedule A means the contractor's
overhead and profit; Schedule B means personnel cost; Schedule C
means site office expenses.
OHB uses a procedure manual in contracts with general
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contractors. The procedure manual, "Toyota Automotive
Manufacturing Facility Project Procedure Manual," includes the
following items:
1) Scope and Procedures -- Project Purchasing.
2) Provided Project Services.
3) Cost Code Requirements.
4) Planning and Scheduling.
5) Document Control.
6) General Contractor Invoice and Application for- Payment.
7) Accounting Report (Forms and Instructions for Submission of
Monthly Progress Report).
8) Cash Forecasting.
9) Quality Control Procedure.
10) Contractor/Subcontractor New-Hire Safety Orientation.
11) Site Security Scope and Responsibilities.
Advantages for OHB to select the six general contractors a
as follows:
1) it can reduce the risks of losing control over a general
contractor that might act freely, in case of the single general
contractor.
2) in the case of a strike or a slow down by the union, OHB can
limit the damage and cope with it relatively easily because the
unit of area is smaller.
3) OHB can reduce the risk of collusion among general
contractors. The possibility of collusion will increase if the
number of general contractors is two or three.
4) Dividing the project into six areas, OHB could choose GCs fr
re
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13 selected general contractors. Because most contractors that
could contract the whole project are closed shop contractors,
merit shop contractors capable of contracting the whole project
are very limited.
The disadvantages for OHB to select six general contractors
are as follows:
1) OHB's coordination work between the general contractors is
necessary. For instance, joints between areas, especially of
building service equipment, need OHB's coordination.
2) Redundancy of common information for all areas appears. OHB
has to explain or provide the same information to six
contractors.
3) Increased difficulties in getting a consensus regarding labor
relations became apparent at the project agreement with the AFL-
CIO during construction.
OHB defined itself as a design-manager because it tried to
avoid an unnecessary political attack from the American
construction industry by cutting off the operational or
executional part of construction to American contractors, and
probably because OHB does not have enough Japanese managers,
engineers, or own forces for the self performance. OHB's project
organization is explained in section 3-3, Project Organization.
Bidding Out:
OHB set the procurement policy of the general contractors as
all subcontracting rather than general contractors' self perform.
Therefore most subcontracts are fixed price contracts such as
lump sum and unit price. Usual bidding process of the project is
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as follows:
1) A general contractor selects several qualified bidders.
2) The general contractor evaluates the bids.
3) OHB checks the evaluation and makes the report of the bid for
TMC. All reports to TMC should be written in Japanese and most
of them should have data or value engineering reports.
4) TMC approves the bidder.
Report making work of 3) above, account for a substantial
amount of OHB's work. As TMC's tradition in Japan, it uses price
competition of suppliers and contracts in every case, but
sometimes price competition principles do not work in a fast-
track program because general contractors cannot get more than or
equal to two bidders in some cases, because of the strong
linkages of several jobs. Then, some future work that is part
of some sequential work may automatically be done by the
contractor of the up front works. This kind of situation is new
and surprising for TMC, so the phenomenon may well cause TMC's
possible frustration.
The basic principle to decide the bidder is, of course, the
lowest price. But OHB's hiring plan was affected by the AFL-CIO,
even before the project agreement (PA) in Nov. 1986 that changes
the project from a merit shop to an almost union shop. The
original hiring plan before the PA actually favors union
participation by guaranteeing that at least 50 percent of bidders
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should be union contractors.
Labor Relations:
A strong construction union is a special feature of the
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American construction industry. A labor-management battle is an
important aspect of the Toyota KY Project. Though the analysis
of the labor relations of the project is out of the scope of the
thesis, this covers from the beginning of the negotiation between
OHB and the AFL-CIO to the project agreement (PA) that changed
the project from a "merit shop" to a closed shop in Nov. 1986.
TMC, OHB, KY., and the AFL-CIO have different objectives which
make the labor relations of the project complicated.
The "merit shop" reflects a market where union and non-union
contractors work side be side. Figure 3-2-3-1 shows the
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schematic structure of a merit shop.
As a background of the labor relations of the project, the
Nissan Smyrna Project, Tennessee, was built with a merit shop,
but the GM Saturn Project signed a project agreement with the
AFL-CIO that made the project practically a closed shop. The
Saturn project pact is "all execution contractors of whatever
tier shall sign, accept and be bound by the terms of this project
agreement." This includes agreeing "to recognize the union(s) as
the sole and exclusive bargaining representative for all craft
employees on the project" and using their hiring halls.
Figure 3-2-3-2 shows the difference between a merit shop and
81
the Saturn project pact. Because non-union workers can register
for the project in a union hiring hall, they have a chance to
work for an open shop contractor in the project, but the open
shop contractor has to use both union and non-union workers.
Though union workers have a chance to work in the project, they
will be assigned to the jobs after all union workers are assigned
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because union workers share the top portion of the waiting list
in a hiring hall. For open shop contractors, they lose a chance
to hire their affiliate workers, but on the contrary, they have
to use many union workers who have no previous experience or
loyalty to the companies. Open shop contractors also dislike
their long term affiliate workers being unionized. A higher wage
rate for their affiliate workers than the usual open shop rate is
another cause for the open shop contractors to hesitate to
participate in the project.
The nature of a project agreement between OHB and the AFL-
CIO is very similar to that of the Saturn pact. From the
beginning of the negotiation about the Toyota project pact, the
union's policy was to use the contents of the Saturn pact for the
Toyota pact. Finally, the AFL-CIO got it.
As the Saturn project pact does not match the labor
situation in middle Tennessee where about 95% of construction is
55
performed by open shop contractors, the Toyota pact does not
match the labor situation of the Lexington, Kentucky, area where
75% of the construction work force is non-union now, up from
42
about 30% a decade ago. Some estimates indicate that open shop
construction accounted for 60% of the national total in 1980,
12
compared with only 30% as recently as 1973; the national trend of
labor relations in construction is similar to that in KY.
Though many meetings have been held between OHB and the AFL-
CIO, and between other related parties, some important events or
national publications regarding labor relations of the project
from the beginning of the construction to the project agreement
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are as follows:
Dec. 1985; OHB decided the hiring plan of the project as a merit
shop. OHB made the decision after a careful survey of the
qualified labor in KY and also after several talks with KY and
TMC. Building trades did not oppose the merit shop so much at
this stage.
May, 1986; Local union were going to sign OHB's proposed project
agreement that included non-strike, non-lockout, free hiring of
labor, no contesting employers' enforcement, permission for TMC
or suppliers' installment of production equipments, and non-
objection against prefabricated construction methods. On the
other hand, the AFL--CIO sued the Budget Director of KY about the
legality of the state incentives for TMC on May 7.
June, 1986; The Building and Construction Trades Department
(BCTD) of the AFL-CIO rejected OHB's project agreement. Then, it
decided a project boycott on June 19. Georgine, the president of
BCTD, sent appealing letters to the president and senators. In
KY, two building tradesmen petitioned the court to allow them to
intervene in the court about the union's suit against KY. On the
other hand, local unions proceeded to sign a revised local
agreement that included most of OHB's proposals.
July, 1986; BTCD's objections against the local unions' movement
towards the agreement with OHB became active. OHB held meetings
with Georgine from July 2 to July 9, however, they failed to
reach agreement. After the meeting with BCTD, OHB decided to
continue the project with the merit shop based on the agreement
with TMC, KY, and six area general contractors. OHB issued a
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letter of intent of caisson and foundation works on July 15. On
ENR, July 17, Krizan reported "Building trades target Toyota."
He explained the negative reactions of local unions against
Georgine. He cited a union contractor executive's comment that
"local trades are agreeable to building it merit shop."
According to the article, BCT's policy was that it would not give
Toyota anything better than Saturn. In the Saturn pact, the
union had the right to refer workers to jobs only through union
halls.
Sep. 1986; Noble reported the project as "Town's Industrial
Rebirth Mired in Labor Dispute," in The New York Times, on Sept.
42
8. He explained the basic differences of the objectives between
OHB and BCTD, though both parties express that their objectives
are for Kentucky workers. According to his article, several
members of the Labor and Industry Committees of the Kentucky
House and Senate complained that the union effort could mar
Kentuck:'s effort to improve its business image. Around this
time, urged by Georgine, the sheet metal workers announced a
national campaign against buying Toyota products.
Oct. 1986; The construction progressed smoothly despite the
continued pressure by the AFL-CIO.
Nov. 1986; The union drew 500 for a rally to protest OHB and
TMC's labor policies in front of the Japanese embassy in
Washington on Nov. 17. The union also drew 1,500 to demonstrate
against TMC in New York on Nov. 21. The union continues legal
challenges to the plant's waste water discharge permit by KY, and
KY's incentives for TMC. Kraker reported the project progress as
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"Tovyota plant plows ahead wit.h no sign of union pact, " in ENR,
31
Nov.27. The project had progressed at a high pace regardless of
the union's pressure on this state. He states "Kentucky plant
has more than 1 10) workers on site, some union despite boycott,"
as a comment with a picture of assembled steel structure frames.
Suddenly, OHB and the AFL-CIO reached an agreement calling
for the hiring of union workers for the project (except contracts
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already held), on Nov. 25. On The New York Times, Nov. 26, Noble
reported the agreement as "Toyota Agrees on Union Workers To
Construct a Plant in Kentucky." He cited a comment of Bennet,
executive vice president of the Associated Building and
Contractors (ABC), reporting that the agreement would create "a
great deal of discrimination." Three provisions of the agreement
are as follows:
1) It "makes a strong commitment to the preference to employment
of Kentucky residents."
2) It "confirms that there will be no discrimination on any basis
with regard to applicants to employment."
3) It "contains a unique three-member employment review board,
one each from management and labor, with an impartial chairman,
to assure that any questions regarding employment referral will
be resolved expeditiously and fairly."
Dec. 1.986; The project agreement was to take effect Dec.1.
Recio. Usui, and Krizan wrote the agreement as "Toyota flip--
-49
flops, signs union pact at KY plant," in ENR, Dec.4. They
reported Georgine's and OHB's comments
, 
ABC's comments, and
sources' comments in Japan. Krizan and Schwartz reported the
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i mpact of the PA as "Toyota pact breaks new ground, " and also
stated "Kentucky project may be thei largest ever to have a
project agreement implemented mid stream." The article reported
former Secretary of Labor John T. Dunl1op would chair the
employment review board.
TMC's comment on the accord is as follows: "We are very
happy that an understanding has been reached between our Kentucky
Project Manager, the Ohbayashi Corporation, and representative of
the Building and Construction Trades Department. We look forward
to continuing our Kentucky project in a spirit of cooperation and
51
harmony."
OHB's explanation of the reason for the agreement with the
union is as follows: Though the merit shop had gotten strong
support by the local construction industry and workers, OHB was
afraid of an escalation of the union's attack against TMC or
possibly other Japanese corporations in the U.S. OHB would have
continued the merit shop if the union attacks against TMC/OHB had
not expanded beyond -the border of KY. Additionally, OHB does not
want the labor disputes developing into a political problem, such
as trade friction in the construction industry between Japan and
the U.S. Finally, OHB tried to avoid KY's continuing to be the
50
place of labor disputes.
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3-2-4 Canstruction Stage
The application of TMC's TOC program to the fast-track
program is probably the most interesting topic at the
construction stage of the project. Though this project is
relatively simple in terms of physical aspect in construction
engineering, the construction management is complicated because
of the fast-track and many contractors. The project is easy to
construct because buildings are accessible from many directions
and the structure is a one story structural steel frame, but
management of change orders, cost control, and quality control
are complicated. The construction has progressed smoothly in
comparison with the Nissan Smyrna Project, as of Jan. 1987. But
there is some friction between the TOC program, the fast-track
program, and the American construction system.
TMC tries to use value engineering (VE) in every change
order to get the maximum cost efficiency, though in many cases it
is practically unable to apply VE. If the cost of loss time or
waiting time due to the delay of the decision on a VE case
exceeds the cost down by the VE, TMC will suffer from not only
the cost but also the bad effects caused by de-motivation of the
construction workers, the subcontractors, and the general
contractors. This mechanism is clearly different in automotive
manufacturing than in construction. Because automotive
manufacturing is a very repetitive production cycle, even if the
cost of loss time exceeds the cost down by VE in one or several
cycles, the total cost savings by VE in most case will exceed the
one time loss by VE. This multiplier effect of VE is very rare
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in c(nstructi on and varies tremendouslV with the subjects of the
VE.
In a fast-track program, importance of instant decisions is
emphasized to eliminate delay of construction and de-motivation
of workers waiting for decisions. The priority of decision
making on the production process between automotive manufacturing
and construction may well be different. During the construction
execution stage, especially after the completion of work
drawings, the priority of supervisor's decision making may well
be as follows:
1) promptness of the decision; quick and sufficient (not
necessary to be the best).
2) avoiding rework; preventing from overdoing.
3) safety, cost effective, high quality, etc.
On the other hand, priority of the auto-manufacturing
supervisor's decision making may well be as follows:
1) the maximum cost efficiency; the lowest cost/quality, or the
highest quality/cost.
2) quality.
3) safety, etc.
In any case, automotive manufactures never give priority to
promptness of decisions. In construction sites, most promptness
of decisions guarantees cost savings and good quality of
buildings because it promotes productivity and motivation of
construction workers. All managers and engineers in construction
sites both in the U.S. and Japan will certainly agree on the
importance of quick decisions in construction. Samelson and
155
Borcherding's study about "Motivating Foremen on Large
53
Construction Projects" supports this idea. They summarizes after
imany interviews with foremen that the most important problems for
foremen are waiting for decisions and rework.
TMC's tradition of pursuing maximum cost efficiency prefers
bidding for any purchase, so general contractors bid out most
jobs, and make lump sum or unit price contracts with
subcontractors. But general contractors have to negotiate the
cost of change orders with subcontractors rather than bidding
out. Sometimes the costs of change orders counts for 50 '4 of the
original contract in the project. Though the principle of VE
and TQC is recently widely accepted by Japanese construction
companies including OHB, it is not popular for American general
contractors. Their unfamiliarity with VE and TMC's slow
decision on VE cases may well cause a negative response against
VE by American contractors and sometimes even by OHB.
The differences of the Japanese quality control system from
the American system cause some friction between TMC, OHB, and the
general contractors. OHB does not try to use its QC program in
the U.S. because OHB knows the differences between the American
QC system and the difficulties in applying the Japanese system
for American subcontractors or general contractors. If the
quality of the final products in the U.S. were apparently
inferior to that in Japan, OHB would use its QC program actively.
One of the special features of Japanese-style QC is process
control methods that require many checks during the production
process rather than inspecting the final products only. American
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general contractors do not accept Cor understand the concept of
process control. American general contractors try to avoid
unnecessrary responsibilities for the subcontractors' jobs by
general contractors' inspections on subcontractors jobs during
the tasks. If a general contractor approves some defective jobs
of a subcontractor through the inspections, the general
contractor will be responsible for the jobs that the subsequent
subcontractor will definitely claim. In most work, a subsequent
subcontractor's inspection of the previous subcontractor's works
at the beginning of the former's job functions as a quality
control system in American construction. For example, accuracy
of the setting of anchor bolts for structural steel columns will
be checked by erectors before their work, if the bolt setting is
done by another subcontractor. In Japan, general contractors are
expected to check the setting of anchor bolts before and after
the concrete works. General contractors should keep the record
of inspection quantitatively in many cases. Moreover, many big
general contractors do statistical analysis of the data to
evaluate subcontractors and to improve construction process using
the Japanese QC program.
In the Toyota KY Project, OHB uses inspection firms or test
labs for structural steel. geotechnical, and concrete. These
services are quite usual because these works are not checked by
other subcontractors in the construction process, and they are a
part of the legal requirement. OHB also provides basic survey
79
control. General contractors are responsible for other quality
control work and OHB witnesses their works. This system is quite
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usu:Al for gceneral contractors and a construction manager in the
U.S. construction. But TMC tries to use its OC program in the
construction process.
For the client satisfaction, OHB tries to use TMC's QC
program as much as possible (maybe responding to 30"4 of TMC's
requests). As expected, the general contractors reactions are
very negative. This causes TMC's frustration. Then, TMC asks
OHB to inspect several works directly as OHB does in Japan,
however, OHB does not do so by itself because it has to avoid
unnecessary responsibility by approving subcontractors jobs, and
avoid disorder at the site.
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3-3 Project Drganization
This section explains the project organization including
contract types. Three organizational charts of the project are
used to explain the organizational structure. Especially OHB's
project organization is explained in detailed organization charts
showing the roles of each member. Appendix 2 shows the operation
charts at every project development stage. These charts
summarize the interaction between TMC, OHB, GIF, GCs, Subs, KY,
and the AFL-CIO. Because the history of organizational formation
including contract types is explained in 3-2-1, Planning /Pre-
design stage, and 3 -2-3, Procurement stage, this section mainly
describes the structure of the project organization and roles of
the members in OHB.
Figure 3-3-1 shows the outline of organizational structure
and contract types of the project. Though detailed explanation
of the definition of the project organizational systems is done
in section 4-1. this structure is a design-build and design-
manage type. General contractors also have some functions of
construction management because they basically do not use their
own forces, either. A contract between TMC and OHB is a cost-
plus-fee contract because of the fast-track program. OHB
contracts GIF by a percentage fee contract with a fee-adjustment
clause for the project cost changes by change orders. Contracts
between OHB and general contractors are a cost-plus-fee with
guaranteed maximum general contractors' cost. All subcontracts
by the general contractors are a lump sum or unit price
contracts.
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FIGURE 3-3-1
OUTLINE OF PROJECT ORGANIZATION AND CONTRACT TYPE
OF TOYOTA KY PROJECT
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Though OHB is responsible for the project completion to TMC,
OHB takd:es no risks of uncertainties of the project cost, that is,
OHB never loses money on the project. Important factors of OHB's
motivation are to keep or obtain its good reputation in the U.S.
and in Japan's construction industry. OHB contracts with general
contractors by a cost-plus-fee contract, too. Because OHB and
general contractors contracted just after the schematic design
phase (without construction documents), a cost-plus-fee contract
was the most reasonable contract. By the contracts with general
contractors, OHB has passed out some portion of construction
management tasks to them.
Contracts between OHB and GIF, and between general
contractors and subcontractors, are the usual types in a fast-
track program in the U.S. For example of a fee adjustment
method, calculation of a total price after change orders in a
unit price contract is as follows:
1) in the case of cost increase change orders, the new total
price is the base price plus additional quantity times 20 percent
above the unit price.
2) in the case of cost decrease change orders, the new total
price is the base price minus the decreased quantity times 20
percent less of the unit price.
Because TMC has used a lump sum contract with its general
contractors, TMC's experience of checking the project cost during
construction must be limited practically to the check of progress
payments of the lump sum contract for general contractors. TMC
has a very detailed cost checking system for its construction,
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however, it may not be able to apply cost checking to a cost-
plus-fee contract during construction. The number of items to be
checked in a cost-plus-fee contract is much more than that of
progress payments. Moreover, large number of change orders
probably are a new experience for TMC. In Japanese construction,
OHB sometimes accepts TMC's change orders without extra charge.
But in this project, OHB charges all costs and cost changes of
change orders to TMC. It may be upset because of OHB's very
different operations in the U.S. from that in Japan, though TMC
conceptually understands this mechanism.
Figure 3-3-2 shows the organization structure of OHB for the
project. All important decision making functions of OHB
regarding the project are in KY, but OHB's project organization
has some staff in the Tokyo office because TMC's important
decision making functions are in Toyota City. OHB is the general
manager of all TMC's projects by OHB in Japan because of the
large amount of TMC's orders and because of the importance of TMC
as a client for OHB in the long-term relationship. Because GIF's
main office is located in Detroit, OHB has the design team in
Detroit, to coordinate TMC and GIF. OHB also has the project
design staff for the project in a design department in the Tokyo
head office.
Figure 3-3-3 shows the organizational structure of OHB's
site office. There were 21 Japanese and 36 American staff
working in the Georgetown site and Lexington offices in Jan.
1987. According to the organizational structure chart, the
Japanese and American staff seems to be well integrated. The
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organization basically works well as a construction manager that
coordinates the client, the A/E, and the general or sub
contractors. Because OHB has to adjust to the large gap between
TMC and American contractors, OHB' s organization has two
substructures; the Japanese staff structure and the American
staff structure. The substructure of the Japanese staff is
mostly dealing with correspondence with TMC. The other American
staff substructure is mostly dealing with the management of
general contractors and suppliers. The Engineering section,
which has two Japanese engineering managers, could be described
as the junction of the two substructures in OHB's organization.
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The Project director, Ohba, seems to have two direct
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subordinates in the site office; Mizoguchi, the Deputy Project
7 3
Manager, and Jordan, the Project Manager. Mizoguchi is at the
top of the Japanese staff substructure and Jordan is the leader
of the American staff. Because of communication difficulties and
the tendency of members' following only a substructure, or simply
because of the matter of their personality, some difficulties of
cooperation between Area Managers and Area Engineers seem to be
the weakest point of the organization. On the other hand, from
the viewpoint of learning experience for the Japanese staff,
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Engineering Managers and Area Engineers are in an excellent
situation because of the necessity of cooperation with American
Managers, and actually in several areas they cooperate well.
Appendix 3 describes the detailed roles of some managers in
OHB's site organization. Except for the Area Engineers in the
organization, the basic structure of OHB's organization in the
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To(:ota KY Project is very similar to that of Daniel 's site
organization in the Nissan Smyrna Project.
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4 Alternative Procurement methods (including classification of
the four automotive plant development projects).
Because of lack of consensus or standards on terminology of
procurement methods, such as construction management, design-
build, and prefabrication systems, it is necessary to define it
to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of each method.
Because of the popularity and explicitness, the author chooses
1
Barrie and Paulson's (B&P) Professional Construction Management
as the text book to define alternative construction management
methodologies. Based on B&P's definition, the author developed a
framework of project organizational systems in a triangular shape
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in Figure 4-1-3. Because Minden's procurement methodology is
used to examine automotive plant construction projects in Chapter
5, his terminology is summarized here in comparison with B&P's
that the author mainly uses to classify the four- projects in this
section. After a brief review of terminology, the Toyota KY,
Nissan Smyrna, Toyota Tahara, Fuji Gunma projects are classified
according to the framework.
The author does not intend to cover the detailed variation
of the project organization but to present simplified contractual
approaches. If we try to define alternate organizational
structures of projects, the description will easily overflow one
chapter. For example, Walker uses 42 alternatives including two
types of clients, three types of design teams, and seven types of
14
contractor's appointment in Project Management in Construction.
B&P uses six main types including a traditional, two types of
turnkey, an Owner-Builder, and two types of construction
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managi.7ement. Mirden uses five major classification, such as
traditional, design-construction-management, contractor-
construc t i on -managemen t, desi gn-bui l d , and systems.
Basic elements to classify project organization or
procurement methods are project participants, relationships
between members, and timing of project members' participation.
Project participants are those such as an owner, a designer, a
general contractor, subcontractors, own forces work, a
construction manager, design-builder, and a systems contractor
(manufacturer). Important relationships between project
participants are contractual rather than normative. Cost-plus
contracts, an important construction contract, are further
4
classified according to J.P.Frein, as follows:
1) Cost plus a percentage fee.
2) Cost plus a fixed fee.
3) Cost plus award fee.
4) Cost plus a fixed fee with guaranteed maximum.
5) Target estimate with incentive fee and penalty.
6) Turnkey proposals (variable conditions).
7) Construction management contracts.
Timing of the project members' participation is another
important element to define procurement methods though B(P do not
explicitly introduce this idea to their definition but rather
treat the timing as a consequence of the procurement methods.
Minden uses this concept indirectly in his definition by
combining organizational structure and its phasing. Especially
Minden's definition of the traditional method is more explicit
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than B&P because he clearl-y states that the key feature of the
traditional method is total separation between the design and
construction phases. If the concept of the timing of the project
members' participation is employed explicitly, the key feature of
the traditional -feature of the traditional method will be
described as follows: the key feature of the traditional method
is the timing of an appointment of a prime contractor after the
completion of construction documents by the A/E. This concept is
very important because the Nissan Smyrna Project organization may
well be classified as a traditional method if the timing of
Daniel's participation is ignored.
1
BI3&P's definition of procurement methods is as follows:
The Traditional Approach: Members of the Associate General
contractors of America (AGC) have generally advocated and
operated under the traditional method. Here the owner employs a
designer (Architects, Architects/Engineers, or Engineers) who
first prepares the plans and specifications, then exercises some
degree of inspection, monitoring, or control during construction.
Construction itself is the responsibility of a single general
contractor under contract to the owner. Much of the work may
actually be performed by individual trade contractors under
subcontract to the general contractor. Although the
subcontractors normally bid upon a portion of the owner's plans
and specifications, their legal contractual relationships are
directly with the general contractor; the latter, in turn, is
responsible to the owner for all the work, including that which
is subcontracted.
Design-Construct or- Design-M4anage (Turnkey): Some authorities
differentiate between "design-construct" and "turnkey." General
usage, however, treats them interchangeably. In this method, all
phases of a project, from concept through design and
construction, are handled by the same organization.
In the case of desion-construct, the constructor acts as a
general. contractor with single-firm control of all
subcontractors. Usually, but not always, there is some form of
negotiated contract between design-constructor and owner. In the
case of design-manage, construction is performed by a number of
independent contractors in a manner similar to the professional
construction management concept. Under either design-construct
or design-manage, construction can readily be performed under a
phased construction program to minimize project duration. this
form of completing project has been used for the majority of
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process--ori ented heavy industrial projects constructed in the
United States in the last few decades. Reference to E-nqineerin~q
News--Record's annual list of the 500 1argest designers shows that
the design--contructors are heavily represented in the top 20.
Professional Construction Management: Professional construction
management unites a three party team consisting of owner,
designer, and construction manager in a non-adversary
relationship, and it provides the owner with an opportunity to
participate fully in the construction process. It is competitive
in overall design-construct time with a negotiated contract under
the traditional method and with the turnkey (design-
construct/design-build) approach. It usually features a number
of separate lump-sum or unit-price construction contracts which,
under certain circumstances, may prove more competitive than
either the general contract or the cost-plus-a--fee approach. If
phased construction is used, it, like phased construction under
other methods, involves the owner in some degree of risk in
overrunning budgets.
(The author omits B4P's definition of "The Owner-Builder" because
of little application in automotive plant construction.)
3e
A summary of Minden's definition of procurement methods is
as follows:
Traditional Method; Typically this is the "default" method
selected in the absence of unusual project requirements or market
constraints by owners without significant management capability,
particularly if they are risk adverse and/or required to
competitively bid work.
Construction Management (CM); At the very minimum, some degree of
cost estimating and contractibility feed back construction
management services are useful on almost any project where cost
and time are significant constraint, even if a conventional
schedule and single responsibility contract is used. However, if
fast-track scheduling, multiple work packages or systems are
used, some form of CM, either in-house or by an outside CM is
generally called for.
However to use CM in this way, the owner either has to be
prepared to accept most risk associated with multiple contracts
directly, as with in-house or design-CM, or he must be able to
effectively negotiate with the CM to avoid an inflated risk
premium as in contractor-CM with a guaranteed price. In either
case the owner should have sufficient management capability in-
house to "manage the managers." If these conditions cannot be
met, the owner is limited to design-CM with a single
responsibility general contractor, (which is essentially the
traditional method with enhanced value engineering), or, in some
cases, he may use design-build.
Design-Build; The main contingency factor governing the decision
to use design-build is the extent to which the project can be
defined in terms of scope and generic standards, as opposed to
prescriptive detail, without compromising quality or other
requirements. Because the designer works directly for/with the
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c:ontractor, not the owner, the owner must have the management
capability and/or the negotiation power to ensure that the
project meets technical requirements at a fair price. If these
conditions are met, then design build may offer not only a means
of obtaining an early, competitive, fixed price, single
responsibility contract, but also optimal fast-track scheduling
and value-engineering, owing to the high level of design and
construction integration.
(The author omits Minden's explanation of "Systems Methods"
because of little application in automotive plant construction.)
Though there are several minor differences between Minden
and B&P's definition regarding procurement methods, three basic
categories, traditional, design-build (design-
construct/turnkey), and construction management, are similarly
defined. The concept of the traditional method is common between
them. Because of Minden's orientation to public agencies that
need accountability, especially of spending, his definition of
design-build and contractor mode CM are relatively narrow because
of the emphasis of possible fixed price contracts in these
methods. In this sense, B&P's definition is more flexible and
easier to classifv various procurement methods or project
organizations than Minden's. Therefore, B&P's definition is
employed in this section, and supplementally Minden's definition
is used to explain the relation with B&P's.
In order to classify four automotive plant construction
methods, such as the Toyota KY, Nissan Smyrna, Toyota Tahara, and
Fuji Gunma, Figure 4-1-1, a Flow chart for the Classification of
Procurement methods, is used. The first check is whether the
project uses different A/Es from a single contractor appointed
after the completion of detailed design. If the answer is
positive, the project will be a traditional method that has some
variations, especially in its contract types, between an owner
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DIFFERENT A/E FROM A SINGLE G.C.
APPOINTED AFTER THE COMPLETION OF
DETAILED DESIGN?
SINGLE FIRM RESPONSIBLE FOR
DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION?
YES
YES
YES
CONSTRUCTION
MANAGEMENT
YES
NO
FIGURE 4-1-1
FLOW CHART OF THE CLASSIFICATION OF
PROJECT ORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEMS
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an Ia general contractor. I the proj ect is not tradi tiona, t e
seccond question is whether the pro-ject has a single firm
responsiblf e for desig n and construction. If the answer is
posi t i ve the pr o.j ec t wi 11 be a turn key /desi gn-build that is
f±urther c1assi f ed as desi gn-bui ld or desi gn-manage. If the
proj ect is not turnkey, the project will be classified as a
construction management that has two modes, Design/CM mode and
Contractor mode. Though this chart may give an impression of
definitive classif ication, each project organizational system can
be adjustable to scme extent to have some characteristics of
other systems.
Figure 4-1-2 gives a simplified B<P's project organization
I
chart of each major approach (the author has modified graphical
expression, added comments on the tradi ti onal model, and omitted
the owner--bui 1 der model) . The most confusinq methods are the
traditi onal aid contractor mode CM methods. Though a lump sum
contract between an owner and a general contractor is the most
popular in the traditior-al method and a cost-plus-fee contract is
usual in the contractor mode CM, it is still possible for both
methods to form a similar contract type-. The most distinctive
difference of these two methods is the timing of the appointment
of the general contractor. Early appointment of a general
contractor to enhance design constructi on integration or to
manage a fast-track program is an important aspect of the
constructi on mode CM.
Other confusing contractual approaches may well be design-
build and desi gn-manage in desi gn-buil d/turnkey. If a design-
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* APPOINTED AFTER THE
COMPLETION OF
DETAILED DESIGN.
(THE AUTHOR ADDS)
TRADITIONAL
TURNKEY/DESIGN-BUILD
1) DESIGN-BUILD
2) DESIGN-MANAGE
** THE AUTHOR DEFINES
THE AREA OF
DESIGN-BUILDER.
CONSTRUCTION
MANAGEMENT (CM)
1) DESIGN/CM MODE
(AIA MODE)
2) CONTRACTOR MODE
(AGC MODE)
(POSSIBILITY OF
GMP BY G.Q/CM)
AFTER BARRIE & PAULSON
FIGURE 4-1-2
BARRIE & PAULSON'S OUTLINE OF ALTERNATE CONTRACTUAL APPROACH
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OWNER
_TI x
AEd CM/G.C.
bui1der does self perfarmance, that is. if it uses its own
forces' work:, the method will be design build because the design-
builder acts as a constructor in the construction phase. If a
design-builder or the prime contractor of design and construction
does not execute self performance, the firm will be classified as
a design-manager because its major function in the construction
phase is as a manager rather than as a builder. It can be said
that the design-build method corresponds to the contractor mode
CM and that the design--manager does design/CM mode CM.
Figure 4-1-3, a framework of the project organizational
systems, gives the relationships of alternate procurement
methods. To construct the diagram, the author uses loosely the
idea of the Mintzberg's contingency theory of organization. For
the simplification, the contract types and the timing of general
contractor's participation are selected as contingency factors.
The most conventional procurement method is located at the top of
the diagram as a lump sum contract with a general contractor
after competitive bidding. Some variations, such as a
negotiated contract with a general contractor and early decision
on a general contractor will pull the location of a procurement
method downward. Turnkey/design-build and Construction
management are located at the same level because their
advantages, such as design and construction integration, and the
possibility of a fast-track program, are the common features.
The fixed price contract pulls the location of a turnkey or CM
method upward, that is, approaching a traditional method. As
exogenous factors, the necessity of a fast-track program or
175
INFLEXIBLE, ACCOUNTABLE,
LESS CONTROLABLE BY OWNER AFTER THE CONTRACT,
DIFFICULT TO MAKE CHANGE ORDERS
/
/ FIXED PRICE
/ TRADITIONAL
/\
EARLY DECISION OF COST-PLUS
G.C. BY NEGOTIATON
US FIXED FEE
( DESIGN-MANAGE)
BUILD
VARIABLE FEE
N
FAST-TRACK
FIXED PRICE
SINGLE CONTRACTOR
GN MODE \
MULTIPLE SUBs
COST-PLUS
VARIABLE FEE
/
FLEXIBLE, LESS ACCOUNTABLE,
CONTROLABLE BY OWNER,
EASY TO MAKE CHANGE ORDERS
FIGURE 4-1-3
FRAMEWORK OF PROJECT ORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEMS:
RELATIONSHIPS OF PROJECT ORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEMS
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DESIGN/CONSTRUCTION
INTEGRATION
/ DESIGN-
highr desi gn/constr ucti on 1 nt egrati orn requi r es a system in the
Desig n-ui 1 d or Corstructi on Management. Generally, the higher
part of the diagram idicates systems of in-flex, ible C, accountable.
less controllcable by owner after the contract, and difficult to
matke change orders.
inden's definition of design build with fix.ed price and his
contractor mode CM are located in the upper part of the design-
build and construction management areas. Because Minden tries to
build the decision making model of procurement methods presumably
for public institutions, and he may well think that the most
practical :i y applicable alternative methods are design-build and
contractor mode CM with a fixed price contract, his definition of
the two methods mav be excessi vel y strict for gener al purposes.
Figure 4-1-4 illustrates these rel at i ons.
Classi-fication of the Four Autom tive Plant Development Projects:
The p:rocurement methods of the Toyota KY, Nissan Smyrna,
royota Tahara. and Fuji Gunma projec:ts are classified based on
the f ramework presented in the previous part. Figure 4-1-'5 shows
the procurement methods of the four automotive plant construction
pro.j e(ts. Because of the lack of cost-plus-fee contract practice
and no fast-track program, the procurement methods in Japanese
constructi on industry are practically limited to traditional and
desicn-build methods using a lump sum contract. AIctually, there
is no explicit concept of construction management in Japanese
construction practice, though J3apaIese automotive manufacturers
have in--house A/E and perform some functions of construction
management. Therefore, the projects in Japan are located in the
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MINDEN'S
DESIGN-BUILD
- ~
MINDEN'S
CONSTRUCTION-CM
(WITH GMP)
/ TRODITIONAL
DESIGN-BUILD CONSTRUCTION \
MANAGEMENT
(MINDEN'S DESIGN-CM)
MINDEN'S DEFINITION
IN THE FRAMEWORK OF
FIGURE 4-1-4
OF DESIGN-BUILD AND CONSTRUCTION-CM
PROJECT ORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEMS
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/
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I
/
- - - - -
- -.1
7 TRADITIONAL * LUMP SUM CONTRACT AFTER
COMPETITIVE BIDDING
* LUMP SUM CONTRACT (TRADITIONAL)\
BEFORE THE START
OF CONSTRUCTION OYOT
AHAR\
FUJI HEAVY USE OF VE
(IN-HOUSE DESIGN MODE CM)(DESIGN-BUILD) * OWNER'S DIRECT CONTRACT WITH
BLDG. EQUIP. CONTRACTORS, &
PRDC. EQUIP. SUPPLIERS
IDESIGN-BUILDI CONSTRUCTION
,-',> IMANAGEMENT
TOYOTA ISSA
Y SMYRNA
(DESIGN-MANAGE) I (CONTRACTOR MODE CM)
SCOST -PLUS-A- FIXED -FEE * COST -PLUS-A-FIXED-FEE
WITHOUT GMP L - - WITHOUT GMP
FIGURE 4-1-5
PROJECT ORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEMS OF THE FOUR AUTOMOTIVE
PLANT CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS
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tr ad i t i onal or upper part of desi gn--bui l d area.
Despite the differences in the project organizational
structures of the Toyota KY and Nissan Smyrna projects, their
location in Figure 4-1-5 is adjacent. This means that the
characteristics of the two project organizations are similar.
Both projects are located in the lower part and near the border
of design-build and CM in the diagram. Both projects have a
contractor mode construction management function and cost-plus-
fee contracts between the owner and the design-builder or general
contractor. The most influential independent variable
(contingency factor) may well be the requirement of the fast-
track program for both projects.
The Toyota KY Project is classified as design-manage in
Figure 4-1-1, the Flow Chart for the Classification of
Procurement Methods. The contract type between TMC and OHB is a
cost-plus-fee whose fee will be fixed during the construction
phase. As of Jan.1.987, TMC and OHB are under negotiation about a
fixed fee and OHB's cost. Because the construction progressed
about 50"4 in Jan. 1987, TMC had taken most cost variance risks
until this time. On the other hand, OHB had not taken the risks
of cost variance though it had taken business risks as a
contractor and professional.
According to Figure 4-1-1, the Nissan Smyrna Project is
classified as contractor mode CM. The contract type between
Nissan and Daniel is a cost--plus-a-fixed-fee. Though Daniel's
fee for its construction management service is fixed, the total
fee associated with Daniel's own forces work varies because this
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fee is reqarded as a part of the con'struction cost. Through this
mechanism, Daniel has the possibility to raise additional profit
without big risks. Regarding the use of its own forces' work,
Daniel takes a very strong stance against a closed shop compared
with OHB in the Toyota KY because Daniel's forces' work is a very
effective arm for Daniel to handle the complexity of the fast-
track program, and it consists of open shop workers.
The Toyota Tahara Project is classified as traditional in
Figure 4-1-1, though TMC has some in-house construction
management function because TMC contracts directly with the
building equipment contractors and the production equipment
suppliers. Additionally, TMC has an in-house A/E that performs
intensive value engineering through the procurement and
construction phase. Therefore, the project organization of the
Toyota Tahara Project has some features of design mode CM even
though the general mode of the project is traditional.
The Fuji Gunma Project is a design-build. Fuii contracts
with OHB by a lump sum contract after the completion of the
detailed design. Fuji also has an in-house construction
management function because Fuji contracts directly with the
building equipment contractors and the production equipment
suppliers. Therefore, the location of the project in Figure 4-1-
5 is on the upper right in the design-build area with some
over. 1ap with constructi on management.
In short, through the classification of the project types of
the four automotive construction projects, the similarity between
Toyota KY and Nissan Smyrna, and between Toyota Tahara and Fuji
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Gunma become clear in Figure 4-1-5. One of the most significant
factors used to divide two groups is a fast-track program. The
procurement methods of Toyota KY and Nissan Smyrna are very
flexible but less accountable. The Toyota Tahara and Fuji Gunma
projects (one of the most flexible types in Japanese
construction) are less flexible but more accountable than the two
projects in the U.S.
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5. Evaluation of the development process and the organizational
systems of the Toyota KY Project.
In this chapter, the development project process and the
organizational system of the Toyota KY Project are analyzed.
Critical questions are as follows:
1) What are the differences in the development process and
organizational systems for automotive plant construction in Japan
and the U.S.?
2) What kind of project organizational system (including project
members' internal organization) do TMC and OHB build to cope with
uncertainties, such as many change orders caused by a fast-track
program?
3) What kind of conceptual model and design methodology of
project organizational systems should be used or developed for
future projects?
Several alternative strategies employed by TMC and OHB to manage
uncertainties in the new environment are examined to define
possibly optimal procurement methodology for TMC and OHB.
Comparative studies using the Nissan Smyrna Project, Toyota
Tahara Project, and Fuji Gunma Project are used to find these
answers.
Though there are many text books and articles about
construction management or procurement methods, they do not have
a rational general theory of the selection for an optimal
procurement method. Then, for a theoretical framework, Minden's
38
procurement method decision making model is used because its
purpose fits this chapter and probably this is the first attempt
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to build a theory of procurement methodology.
Although the main purpose of this chapter is not to build a
procurement theory, application and another interpretation of
his theory including some recommendation to improve it will be
presented here. As his thesis title, "Design-Build in The Public
sector: A Case Study of The Commonwealth of Massachusetts
Division of Capital Planning and operations (DCPO) Design-Build
Project For Three Correctional Facilities," indicates, his theory
is based on a case study of public project management as well as
logical analysis of procurement methods. Therefore, the nature
of his matrix is relatively normative rather than predictive. To
analyze TMC's strategy for the Toyota KY Project, similarities
and differences between public agencies and TMC will be examined
as well as the comparison between TMC in the KY Project and
Nissan in the Smyrna Project.
For a framework for organizational analysis of TMC and OHB,
9
the concepts built by Henry Mintzberg, Bronfman Professor of
Management Policy at McGill University, is used. This theory
provides a framework for the classification of organizations and
for defining independent variables known as contingency factors,
to change or formulate organization structure. Henry Irwig's
27
summary of Mintzberg's framework is used to show the results of
the analysis on the Irwig's pentagon diagram after Mintzberg.
The first section examines the differences in development
process and organizational system for automotive plant
construction in Japan and the U.S. referring Minden's contingency
factors. The second part analyzes the four automotive plant
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development projects- based on Minden's "Procurement Method Design
Matrix (presented in Appendix 4). " The actual methods are
compared with the theoretically optimal methods by the Design
Matrix. The third section analyzes TMC's strategy -for the
Toyota KY Project. The project organization including contract
types and the TMC's organization for the Toyota KY Project are
studied. Finally, OHB's strategy for the Toyota KY Project is
examined. In the evaluation of TMC and OHB's strategy for the
project, their learning process in the new business environment
and the difficulties of technology transfer in the construction
industry are supplementally examined.
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5-1 Differences in the development process and organizational
systems for automotive plant construction in Japan and the U.S.
The differences in the development process and
organizational systems for automotive plant construction in Japan
and the U.S. are examined in this section. As mentioned in
several parts of the thesis, special constraints of the Japanese
Building Code, inflexible administrative procedure regarding the
Code, and the owners' strong preference for fixed price contracts
requires the sequential construction method. Limitation of
strong independent subcontractors and the relatively unilateral
relationships between clients and contractors (caused mainly by
the historical relationships of stronger clients in the Japanese
construction practice) are other constraints. Consequently, the
concept of construction management service is not well developed
in the Japanese construction industry though currently the
concept of value engineering is widely accepted in Japan.
The construction environment in the U.S. is more flexible
and allows more alternative procurement methods than in Japan.
To extract the differences of project organizational systems
between Japan and the U.S., Minden's framework of procurement
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methods formation is used here. He summarizes the procurement
method decision model variables in Figure 5-1-1, which is well
organized and covers most factors though they should include
variables regarding labor relations, an important factor in U.S.
construction.
Because detailed analysis of Minden's decision model is out
of the scope of the thesis, only a brief explanation about
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Procurement Method Decision Model Variables
(CONTIGENCY FACTORS) (PROCUREMENT METHOD VARIABLES)
INDEPENDENT INTERMEDIATE DEPENDENT
VARIABLES VARIABLES VARIABLES
PROJECT
REQUIREMENTS
*delivery time
*size/ complexity/
environmental risk
*cost
OWNER ATTRIBUTES
*management
capability
*bid/ negotiating
constraints
MARKET CONSTRAINTS
*bidding climate
*risk aversion
*benefits of project
disaggregation
* available systems
*aggregation potential
SCHEDULING
*sequential
|*fast-track i
*pre-engineering
WORK PACKAGING
*single
responsibility
*early work pkgs
w/ transfer
*multiple work
packages
SYSTEMS
APPLICATION
*develop new system
*apply existing
system
MANAGEMENT
METHOD
*traditional
A*CM
-design mode
-contractor mode
*design/build
*systems
CONTRACTOR
SELECTION
*bid
*negotiate
PRICING
*fixed
A *shared savings/
incentive
*cost plus
I I-
A RATIONAL THEORY EXIST IN JAPAN I
SOURCE: MINDEN'S THESIS AT MIT, 1986
FIGURE 5-1-1: MINDEN'S PROCUREMENT METHOD DESIGN MODEL VARIABLES AND
UNFAMILIAR VARIABLES FOR JAPANESE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
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several terms, rather than full expl anati on, is presented here.
He uses three factors, project requirements, owner attributes,
and market constraints, as contingency factors. These factors
are further divided into ten items. All independent variables
are applicable for Japanese construction. In project
requirements, environmental risk includes factors such as unknown
site, weather, logistic, and the economic and political
conditions affecting a project. In market constraints, risk
aversion means the contractors' ability to bear different types
of risk, notably cost risks. This is reflected in the patterns
of contractors' risk premiums in case of fixed price contracts.
Benefits of project disaggregation, and aggregation potential are
applied for very large projects or small projects respectively.
Available systems are related to prefabricated building systems.
The author advocates adding local labor relations as a variable
of market constraints and also adding types of shop (open shop,
merit shop, and closed shop) to dependent variables.
Supplementally., explanation of some confusing terms in the
procurement method variables in Figure 4-2-1 are as follows:
1) Shared savings/incentives; this is one of cost-plus-fee
contracts where the contractor receives reimbursement for actual
costs plus compensation based on a special formula for sharing in
actual costs over or under target costs. A sample formula is as
4
follows:
Fee = x (2'P-C) where: P - target price
C - actual cost
x - base percentage
Using this formula, a contractor can get a higher fee in case of
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a lower cost, and a lower fee in case of a higher cost based on
the target price.
2) Pre-engineering; this concept is associated with some kind of
systems application. If "off-the-shelf" systems are available,
the effects of pre--engineering, such as reduction of design and
construction time, are usable.
3) Work packaging; this refers primarily to construction work.
Variations are single responsibility, early work packages with
transfer, and multiple work packages.
4) Single responsibility; this means a contract between an owner
and a single contractor responsible for the construction usually
associated with a fixed or guaranteed price for an entire
proiect. For example, a traditional general contractor, design
build, and contractor CM with CM holding specialty contractors
are main actors.
5) Early work packages with transfer to single responsibility;
this is a compromise that can sometimes satisfy the requirements
using a fast--track approach while minimizing the owner's risk and
the management requirement.
6) Multiple work packages; this refers to the owner's direct hold
of multiple separate package contracts throughout the project.
The decision to use these packages may be dictated by the use of
fast-track and/or an attempt to enhance competition and manage
risk by desegreqating the project.
Among procurement variables, fast-track. construction
management, shared savings/incentives, and cost-plus are not
applicable for the Japanese development project. These variables
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are exactly the di-fferences in procurement methods, broadly the
development process and organizational systems, between Japan and
the U. C. I'onstruction management is not well developed in Japan,
though some owners, such as TMC and Fuji, and A/E have the
capability to provide some part of design mode CM services such
as value engineering, contracting, cost control, and quality
control.
Figure 5-i-2 gives the graphical image of the Japanese
construction procurement methods in the project organizational
systems framework. Because the area of Japanese construction
procurement methods is the combination of Minden's design-build
and the traditional method, his matrix is supposed to be
applicable for Japanese construction with some restrictions, such
as no fast-track and no cost-plus.
190
JAPANESE PROJECT
ORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEMS
D&B CM
FIGURE 5-1-2
JAPANESE PROJECT ORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEMS
IN THE PROJECT ORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEM FRAMEWORK
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5-2 Evaluation of the Four Automotive Plant construction
Procurement Methods.
The project organization of the four automotive plant
development projects, the Toyota KY, Nissan Smyrna, Toyota
Tahara, and Fuji Gunma, are analyzed here based on Minden's
theoretically optimal methods. The applicability of Minden's
38
"Procurement Method Design Matrix" for automotive plant projects
is also examined. Because Minden's design matrix is developed
based on the close examination of design-build projects by DCPO
of Massachusetts and the theoretical reasoning, the nature of his
matrix is relatively normative rather than predictive. After the
application of the matrix for the projects, the validity of the
matrix is supported by the well matched results with the actual
methods employed in the successful projects. Consequently, the
well matched results between the optimal method and the actual
method in the Toyota KY Project suggest that only fine tuning
rather than a surgical operation of the project organizational
system is necessary to improve it in the project.
First, Minden's procurement method design matrix is applied
to the four projects. Then, a comparison between the optimal
methods and actual methods is done, while applicability of the
design matrix is examined. Minden's whole "Procurement Method
Design Matrix" is presented in Appendix 4.
Figures 5-2-i includes contingency factors of the four
automotive plant projects. Figures 5-2-2-a contains the results
of the application for the Toyota KY Project. Figure 5-2-2-b,
-c, and 5-2-2-d, contain the results of the application for the
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I
I
Nissan Smyrna, 'Toyota Tahara, and Fuji Gunma projects
respectively. The section of the project procurement method
shown in the figure is especially important to evaluate project
systems. As explained in the previous section, Minden's
definition of Construction-CM and Design-Build is quite strict
for general purposes, so the optimal results represented by the
model may be strictly evaluated against these two methods.
Actually, the optimal results seem to be different somewhat from
the actual methods in the Toyota KY and Nissan Smyrna cases, but,
in the framework of Figure 5-2-3, the discrepancy of the optimal
or sub-optimal methods from the actual methods is found to be
very small. Minden's decision matrix seems to be favorable for
Design-CM probably because Minden uses Design-CM as a default-
option for alternative methods.
The Toyota KY Project is a Design-Build project using a
cost-plus contract without guaranteed maximum price, and the
project is classified as design-manage by B&P's definition.
Minden's design-build does not contain the concept of design-
manage that will be classified as design-CM according to his
definition. Therefore, it can be said that the optimal
recommendation matches the actual method in the Toyota KY
Project. Additionally, design-build and construction-CM are
possible options or sub-optimal of the matrix.
Contrary to the Toyota KY Project, the actual procurement
methods of the Nissan Smyrna Project seem to match perfectly with
the optimal methods of the matrix, but the project is not exactly
Minden's construction-CM (with GMP) because Daniel, the
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constructor-CM, did not set a GMF'. Therefore, the actual methods
of the Nissan Smyrna Project should be classified as a design-CM,
which is second best in the matrix, accorcding to his definition.
In the contingency factors, tkhe difference between the
Toyota KY Project and Nissan Smvrna Project is only the
bidding/negotiating constraints in the owner constraints. Though
TMC's classification as the Type 1 Owner is quite certain,
Nissan's one as the Type 2 Owner is not so certain considering
the strong negotiating position of Daniel with NMMC. If Nissan
is classified as the Type 1 Owner, the optimal project system of
the Nissan Smyrna Project will be the design mode CM because the
contingency factors of Nissan Smyrna and Toyota KY become exactly
the same by this change. In this case, the actual method of
Nissan Smyrna matches the optimal method by the matrix.
Considering that Minden's theoretically optimal methods
cover the four successful automotive plant development projects
very well, small differences between the actual and the
theoretically optimal methods in Nissan Smyrna projects may
suggest the possibility of the improvement of the project's
organizational, system or of the misjudgment on the contingency
factors, rather than the possibility of the improvement of his
model.
As predicted in the previous section using Figure 5-1-2,
actually, in the cases of Toyota Tahara and Fuji Gunma, the
optimal methods by the matrix and the actual methods coincide
perfec-tly. This may well support the validity of his algorithm
and suggest applicability for other public projects in the U.S.
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5-3 Analysis of TMC's strategy for the Toyota KY Project.
TMC's strategy for the Toyota KY Project, which contains the
project organizational system and the TMC's organization for the
project, is studied. First, a brief overview of the TMC's
strategy for the development project is presented. Then, the
project organization of the Toyota KY Project, especially its
cost control mechanism is studied, comparing it with the Nissan
Smyrna Project. Next, TMC's organization for the KY Project is
analyzed. For a framework of organizational analysis for TMC,
9 27
Mintzberg's theory, summarized by Irwig, in his pentagon diagram
is employed. Finally, alternative methods or possible
improvements for TMC for a risky/large/complex project are
studied. Critical questions in this section are as follows:
1) How does TMC cope with uncertainties in the new environment?
2) What are the alternatives or possible improvements for TMC for
a risky project like the Toyota KY Project?
TMC's strategy for- the Toycyta KY Project:
Though there are no clear statements by TMC about its
strategy for the Toyota KY Project, it must have set up a new
strategy rather than using a standard manual for the project
because it is large, complex ,and risky. The strategy seems to
be classified into three steps: general strategy for the
management of the new subsidiary, the strategy for the site
selection, and the strategy for the design and construction of
the project. TMC' s general strateav may well be typical of
,Japanese corporations having overseas subsidiaries that rely on
Japanese management to run the subsidiaries. Though it is not
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clear about the degree of the new subsidiary's autonomy for its
operations, TMC retains most control until the construction
phase.
In order to choose the plant site, TMC formed a site
investigation team, though the team did not continue to the
design and construction phase. Through the intensive negotiation
with KY in a competitive environment of several states, TMC
succeeded in getting $125 million in incentives from KY.
For the plant construction, two of the most important TMC
objectives are to make a Toyota style plant in KY and to make it
in the shortest duration. Additional requirements are reasonable
cost and higher involvement of TMC in construction management
(especially technically) using TMC's methods as much as possible.
Because of the large scale, complexity, and uncertainties of
the construction environment in KY, TMC must have decided to use
OHB as a buffer against the risks. TMC tries to be involved in
the design and construction through OHB, so TMC contracted
design-build with OHB by negotiation. By contracting design-
build with OHB, TMC can avoid any possible contractual troubles
with American A/Es or contractors. Through the negotiation with
OHB, TMC contracts with OHB by a cost-plus contract because of
the necessity of a fast-track program to achieve the shortest
project duration. Consequently, TMC assumes the financial risks
of the project (this enables to TMC to control the project) and
to be involved heavily in the project because of the necessity of
many change orders, a special feature of a fast-track.
Presumably, TMC's intention in its involvement in the project is
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ma in1y for quali t/ control but not cost control during
construction, because TMC traditionally prefers competitive
bidding and a l ump sum contr act.
Because probably TMC did not expect the complexity and
necessity of large amount of change orders caused by the fast-
track program, TMC did not adjust its organization for the
intensive cost control in the KY Project. This causes a
potential problem of delay of the project because of the mismatch
of TMC's traditional cost control system with the fast-track
program in the KY Project.
The Cost Control Mechanism in The Project O1rganization of the
Toyota KY Project.
As analyzed in chapter 4 especially shown in Figure 4-1-5,
the project organizational type of the Toyota KY and Nissan
Smyrna are very similar and classified as one of the most
flexible types, but some potential friction between TMC and OHB,
which did not exist between NMMC and Daniel, seems to exist
especially in the cost control. Both projects generally have
progressed smoothly and successfully in the similar contractual
type between owners and contractors but in the different
mechanism of the cost control.
Figure 5-3-1 illustrates the mechanism of the cost control
system in the Toyota KY and Nissan Smyrna projects. Regarding
subcontracting, both projects use basically fixed price
contracts, so the owners do not assume cost variance risks or
need to control costs after the subcontracts if the owners make
no change orders. Different cost control mechanisms between the
203
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two projects appear in the case of change orders. In the Toyota
.Y Project, TMC does not delegate any authority of change orders
to OHB and TMC controls the subsidiary directly. Therefore, many
change orders go to TMC's head office in Japan. As is the nature
of a fast-track program, TMC is required to make quick decisions
on change orders, but it seems to be difficult because TMC is
Just using the traditional cost control system for the project.
In the actual project, OHB acts as a safety valve to facilitate
the flow of works by deciding emergency work without getting the
TMC's approval before the start of the works, though this
function is informal. Certainly, TMC may feel uncomfortable to
approve OHB's individual decision making after the start of this
work. Despite the very cooperative contract type between TMC and
OHB, TMC has had to keep excessive distance from OHB perhaps
because of the traditional unilateral relationships between them
in Japan.
In the Nissan Smyrna Project, Daniel is in a much more
flexible position than OHB in the KY Project because of NMMC's
formal delegation of decision making and permission of Daniel's
use of its own forces. The project management team, NMMC, Kahn,
and Daniel, seems to cooperate well. One of the disadvantages
for NMMC is less accountability of the cost effectiveness of the
work done by Daniel's own forces. From Nissan's viewpoint,
though, its learning opportunities are limited only through the
C-30 task force about the development process. It has succeeded
in utilizing the American development system fully.
Compared with TMC and Nissan in each project, TMC has more
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opportuni ties for its Japanese managers to learn Ameri can
construction or general business through the project than has
Ni ssan.
Though TMC's higher involvement in the project has certain
advantages, OHB's informal function as a safety valve regarding
decision on urgent change orders suggests the possibility of some
improvements of the project organization. Regarding the
possibility of the setting of GMP by OHB or Daniel, it can be
said that Daniel is in a position to offer less risk premium to
the owner than OHB because Daniel's formal latitude and less
risks associated with the owner's cooperation with the project.
Coincidentally, this analysis corresponds to the theoretically
optimal method by the Decision Matrix that recommends
construction-CM with GMP for the Nissan Smyrna Project.
TMC's organization for the Toyota KY Project.
Though TMC's total organizational analysis is not the
subject of the thesis, Mintzberg's theory summarized by Irwig in
his pentagon diagram, is employed for the analysis of TMC's
organization regarding the Toyota KY Project.
Because of the strictly functional configuration of TMC's
departments, a high demand for accountability of cost
effectiveness, and highly standardized manual for operations in
11
most areas by the TOC program, TMC has many common
characteristics with the public institute. Despite its large
size and old age, TMC's organization for the KY project is
classified as a fairly pure type of machine bureaucracy in
Mintzberg's framework. For reference, Nissan's organization
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regardi ng the Smyrna Project is cl assi f ied as a di vi si onal. i zed
form because of NMMC's total autonomy.
9
Figure 5-3-2 gives Mintzberg's framework for organizational
28
analysis, as summarized by Irwig. Special features of
Mintzberg's five pure types of organization are as follows:
1) The Simple Structure; this has centralized authority that
executes direct supervision. Typical operations are relatively
undifferentiated. For example, the small owner-managed company
is this type.
2) The Professional Bureaucracy; this has considerable delegation
of authority to professionals. Less direct supervision is a
character of this type. For instance, a university is this type.
3) The Machine Bureaucracy; this has departments that are
strictly separated by their functions. This relies heavily on
standardized procedures for the coordination and control of
activities. For example, a mass--production firm is this type.
4) The Divisionalized Form; this has some segments which are
strongly related to market and relatively independent of each
other and of the headquarters. For instance, Sloan's General
Motors is this type.
5) The Adhocracy; this has matrix lines which -typically include
project groups. Coordination within these groups is relatively
informal. For example, a large construction company using a
field based project manager system is this type.
Because in addition to less delegation to the subsidiary in
KY, TMC does not have an inter-departmental consistent project
team, TMC's organization for the project is removed from the two
207
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more desirable organizational types, divisionalized form and
adhocracy, for a big and risky development project that requires
dvnamic, flexible, and prompt actions.
Figure 5-3-3 illustrates TMC and Nissan's organization for
their projects in the U.S. in Mintzberg's framework. The dot
arrow under TMC gives the recommended movement of TMC's
organizational type for risky projects.
Alterative Methods or Possible Improvements for- TMC to a Risky
Project.
Given that TMC 's strategy for the project is unchanged,
there will be several alternatives, though the actual method
generally works well. As studied in section 5-2, Design-CM,
whose nature is almost the same as the actual Design-Manage, is a
feasible alterative. Other variations are to set the Guaranteed
Maximum Price (GMP), the Construction-CM, using shared savings
contract, and early work packages with transfer to single
responsibility. If TMC maintains the current project
organization, possible adjustments are to add more flexibility to
TMC's organization for the project by delegating considerable
authority to the subsidiary or structuring the inter-departmental
project team. Another adjustment is to utilize OHB more actively
by delegating some authority about change orders.
Because the actual design-build, OHB is classified as
design-mange, the additional merits of TMC's using design-CM in
the actual method is questionable. Because Japanese companies
who can provide construction management services in the U.S. are
extremely limited, though there are many American CMs, as long as
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TMC ex-pects commurni cation in the Japanese 1language with CM, this
alterative will have practically no benefit for the actual
method. If TMC accepts English communication with the CM, TMC
can select the design-CM from several American CMs. The
experience of the development project with the American CM may
provide good learning opportunities about American style of
construction management although it may well be inconvenient and
risky for the first project.
Other alternatives regarding procurement methods are mostly
related to the setting of the GMP. Because of the many
uncertainties associated with it, such as fast-track, big
project, unfamiliar place, labor relations, and TMC's reactions
with the design-builder, it is very hard for TMC to get the GMP
from OHB without big risk premiums. Even if TMC had gotten the
GMP from OHB, various scope changes and the change of labor
relations during construction would have made it invalid.
Nevertheless, setting the GMP will be attractive for TMC because
the action changes the organizational system to be similar to the
TMC's familiar traditional one. In the conceptual framework of
the project organizational systems in Figure 4-1-3, the setting
of the GMP pulls the organizational system toward the traditional
system.
One of the most practical ways for TMC to get the GMP from
OHB or the design-builder is to apply the methods used by public
aqencies for design-build where making an excellent request for
proposals (RFP) is the key point. The RFP must be performance
specifications and generic standards rather than prescriptive
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specifications to get opti mal quality and delivery time without
any control by the owner after a lump sum contract with the
design builder that should be set before the construction. To
get the shortest project duration, some public institutions made
a lump SLIm contract with a design builder even at the design
development stage. This means, after the contract, the owner's
monitoring work becomes minimum but at the same time, the owner
loses the chance to be involved in the design and construction.
Because even The Commonwealth of Massachusetts Division of
Capital Planning and Operations (DCPO), which used the fixed
price design-build (minimum requirements for the owner's
involvement in the project after the contract), formed a "special
unit" (inter-departmental project team)for the design-build
project to implement the entire process, the formulation of a
project team for the entire development process will certainly
improve TMC's organization for large and risky projects. In
9
Mintzberg's framework, the formulation of a project team pulls
TMC's organization toward adhocracy that has flexibility for
complex and risky projects. Another possible improvement for
TMC's organization for the project is the delegation to the TMM,
U.S.A., because this adjustment promotes prompt decision and
facilitates the project based decision making. In Mintzberg's
orqanizational framework, this delegation pulls TMC's
organization toward the divisionalized form that is usually
ef fective for overseas operati ons.
In short, possible alternatives for TMC to the Toyota KY
Project are the use of the design-CM, design-build with the GMP,
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the formati on of an i nter-departmental proj ect team i n TMC, and
the delegation of aLthority to the subsidiary.
213
5-4 Analysis of (JHB's strategy fOr the Toyota KY Project.
OHB's strategy for the Toyota KY Project is studied.
Because the alternative methods of the project organization are
examined in the previous section 5-3, this section includes a
summary of OHB's strategy, OHB s organization for the project,
and alterative methods for OHB to avoid a risky project.
Critical questions in this section are as follows:
1) How does OHB cope with uncertainties in the new environment?
2) What are the alternatives or possible improvements for OHB for
a risky project like the Toyota KY Project?
ThrouIgh the evaluation of OHB's strategy, its learning process in
the new environment and the difficulties of technology transfer
in the construction industry are supplementally examined.
OH's strategy far- the Toyota KY Project:
After OHB got a design-build contract from TMC, OHB defined
itself as a design-manager in the project following the general
strategy of using construction management or joint venture with
local contractors actively to ease friction with the local
construction industry in the U.S. As is inherent with a
contractor, its strategy for a project is greatly influenced by
the client's requirements. The Toyota KY Project is not an
exception but OHB had more latitude to select project
organizational systems than usEual because TMC was more flexible
in the neqotiation about the contract with OHB than usual.
Before OHB defined itself as a design-manager, OHB had
choices of operation style, such as structuring a joint venture
and using Citadel, OHB's subsidiary in the U.S. The joint
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venture plan was not favorable because this style did not make a
good impression on TMC and there was some possibility that OHB
mi ght have had difficulties to control joint venture partners.
Moreover, OHB's using Citadel was a much more favorable and
practical method than the joint venture. If OHB had gotten the
project from an American automotive manufacture, OHB would have
used Citadel to manage the project. But the high requirements of
TMC's involvement in the design and construction and the Japanese
language requirement determined OHB's direct participation in the
project rather than using Citadel. In addition to this reason,
OHB also expected that it would be able to hire an excellent
American project manager who could manage the project because of
the big size of the project and OHB' s information network through
Citadel.
OHB succeeded in hiring Jordan and gave him the widest
possible latitude in structuring OHB's site organization and to
manage the project. This strategy is similar to Nissan's with
Runyon. Based on Jordan's rich experience in American
construction, including fast-track programs and construction
management, OHB negotiated with TMC and made a cost-plus-fee
contract using AGC's design-build form.
Though analysis of labor relations is out of focus of the
thesis, it is very important arid has a big influence on this kind
of project. Based on the local labor relations and discussion
with TMC and K 4Y, OHB decided to build a merit shop for the
proj ect. Consequently, the possible general contractors (not
subcontractors) are limited to merit shop contractors and open
215
shop contractors. Because many large general contractors who can
contract this kind of big project are union shop contractors, the
decision of the merit shop limits the availability of capable
general contractors significantly.
OHB decided to divide the project to six areas to reduce the
risk of possible labor problems with unions and to increase
market opportunities of capable general contractors. The
disaggregation of the project also increased the accountability
of the selection of general contractors for TMC.
CMB's organization for- the Toyota KY Project:
Though OHB's total organizational analysis is out of the
9 27
scope of the thesis, Mintzberg's theory summarized by Irwig in
his pentagon diagram, is used here as was the TMC's
organizational analysis.
Because of the almost total field autonomy for the KY
Project, OHB's organization regarding this project is classified
as a divisionalized form like Nissan's regarding NMMC. In terms
of overseas operations, OHB's organization is a fairly pure
divisionalized form because of less interaction with its main
engineering or administrative departments, though OHB's
operations in Japan are done through relatively adhocratic
organization because of its matrix lines using the field based
project manager system. Figure 5-4--1 gives OHB's organization
for the Toyota KY Project and for its operations in Japan in the
framework of Irwig's pentagon, after Mintzberg.
Because of the large size of the project and the relatively
low technical requirements, OHB's field autonomy for -the project
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will certainly be optimal to promote quick and project based
decision maki ng. But in case of technically-complex projects or
prefabricated system buildings, OHB's divisionalized form for
overseas operations may well be inefficient to utilize the full
potential of OHB.
As described in section 3-3, Project Organization of the
Toyota KY Project, there are two subsystems in OHB's e
organization. Thorough Jordan's leadership, OHB's American
staff is controlling general contractors and suppliers, and by
Ohba and Mizoguchi's leadership, OHB's Japanese staff is
corresponding with TMC. These two subsystems are integrated in
the organization especially at the engineering section.
This functional division of American and Japanese staff
works well and provides an excellent environment especially for
Japanese engineers and managers to learn extensively about the
American construction business.
Alternate methods or possible improvements -for OCB to a risky
project:
Many of TMC's alternatives, explained in section 5-3,
overlap with those of OHB because OHB's roles in the Toyota KY
Project are similar to TMC. In this respect, OHB should have
informed TMC more closely of the complexity of a fast-track
program and the owner's responsibi 1 i ties and roles in OHB's
design-manage mode project organization. Especially the strong
suggestion of TMC's inter-departmental project team assuming wide
latitude in the U.S. might well have been beneficial for TMC and
OHB. As analyzed in section 5-3, OHB acts as a safety valve
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informally regarding the decision process of change orders for
the sake o-f smooth project progress. This function is very
i mportant and should have been authorized at the beginning of the
project, that is, OHB should have gotten some authority to decide
change orders without TMC's permission. This delegation will
definitely improve the relationship between TMC and OHB in the
project formally, to facilitate the fast-track program, and to
activate OHB's construction management functions, such as value
engineering and quality control.
The disaggregation of the project to six contractors might
not be the optimal strategy for OHB. As a result of the project
agreement with the AFL-CIO during construction, OHB had to
coordinate six general contractors regarding the change from the
merit shop to the union shop. Actually the strategic decision
between disaggregation of the project and the single package
contract depends on the trade off between market opportunities
for general contractors and OHB's additional coordination of the
general contractors.
Though analysis of labor relations of the project is oLit of
focus of the thesis, the selection of a merit shop was a really
important decision at the procurement stage. The selection of
the union shop at the beginning of the project is the alternative
for OHB. Assessment of benefit and cost of the alternative
decision is complicated, but at least, OHB" selection of the
union shop at the early stage of the project could have avoided
the labor disputes with the AFL-CIO. The impacts of the project
agreement on the contracts are very big. The agreement made most
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of the fixed price contract between GHB and the general
contractors invalid, and a change in the original conditions of
the contracts.
Setting the GMP (not guaranteed maximum cost) may well be
unrealistic in the project because of so many uncertainties
including labor relations, but it is still a considerable
alternative. OHB may well be able to have the general contractors
offer the GMP the during the construction stage. Then, OHB will
be able to propose the GMP for TMC. If TMC does not make big
scope changes, this offer will make sense for the project
participants. In this case, OHB can get the widest latitude on
the project management after the setting of the GMP.
Finally, the technical investigation of American
construction by OHB's special team is an option that OHB could
take. Though OHB creates a good environment for the managers to
learn American construction management, OHB does not utilize the
good opportunity to learn the engineering aspect of American
construction. Though the direct transfer of the Japanese quality
control program to American construction is impossible because of
the differences of business conventions, there is some
possibility for Japanese contractors to apply the QC program by
some adjustments, and to learn some engineering details from the
American construction industry to improve the program. OHB's
structuring of a special unit, including staff From its technical
research institute and engineering department for the project,
apart from the actual site organization, may well have been a
good idea. Probably, too much of a divisionalized form of OHB's
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organi Zation for overseas operations hinders this kind of
attempt. There+ore, some shift of the organization form of the
overseas operati on-s toward adhocracy by the overseas divi sion' s
collaborating with other departments, such as the technical
research institute and the engineering department, may ameliorate
OHB's overseas oper at i ons.
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6. Conclusions and Further Resear-ch.
Through the case study of the Toyota KY Project and the
other three comparable projects, Nissan Smyrna, Toyota Tahara,
and Fuji Gunma, the differences of the development process and
project organizational systems between Japan and the U.S., it is
found that the American development environment is more dynamic
than the Japanese environment. Japanese project organizational
systerms can be recognized as a part of the American systems. A
fast-track program, a dynamic phased construction process, exists
in American construction but not in Japan primarily because the
Japanese Building Code strictly requires the traditional
sequential development process. A fast-track program requires
high-level coordination of design and construction that cannot be
managed by the traditional organizational system.
Some alternative project organizational systems, such as
design-- r-manage and construction management that has a design-mode
and a construction-mode, exist in the U.S. but not in Japan.
Design-build with a lump sum contract exists in Japan and this
project organizational system is the most flexible and best
system for short duration projects in Japan. Another important
advantage of the design-build is the higher integration of design
and construction. Because design-manage is a hybrid of design-
build and construction management, it can be said that Japanese
project organizational systems are the residual of the all
American systems minus all construction management type methods.
All conStruction management types usually employ cost--pl.us-fee
contracts that also do not exist practically in Japanese building
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construct i on.
Consi dering one of the most important advantages of
construction management is the use of a fast-track program
associated with early delivery of a facility, influences of the
lift off of the strict requirements of the sequential development
process in Japan on the elaboration of formal construction
management may be beneficial for the Japanese c:onstruction
industry. Though limitation of strong independent
sLAbcontractors and special relationships between owners and
contractors are a potential reason for the immaturity of the
construction management, deregulation of the construction process
may well promote the development of management skills of Japanese
contractors and contribute to the effective use of limited
resources by allowing the owners' choosing possibly financially
optimal project development methods.
A framework of the project organizational systems is
developed to define the project organizational systems clearly
and to facilitate the design of appropriate systems for various
projects. Using the framework of the project organizational
systems presented in Figure 4--I-3, the project organization types
of the Toyota KY and Nissan Smyrna are found to be very similar
because they are very flex ,ible (controllable by owners) but less
accountable systems despite the different configuration of their
project organizations. In the framework, Toyota Tahara is
classified as traditional, with some owner's in-house
construction management functions, and the Fuji Gunma is
classified as a design-build with a lump-sum, also with some
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owiner' s i n-house construct i on managqement fuIcti ons.
In order to figure out the theoretical ly optimal project
organizational systems or procurement methods, Minden''s
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"Procurement Method Design Matrix" is applied for the four
automotive plant construction projects. Well matched results of
the theoretically optimal procurement methods with the actual
methods employed in the four successful projects support the
validity of his design matrix, at least for automotive plant
projects. Because his matrix is presumably made for public
projects originally, his definition of design-build and
construction-CM seems to be excessively strict for general
purposes, however, if some adjustment of the definition for
project organizational systems is made, the design matrix will be
useful for many types of projects.
Despite TMC's tendency (or presumably its policy) to use
its traditional methods for its construction in Japan in the KY
Project, the project organization is unusual for TMC. This
implies that OHB's suggestion was implemented regarding the
project organizational systems to achieve possibly the shortest
project duration. Though the project organizational system will
definitely be one of the optimal methods analyzed in Minden's
design matrix, many factors of the development process and
organization seem to be undesirable for TMC because instant
decision making and many change orders during construction
required by the fast-track program contradict TMC's traditional
construction management methods. Further, the cost-plus-fee
contract does not guarantee the final project cost for TMC, and
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many change orders increase the uncertainties of the final cost.
The project organizational systems in the KY Project is good
for the fast-track program because it is flex.ible for TMC to make
many change orders (though TMC assumes cost variance risks for
its sake), but OHB's informal function as a safety valve for
decision making on some urgent change orders implies the
necessity of some adjustments between TMC and OHB. Because of
the cost-plus contract and many change orders, TMC's headquarters
in Japan seems to hold excessive authority regarding cost
control. Because of TMC's machine bureaucratic organization (in
Mintzberg's framework) for the project, less delegation to the
subsidiary in KY regarding the development, and less delegation
to OHB about change orders, TMC's decision making process on
change orders may not work smoothly. To activate OHB's
construction management function more, TMC's delegation to OHB
regarding decision making on change orders to some extent will
certainly work as motor oil in this cost control mechanism. In
addition, formation of an inter-departmental project team for the
project may well be a good prescription to give some flexibility
to TMC's organization to cope with uncertainties associated with
this kind of big, comple., and risky project.
Setting the GMP by OHB, which changes the type of the actual
oroanizational system greatly to a more inflexible type, is
probably not the optimal procurement method for the Toyota KY
Project and is not practical in this risky project environment,
but TMC may well prefer it because it is accountable. One of the
most practical ways for TMC to get a reasonable GMP from OHB is
225
to appl y the methods used by public: agenci es for desi gn-bui Id.
If TMC makes an excellent requirement for proposals (RFP) that
should be performance specifications and generic standards rather
than prescriptive specifications, TMC will be able to get optimal
quality and delivery time without the owner's control after a
lump sum contract.
In reality, even if TMC had gotten the GMP from OHB, it
would have become invalid because of the project agreement with
the AFL-CIO during construction that changed the original
conditions. Actually, the labor relations are big uncertainties
in the Toyota KY Project.
From the viewpoint of the learning experience for TMC and
OHB about the American construction business, the project
organization provides an excellent environment for them because
of the higher involvement (associated with higher risk taking) in
the design and construction. Though they may well encounter many
surprising things, these experiences are vital for their next
steps. Especially, OHB's site organization is good for Japanese
manaqers to learn American construction business because of the
rich interactions between American managers and Japanese
managers.
The autonomy of OHB's site organization seems to work well,
probably because of the big size of the project and the
relatively low engineering requirements. The functional division
of American and Japanese staff into two subsystems works well for
American managers to manage the general contractors and suppliers
and for the Japanese managers to correspond with TMC.
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Al thoug~h 01-B manages the proj ect well and ac:t i vel y learns
the American construction business, it seems to be relatively
indifferent to engineering. The Toyota KY Project provides good
opportunities to study engineering as well as American
management. Despite OHB having enough staff to study aspects,
such as construction methods, quality, productivity, and quality
control system, OHB has not formulated this kind of study team.
Though the Toyota KY Project may not be appropriate to study the
engineering phase because of its quite simple structure, OHB
seems to have lost a good opportunity. Probably, its too
9
divisionalized form (in Mintzberg's organizational framework) for
overseas operations prevents OHB from structuring a study team
consisting of staff in non-overseas departments. Therefore, some
shift of OHB's organizational systems from divisionalized form
toward adhocracy by collaboration between the overseas division
and other departments would be beneficial for OHB. Hopefully,
this kind of adjustment would improve OHB's organization for
overseas operations and will contribute to the promotion of
technology transfer between Japan and the U.S.
Further- Research:
This thesis studies a very limited aspect of a real
development projects. Even in one project, for example, in the
Toyota KY Project, there are several interesting topics
remaining, such as, relations, engineering, site selection, and
the social and economic impact of the project on the region.
Theoretical development of methodology to define optimal project
organizational systems or development process in various
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conditions, though this thesis does evaluate Minden's theory as a
firm step toward the general theory.
Extensive studies are necessary both for understanding the
differences and similarities between the U.S. and Japan, and for
developing a general theory for project organizational systems.
Comparative case studies between the U.S. and Japan of several
kinds of projects, such as public projects, the third sector
(public private partnership) projects, urban renewal projects,
housing, shopping center developments, and usual office building
developments should be carried out.
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Boyd Paulson predicted in 1979, after his research on
Japanese transportation construction, that "the distant clouds of
concern may gather into a storm of protectionist to (Japanese
contractors") participation in the U.S. market;" the "distant
clouds" are approaching. A two-way flow of information and
commerce between the U.S. and Japan is really necessary for the
benefits of consumers and the construction industry in both
countries because of the presumable existence of comparative
advantage.
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Detroit, MI: January 1987. Interview.
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Appendix 1
OliBAYASHI COIPORATION
AGREEMENT BETWEEN CONTRACTOR AND CONSTRUCTION MANAGER
FOR CONSTRUCTION
Contract No. 200
Contract Date June 26, 1986
PROJECT:
LOCATION:
CONSTRUCTION
MANAGER:
Toyota Automotive Manufacturing Facility
Scott County, Kentucky
Ohbayashi Corporation, a foreign corpo-
ration of Osaka, Japan - authorized to
transact business in the Commonwealth of
Kentucky with offices at Suite 200, 880
Corporate Drive, Lexington, Kentucky
40503-2749
For the Contract Price herein stated, CONTRACTOR agrees to
perform and complete the work in accordance with Drawings and
Specifications prepared or which shall be prepared by
ARCHITECT/ENGINEER: Giffels Associates, Inc.
Architects and Engineers
25200 Telegraph Road
Southfield, MI 48037
Ernest R. McCamman, PE
Arthur 0. Moran, Jr., AIA
or such other or additional Architect/Engineer(s) as the CON-
STRUCTION MANAGER may select.
WORK TO BE
COMMENCED:
WORK TO BE
COMPLETED:
THE CONTRACT
PRICE:
July 1, 1986
August 30, 1987
See Article (3) three.
THIS AGREEMENT made the day of _ , by and
between National Industrial Constructors, a
corporation, having its principal offices at 1130 South 22nd
Street (P.O. Box 101), Birmingham, Alabama 35201, hereinafter
called the "CONTRACTOR", and the aforesaid Ohbayashi Corporation,
hereinafter called the "CONSTRUCTION MANAGER."
WITNESSETH, that the CONTRACTOR and the CONSTRUCTION MANAGER, for
the consideration hereinafter named, agree as follows:
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ARTICLE 1 - SCOPE OF TIHE WORK
The CONTRACTOR shall furnish or cause others approved by the
CONSTRUCTION MANAGER to furnish all of the materials arid perform
or cause others approved by the CONSTRUCTION MANAGER to perform
all of the work shown on Drawings prepared by the Archi-
tect/Engineer or hereafter prepared by the Architect/Engineer and
furnished to the CONTRACTOR by the CONSTRUCTION MANAGER with
respect to the paint building (hereinafter "the Work") at the
Project. The Work shall be completed in accordance with the
directions of the CONSTRUCTION MANAGER with such changes, modi-
fications, additions and corrections as the CONSTRUCTION MANAGER
may hereafter impose; provided, however, the CONSTRUCTION MANAGER
presently anticipates the Work will generally be as follows:
Paint Building (the "Work")
Approximately
606,000 Sq. Ft. floor area
Tons structural steel
Cu. Yds. concrete
The Paint Ship is founded on both solid rock and
engineered soil-rock fill. Dependent upon subsurface
conditions, building foundations will be spread
footings and/or drilled caissons. The slab on grade is
anticipated to be an eight (8) inch thick unreinforced
slab with surface hardening. The building structure is
a typical structural steel column, beam and truss con-
struction. The roof system is a ply built-up roofing
installed on insulation and metal deck. Sidewalls will
be architectural profile insulated sandwich panels and
masonry.
The facility environment will be controlled by roof
mounted air handlers which will be gas fired for
heating and contain cooling coils for circulating
chilled water for cooling. The air handlers and roof
mounted substations will be enclosed within a continu-
ous roof monitor, the areas between these units will be
utilized to allow for infiltration of natural light.
The primary side of the roof mounted substations will
be cable fed, the secondary distribution will be by
means of both buss duct and cable. Internal to the
building will be fire walls as well as a mezzanine
structure for support of future process air supply
house(s). Lighting will be high pressure sodium vapor
fixtures.
Included within the Paint facility area will be a major
process pit/equipment foundation x x depths
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varyinj from and several smaller
process related pits.
The following process and utility headers will be
installed in the building: high pressure air, pres-
surized industrial waste, natural gas, potable water,
deionized water, chilled water, steam, storm sewer and
sanitary sewer.
There will be several toilet facilities located within
the area and other related employee facilities.
The Paint Shop bay spacing is
The facility will be fully sprinkled at a rate of
GPM/Sq. Ft. The paint storage and mix area will have
either CO or Halon space flooding in addition to being
sprinkled.
ARTICLE 2 - TIME OF COMPLETION:
The Work to be performed under this Agreement shall be commenced
July 1, 1986, and shall be completed on or before August 30,
1987, and during the period of construction the CONTRACTOR agrees
to complete portions of the Work as follows:
Portion of the Work: Completion Dates:
Start Foundations 7/01/86
Start Equipment Pits & Foundations 7/01/86
Start Steel Erection 9/01/86
Start Roof Closure 11/01/86
Mechanical & Electrical Installation 12/01/86
Building Closure Completed 1/01/87
Paint Shop Ready for Selected Process 4/1/87
Installation
Equipment Trial Runs 11/01/87
ARTICLE 3 - THE CONTRACT PRICE:
The Contract Price shall be the sum of the following:
(a) A lump sum fee of to cover the CONTRACTOR'S over-
head and profit, which amount shall be (i) increased by
of the amount by which the costs included in the Contract
Price pursuant to subparagraph (d) of this Article 3 exceeds
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or (ii) reduced by of the amount by which
the costs included in the Contract Price pursuant to sub-
paragraph (d) of this Article 3 are less than
(b) Reimbursement for the CONTRACTOR'S "actual costs", as
hereinafter defined, of such management and supervisory
personnel in the employ of the CONTRACTOR as may be neces-
sary to supervise the CONTRACTOR'S contractors and subcon-
tractors if and only if such personnel have been approved in
writing by the CONSTRUCTION MANAGER, which approval by the
CONSTRUCTION MANAGER shall riot be unreasonably withheld as
long as the total of such "actual costs" pursuant to this
subparagraph (b) does not exceed
(c) Reimbursement of such general overhead items as detined in
Schedule C to the bid submitted by the CONTRACTOR as the
CONSTRUCTION MANAGER approves in writing, which approval
shall not be unreasonably withheld as long as the total cost
pursuant to this subparagraph (c) does not exceed
(d) The "actual costs", as hereinafter defined, to the CONTRAC-
TOR of completing the Work, with the exception of elements
of "actual costs" included in subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c)
of this Article 3. Such "actual costs" of completing the
Work shall include the "actual costs", as hereinafter
defined, of all labor and materials necessary to complete
the Work other than with respect to labor or materials for
which the CONTRACTOR is to be compensated pursuant to
subparagraph (a), (b) or (c) of this Article 3. Notwith-
standing anything contained in this or any other agreement
to the contrary, (i) such "actual costs" of completing the
Work shall be included in the Contract Price only to the
extent all elements of such "actual costs" of completing the
Work, including, but not limited to, all contracts, subcon-
tracts, and cost of materials and labor, have been approved
in writing by the CONSTRUCTION MANAGER and (ii) no amounts
paid or payable to the CONTRACTOR, officers, directors or
employees of the CONTRACTOR or persons or entities owned or
controlled by or which own or control the CONTRACTOR shall
be included in the Contract Price pursuant to this subpara-
graph (d) except to the extent such payment is specifically
approved in a writing signed by the CONSTRUCTION MANAGER,
which writing also acknowledges such relationship.
The term "actual costs" as used in this Article 3 shall mean the
aggregate amount of all expenditures actually paid with respect
to labor, materials and supplies employed in the completion of
the Work with the CONSTRUCTION MANAGER to receive the benefits of
all discounts, credits, rebates, similar arrangements and other
benefits, except as otherwise limited in this Agreement. The
term "actual costs" shall, however, not include the following:
(i) Compensation of the CONTRACTOR'S execu-
tive or administrative officers.
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(ii) Overhead or general expenses, of any
kind, excupt any such expenses
speci fically mentioned in subparagraphs
(b) and (c) of this Article 3.
(iii) Services and expenses of the CONTRAC-
TOR'S executive, administrative, es-
timating, purchasing, cost, and account-
ing departments.
(iv) Any and all costs of capital employed or
money borrowed.
(v) Any and all costs of taxes, fees or
charges imposed on the CONTRACTOR
relating to receipts, income, either net
or gross, licenses or similar items.
(vi) Any and all costs of insurance acquired
by the CONTRACTOR, except as otherwise
specifically provided in the General
Conditions.
(vii) No expenses or costs shall be included
as "actual costs" to the extent paid
more than once, thus, by way of illus-
tration, if the CONTRACTOR makes a
payment to a Subcontractor,
Sub-subcontractor or supplier for
services or materials and a lien is
subsequently filed by a
Sub-subcontractor for an item included
in such payment, the CONTRACTOR will be
required to pay such Sub-subcontractor
the amount due in order to release the
lien and the expenses of such payment
shall not be included as an item of
"actual costs. "
(viii) Any and all costs and expenses of
attorneys and others in connection with
any claims or litigation, reviewing of
agreements, or similar matters relating
to the Work except as otherwise provided
in this Agreement or in the General
Conditions.
(ix) Any and all liability, cost or expense
the Contractor might incur in connection
with breach of or failure to perform or
claimed breach of or failure to perform
in accordance with this Agreement, the
General Conditions or the Contract
Documents described in the General
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Conditions, whether relat 1 fig to a
warranty, breach of contract or any
other matter.
(x) Any costs and expenses incurred after
the earlier of (A) the termination of
the Agreement pursuant to Article 18 of
the General Conditions, or (B) final
payment as provided in Article 14 of the
General Conditions.
(xi) Any and all matters, costs and expenses
which the General Conditions provide are
to be borne by or at the expense of the
CONTRACTOR, including, but not limited
to those relating to uncovering, replac-
ing and correcting work pursuant to
Article 18 of the General Conditions.
(xii) Except to the extent the CONSTRUCTION
MANAGER has otherwise agreed in writing,
any and all payments, expenses and costs
of or relating to any item, compensation
or other matter in excess of the lowest
amount specified for such item, compen-
sation or other matter in either (A) the
CONTRACTOR'S bid, including Schedules B
and C thereto; (B) written representa-
tions and correspondence between the
CONTRACTOR and CONSTRUCTION MANAGER; or
(C) Exhibits "A" and "B" attached hereto
and incorporated herein.
ARTICLE 4 - PROGRESS PAYMENTS AND FINAL PAYMENT:
The CONSTRUCTION MANAGER shall make payments on account of the
Contract as provided in the General Conditions.
ARTICLE 5 - THE CONTRACT DOCUMENTS:
The Contract Documents consist of this Agreement, the General
Conditions attached hereto as Exhibit "C", reflecting a last
revision date of June 12, 1986, and incorporated herein by refer-
ence, any supplementary or other Conditions added pursuant to the
General Conditions or by agreement of the parties, such written
construction procedures and guidelines as the CONSTRUCTION
MANAGER may hereafter reasonably adopt, the Drawings, the Speci-
fications, and all Addenda issued prior to and all Modifications
issued after execution of this Agreement, and all are as fully a
part of this Agreement as if hereto attached or herein repeated.
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ART ICLE 6 - CONDITIONS FOR UNION CONTRACTORS:
Thu CONTRACTOR represents and warrants it has attached to this
Agreement true and correct copies of any and all written agree-
miients and a detailed summary of any and all non-written agree-
ments or other obligations entered into between the CONTRACTOR
and any union contractor the CONTRACTOR intends to involve in the
Work and all unions which the CONTRACTOR or any such other
contractor recognizes as bargaining agents for its employees on
this project. In the event of a violation of any of the pro-
visions of the attached agreement by a signatory union, the
CONTRACTOR agrees to promptly and aggressively pursue all avail-
able legal remedies against the union. The CONTRACTOR agrees not
to subcontract or allow any Subcontractor or Sub-subcontractor to
subcontract any portion of its work on this project to any other
contractor who recognizes any union as the collective bargaining
agent of its employees on this project who has not, prior to
being assigned such work, entered into collective bargaining
agreements (a) identical to the form of a collective bargaining
agreement attached hereto as Exhibit "D" with all such recognized
unions or (b) otherwise approved in writing by the CONSTRUCTION
MANAGER.
In the event the CONTRACTOR breaches the provisions of this
paragraph, such breach shall be considered a substantial vio-
lation of the provisions of this Agreement and of the Conditions
of the Contract and CONSTRUCTION MANAGER shall have the rights
and remedies provided for in paragraph 19.2.1 of the General
Conditions.
ARTICLE 7 - PERFORMANCE BOND AND LABOR AND MATERIAL PAYMENT BOND:
The CONTRACTOR, upon written request from the CONSTRUCTION
MANAGER, shall furnish and pay for bonds, in favor of the CON-
STRUCTION MANAGER, covering the faithful performance of all or
such part of the Work as may be requested by the CONSTRUCTION
MANAGER and the CONTRACTOR'S and Subcontractors' and
Sub-subcontractors' obligations under this Agreement and the
Contract Documents and all obligations arising thereunder or
otherwise relating thereto, for such amount as the CONSTRUCTION
MANAGER in good faith estimates it will cost the CONSTRUCTION
MANAGER to complete and pay for the portion of the Work with
respect to which such bond or bonds are to be provided, and with
such sureties as may be agreeable to the CONSTRUCTION MANAGER.
The CONTRACTOR shall, upon request from the CONSTRUCTION MANAGER,
promptly submit satisfactory evidence to the CONSTRUCTION MANAGER
that such bonds have been issued. Subject to the limitations
contained in Article 3 of this Agreement, the reasonable actual
cost of such bonds required by the CONSTRUCTION MANAGER shall be
included as part of the Contract Price.
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ARITICiL 8 - MIISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
(a) In the event of any conflict between the provisions of this
Agreement and the provisions of any other Contract
Document(s), the terms and provisions of this Agreement
shall control and be fully applicable.
(b) Except to the extent inconsistent with this Agreement, the
definitions contained in the General Conditions shall be
applicable in interpreting this Agreement.
(c) This Agreement shall be governed by the law of the Common-
wealth of Kentucky.
(d) The titles and headings contained in this Agreement are for
convenience only and should not be used in construction of
this Agreement.
(e) The CONTRACTOR shall not be entitled to assign, transfer or
convey any of its rights or obligations pursuant to this
Agreement without the prior written consent of the CON-
STRUCTION MANAGER.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this
Agreement this the day and year first above written.
CONTRACTOR:
NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONSTRUCTORS
BY:
ITS:
CONSTRUCTION MANAGER:
OHBAYASHI CORPORATION
BY:
ITS:
000:020
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Appendix 3
Roles of sam manager-s in (1B's site office in the Toyota KY
Project Director (Ojhba):
1) Responsible for all field and design activities.
2) Companies on and off site representative of the project.
3) Organizing Ohbayashi's Toyota KY on and off site office.
Deputy Project Manager- (Mi zoguchi):
1) Responsible for all job site activities.
2) Companies on site representative with owner, labor, vendors,
and public.
3) In the absence of the Project Director, assumes the
responsibilities of the Project Director.
Project Manager (Jordan):
1) Promotes and maintains good relations with the client, A/E,
and local community.
2) Provides the focal point for the coordination of the
construction staff and achieves the required schedule, cost, and
quality.
3) Is an integral part of the development of the overall project
p1an.
4) Integrates the engineering, procurement, administration, and
construction groups to a common goal.
5) Monitors the projects safety, security, and medical aid
programs.
6) Monitors the overall project schedule and budget performance.
7) Promotes labor harmony.
Engineer-ing Manager (Japanese):
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Engineering Manager (Japanese):
1) Is responsible for procirement, aid coordinates information
flo :w with enineering expertise among cliert TIMC), constructi on
manager (OHB) , A/E (GIF and OHFB' deslign team), and area general
contractors.
2) Provides bid package and recommendation (analy inq conterts o
bid pacikaqe, method of bid classifiction, listing of bidders,
bid itself, etc.)
3) Provides for the orderly flow of design documents to support
the construction effort, along with the timely flow of
construction documents to the desion firm for reviews and
approval s.
4) Coordinates the economic utilization of similar materials,
equipment, and conistruction principals with the design effort to
obt ain op ti mum result Ls.
5) Provides foir techr-ical crrespondence with the A/E., vendors.,
r3rofessiolnal societies, etc.
6) Provides., monitors. and recommends changes to the project
master schedule plan.
7) Provides the management level cost, capitalization and budget
reporting.
S) Controls the quality of soil, steel, and concrete quality.
9) Edits construction reports (in Japanese).
Area Manager (American):
1) Manaqes and administers the contract with the Construction
Manger/General Contractor with his assigned area.
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-
_) Ens;uLr cs con tr uci or meet. or ex. ceds t h P o r oject obj cec t i ves
with r egard to cost, qual it y., and schedul e i n accordance with the
Con xst r uct ti on Document s.
3) C'ordinates and cooperates with the other Area Managers and
Area Engi neers to promote and insure the overall Project goals
are met and that good working relationcShips are maintained.
4) Promotes and enforces the Construction Marager's/General
Contractor's safety and security programs by insuring a
mai ntained awareness among construction S.upervision on the
overall project safety and security.
5) Advises and receives advise from Engineering Manager as
regards planning for both the project and his individual area
requ i rements.
6) Monitors and directs General. Cntractor's subcontractors'
planning efforts to achieve proj ect requireffierts.
Area Engineer/Area Contract Coordinator (Japanese):
1) Is resoonsible for engineeringc in his assigned area.
2) Needs direct contact with TMC, A/E, and the Area General
Contractor to deal with the following works.
3) Needs close cooperation with Engineering Manager.
4) Evaluates bids and recommends award contractors.
5) Reviews and negotiates estimates for change orders.
6) Monitors and approves area budoets, and adjustmerts. to these
budgets.
~7) With the General Contractor estabi i shes short rang e schedules
and provides for monitoring and recommeindations for corrective
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act i on,
8) Frovi. des conIStr-Uct i on pl anni ng in his a.si qned area.
9) Monitors the constructi on work for compliance to Project
QuaIity Standards..
1C) Th r ough f 1. i d tcours pr-ov ides f-or eff 3. ci ent uti Ii zati on of
1abor, materials, equi pment., and servi ces.
11) Coordinates ccnstrLc:ti on pr-ocess with the General Contractor
and supplies of production machineries for the setting for them.
12) Provides construction report written in Japanese to TMC.
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APPENDIX 4
MINDEN'S "PROCUREMENT METHOD DESIGN MATRIX" And Its Explanations
Figure A General Procurement Method Decision Algorithm
IDENTIFY
CONTIGENCY FACTORS
CHARACTERIZE AND WEIGH
CONTIGENCY FACTORS
BASED ON UUDGEMENT
OF OWNER
CORRELATE AND
EVALUATE PROCUREMENT
METHOD ATTRIBUTES
WITH CONTIGENCY FACTORS
TENTATIYELY IDENTIFY
PREFERED PROCUREMENT
METHOD ATTRIBUTES
ARE IDENTIFY INCOMPATIBLE
PROCUREMENT ATTRIBUTES AND REPLACE
METHOD ATTRIBUTES NO WITH NEXT PREFERABLE
MUTUALLY ALTERNATE ATTRIBUTE
COMPATIBLE WHICH IS NOT INCOMPATIBLE
YES
DEFINE AND IMPLEMENT
PROCUREMENT METHOD
SOURCE: MINDEN'S THESIS AT MIT, 1986
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Instructions
1 Select contingency factors which apply
to project.
2 Weigh contingency factors in terms
of relative importance,
3 Compare each contingency factor with
procurement method attributes as
indicated on the left matrix.
4 Score each attribute according to
correlation with weighted contingency
factors. Example: Score design-build
given:
0
0
5 Tentatively select attribute in each
category with highest score.
6 Compare attributes on right matrix
for incompatibility, denoted " X"
If incompatibility detected, select
alternate attribute(s) to eliminate
incompatibilities while optimizing
total score of all attributes.
Early Delivery 5 0 5
Complex Project 2 x -2
Tight Budget 3 0 3
Sophisticated,
limited mgmt 2 0 2
Type i Owner 4 o 
Total Score to 12
SOURCE: MINDEN'S THESIS AT MIT, 1986
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Weight Procurement Method Contigence Factors
Early Accelerated Deliver y Required delivery time
Normal Sequencing Adequate, Delivery Time Not Critical
Project Large &/or Complex &/or High Risk &/or Poor Definition
Project Moderate in Size &/or Complexity size/complexity/risk c
Project Simple, Straightforward, Governed by Generic Standards
Based on Scope/Quality/Time, Budget Appears Tight cost
Owner has Sophisticated,Capable & Extensive Management Resources
Owner has Sophisticated but Limited Management Resources anement
Owner lacks Management Resources & Know-how
Type I Owner, Weak Negotiating Position, or Required to Bid bibbing/negotiating
Type 1I Owner, Strong Negotiating Position, No Bidding Restraints constraints
Requires Fixed Price Before Commiting to Bid
risk aversion
Able to Bear Most Cost Risk
Weak Competition, Limited Qualified Contractors
Good Competition, Bidding Viable
bidding climate
Qualified Contractors Unable -to Offer Fixed Price w/o High Premium contractor risk
Qualified Contractors Can Offer Fixed Price v/o Excessive Premium aversion
Competition May Be Improved or Risk Managed by Disaggregating Project advantages of
No Significant Benefit by Disaggregating Project disaggregation
Building Systems Meeting Project Requirements Available
Building Systems Not Available but Potential Market
Aggregations Mayq Justify
building systems
availability or
market potential
27
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SOURCE: MINDEN'S THESIS AT MIT, 1986
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Procurement Method Attributes I
Normal Sejuential Design/ Bid/ Build Schedule
Accelerated Design &/or Construction
Fast-Track
Pre-Engineering
Single Responsibility Contract
Early Work Packages w/ Transfer
Multiple Work Packages
Use Existing System
Develop New Building System
Use Open Systems or Conventional Technology
Traditional Method
Design-CM
Construction-CM (CM w/GMP)
Design-Build
Systems
Bid Competitively*
Negotiate*
Fixed or Unit Price*
Shared Savings*
Cost Plus*
* Fsw o v// pr"i. rz' namseri
.sepers~te w-k pataps-
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